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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on price and insurance coverage trans-
parency in the health care market. In these essays, I empirically examine how
providing patients with information about health care prices and insurance cov-
erage characteristics affects both the utilization and prices of health care and
then, in turn, affects the physician’s decision to disseminate this information.
To this end, I study the consequences of a specific Medicare document that Part
B physicians use to warn patients about expected out-of-pocket costs prior to
receipt of medical care.
In the first chapter, “The Effect of Health Care Price Transparency on Uti-
lization and Prices”, I exploit a March 2008 reform to the Medicare document
that required providers to provide additional charge price information to pa-
tients at the time of service to estimate the effects of price transparency on uti-
lization and prices themselves. I argue that this reform affected certain providers
and not others and use this insight to implement a difference-in-differences em-
pirical strategy with Medicare administrative claims data. I find that, for pre-
ventive gynecological procedures, this type of price information given directly
to patients reduces the number of claims submitted to Medicare for reimburse-
ment and reduces the prices providers charge. These results uncover a potential
downside of increased price information that should be considered along with
the previously established benefit of incentivizing patients to switch to low-cost
providers. Price transparency has the potential to reduce utilization of medi-
cal care, and, depending on the value of the medical care that is reduced, the
welfare consequences are unclear.
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In the second chapter, “Information Disclosure in the Presence of General
Uncertainty: Evidence from Medicare Part B”, I document surprising patterns
of physician use of the Medicare document. The strategies can be explained by
the presence of general uncertainty over the accuracy of the information and
the optimal response of the distributor to the demand consequences of making
an ex-post “mistake”. I show that a substantial number of physicians make
ex-post mistakes when giving this document; they do not give this document
to patients who experience an ex-post non-coverage and vice versa. In March
2008, the informational content of the document was changed in such a way
that shifted the demand consequences of ex-post mistakes differently across
physicians. I show that the response of physician strategies are consistent with
the presence of high costs in discerning which patients will be denied. Using
Medicare claims data from before and after this reform, I find that physicians
restrain their distribution strategies accordingly, but the probability of making
an ex-post mistake remains unchanged. These results imply that the presence
of general uncertainty plays a nontrivial role in explaining physician disclosure
behavior, and that physicians strategically respond to the demand consequences
of revealing price information to patients.
In the third and final chapter, “The Effect of Insurance Coverage Infor-
mation on Utilization of Health Care for New Medicare Enrollees ”, I investi-
gate the association between receipt of salient Medicare coverage information
soon after enrollment on future utilization of medical care. In particular, I use
the Medicare document to examine the effect of being warned within the first
six months of enrollment that Medicare does not cover all procedures on total
charges and procedure counts in the subsequent two years. The results indicate
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that this warning is associated with fewer submitted charges and fewer proce-
dures performed. For immediate policy relevance, the results suggest that early
patient experience with new health care plans can be important in determining
future health care spending. However, I find suggestive evidence that vulner-
able groups, the poor and less-educated, refrain from receiving covered care in
addition to non-covered care after receipt of this information, arguably due to
the high cost of disentangling the two. This indicates that the information can
be effective in reducing spending, but this benefit is mitigated by reductions in
necessary care by disadvantaged populations.
Primary Reader: Jorge Balat
Secondary Readers: Robert A. Moffitt and Richard Spady
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Chapter 1
The Effect of Health Care Price
Transparency on Utilization and
Prices
1.1 Introduction
The study of uncertainty is important for understanding health behavior and
the response of that behavior to many proposed reforms of the health insurance
environment in the United States. Starting with Arrow’s 1963 discussion of
the uncertainties that plague the health care sector, much research has demon-
strated that individuals do not perceive attributes of their care correctly. While
research has traditionally focused on the uncertainties regarding the prevalence
of illness and the efficacy of treatment, focus has shifted toward the financial un-
certainties that surround medical care decision-making and have been thought
to contribute to the high costs of health care.
Price uncertainty in particular is now receiving attention. For example, a
recent white paper from the Brookings Institution (Hall et al., 2016) proposes
methods for “solving surprise medical bills”. Patients typically first learn prices
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when they receive an explanation of benefits from their insurer which can ar-
rive months after a medical visit (Reinhardt, 2006) and after the patient is
already locked into payment. Policymakers, private firms, and insurers have
taken note of this, along with documented price dispersion (Phelps, 2000), and
have identified an opportunity for reducing health care spending by reducing
price uncertainty. The hope is that equipping patients with price information
prior to receipt of medical care will help patients become selective consumers
and drive down the costs of health care.
While the idea of increased price information, or price transparency, before
receipt of medical care is appealing, the implementation is not straightforward.
Pricing systems in health care are complex. There are potentially multiple prices
associated with a single procedure, for example: the charge price, which is the
price the provider would charge an uninsured individual;1 the negotiated or al-
lowed price, which is the price the insurer and provider have agreed upon;2 and
the out-of-pocket expense, which is the amount for which the patient is respon-
sible in consideration of deductibles, coinsurance, and copays. What results is a
system where provider identity, insurer identity, insurance plan characteristics,
and procedures codes are all potentially necessary for determining price. Taken
together, these complications make it unclear which prices to report (Sinaiko
and Rosenthal, 2011), by whom the information should be given, and how it
should be given.
The existing literature on price uncertainty reflects this complexity. Across
1It is possible that the provider might have cash discounts, charitable reductions, or nego-
tiations with the uninsured.
2A discussion of the negotiations between providers and insurers can be found in Gaynor,
Ho, and Town (2015).
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this literature there is variation in the type of price information that is studied.
There are papers that study information given about charge prices (Christensen,
Floyd, and Maffett, 2017), negotiated prices (Tu and Lauer, 2009) and out-of-
pocket expenses (Lieber, 2017 and Whaley et al., 2014). While the papers
agree that there is potential for substantial reductions in spending, there is
spread in the actual estimated effects ranging from no effect to upwards of 17%
savings. The commonality among these papers is that the price information
is typically given via a website. Mehrotra, Brannen, and Sinaiko (2014) have
established that use of these price information websites by patients is quite
low and concentrated for specific procedures. Their findings might explain the
variation in effects sizes across papers.
An unstudied alternative for delivering the information to patients is to give
it in a manner similar to other markets, namely, to give the information directly
to patients at the time of service. In this paper, I fill this gap. I exploit a 2008
Medicare reform that required providers to provide additional price information
to patients, and I use detailed claims data to estimate the effects of this reform.
Researchers have not previously exploited this reform, although it provides an
excellent source of variation in information sets. The particular Medicare re-
form applies to Medicare Part B providers and extends previous information
disclosure requirements. Medicare has always urged Part B providers to no-
tify patients when they think that a procedure will not be paid by Medicare,
in order to warn the patient that they will be financially responsible for the
procedure in that case. The incentive to abide by this request is that if the
provider does not notify the patient, then the provider cannot collect payment
from the patient if the procedure is not covered. This notification is achieved by
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having the patient read and sign a standardized document called the Advance
Beneficiary Notice of Noncoverage (ABN). After receipt of this document, the
patient has the opportunity to decline the medical procedure. If the patient
decides to have the medical procedure performed, she does so acknowledging
that she will be financially responsible in the event of noncoverage. The 2008
reform changed the informational content of the ABN. Prior to the reform, the
providers do not have to include the prices that would be charged in the event
of noncoverage on the ABN. After the reform, there is a dedicated spot on the
ABN where providers are required to write the prices that would be charged
in the event of noncoverage. This reform represents an increase in the price
information that patients have prior to receiving medical care and can be used
to study the effects of increased price transparency.
I develop a model of medical decision-making under price uncertainty to
guide the empirical work. The main innovation of the model is to explicitly
incorporate uncertainty over the probability of denial, and the price in the
event of denial. These uncertainties are (partially) resolved by information
given at the provider’s discretion. In the model, the provider knows that the
price information they give to the patient will influence the patient’s decision to
undergo the procedure. As such, the decision to give information is endogenous.
In the model, the decision to give information is binary; the provider either gives
information or they do not. Before the 2008 reform if the provider chooses to
give information, they must reveal information about the chance of denial but
not information about the price in the event of denial. After the reform, if the
provider chooses to give information, they must reveal both information about
the chance of denial and reveal the price in the event of denial. Comparison of
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the model solutions before and after the reform yield predictions of the effect of
the reform. The main theoretical prediction of the model is that patients who
are uncertain about prices are less (more) likely to undergo the procedure after
being shown high (low) prices, relative to the average price. What occurs when
the patient is shown the average price depends on their degree of risk aversion
and whether they have properly specified prior beliefs about the distribution of
the prices.
The data used in this analysis are the 2007 through 2009 5% research iden-
tifiable administrative claims files provided by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS). The data provide detailed claim information for 5%
of Medicare beneficiaries, including date of claim, provider identity, provider lo-
cation, procedure codes, diagnosis codes, charge amounts, allowed amounts, and
procedure modifier codes. The procedure modifier code is the critical variable
for this analysis since there is a specific value which indicates that the patient
was given the ABN. Preventive gynecological procedures lend themselves to this
research due to the prevalence of the ABN modifier among these procedures.
To estimate the effects of the reform I employ a difference-in-differences
strategy. Since the reform is national and occurred at one time, to imple-
ment the difference-in-differences approach I exploit variation in the providers’
pre-reform use of the ABN to separately identify providers that presumably
should be affected by the reform from providers that presumably should not
be affected, and I assign the two types to the treatment and control groups,
respectively. Both pre- and post-reform, many providers never use the ABN
and many providers always give the ABN to every patient. The providers who
always distribute the notification serve as the treatment group and providers
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who never use the notification serve as the control group. The idea is that
patients visiting providers that do not distribute the ABN are not affected by
the increase in price information since they will not see the document in the
first place, and patients visiting providers who always distribute the ABN are
affected by the increase in price information. The restriction of the empirical
strategy to providers who do not use the ABN with discretion alleviates the
endogeneity concern of selective dissemination raised in the theoretical work.
The results show that revealing price information at the time of service
reduces the number of claims submitted by 7.3% on average and reduces charge
prices by 3.4% on average. In line with the model predictions, I find that the
effects are more pronounced for high-price providers; utilization at high-price
providers falls by 13.3% on average. To test the model prediction that the
effects are more pronounced for relatively uninformed beneficiaries, I test if the
effect sizes differ for providers who service new-to-Medicare beneficiaries. I find
that the number of claims submitted falls by 12.3% at providers who service
new-to-Medicare beneficiaries. The results are robust to the inclusion of varying
fixed effects and varying criteria for providers to be included in the analysis and
in the treatment group.
The results thus indicate that both prices and utilization fall when prices
are revealed. If the goal of policy is to reduce health care spending, these results
do suggest how to improve price transparency initiatives to make them more
effective in this regard. The results imply that price information which targets
price elastic procedures, discloses prices directly to patients, and explains why
the information is relevant is effective in reducing health care spending. Future
6
price transparency initiatives in the health care sector should try to incorpo-
rate these features. Given the short time frame of the dataset, it is difficult
to draw conclusions about long term health outcomes. Without better infor-
mation about outcomes, it is difficult to determine if patients are cutting back
on necessary or unnecessary medical care. Although it is difficult to concretely
state the welfare consequences of this information, the finding that the infor-
mation reduces the utilization of medical care highlights a potential downside
to increased price information.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the
existing literature, section 3 discusses the Medicare reform, section 4 presents
the theoretical framework, section 5 discusses the data, section 6 discusses the
empirical strategy and presents initial results, section 7 presents heterogeneity in
the effects sizes, and section 8 concludes with a discussion of policy implications
and future research.
1.2 Existing Literature
This research contributes to the large literature regarding uncertainties in health
care. The prevalence of uncertainty in health care markets is well-established.
Traditionally research focused on the uncertainties surrounding the delivery of
medical care itself. Starting with Arrow’s 1963, academic research has furthered
our understanding of the uncertainty in the chance of illness and recovery, the
efficacy of treatment (see Coscelli and Shum, 2004; Crawford and Shum, 2005),
and provider quality (see Hibbard, Stockard, and Tusler, 2005; Cutler, Huck-
man, and Landrum, 2004; Dafny and Dranove, 2008; Dranove et al., 2003).
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More recently, focus has shifted to the uncertainties surrounding the finan-
cial aspects of medical care decision-making. There is a substantive litera-
ture studying the frictions and uncertainties that affect insurance plan choice
(see Chernew, Gowrisankaran, and Scanlon, 2008; Handel and Kolstad, 2015;
Abaluck and Gruber, 2011; Kling et al., 2012; Ketcham et al., 2012; Fang, Keane,
and Silverman, 2008; Barseghyan et al., 2013).
Recently, there exist a few papers that specifically study the effects of price
transparency in health care, and there is variation in the findings. These pa-
pers typically fall into one of two groups. The first group contains papers that
make use of sweeping state reforms to identify the effects of price transparency
on prices and price dispersion. The typical state reform requires hospitals to
post the charge prices or average prices paid for their most common procedures.
These postings are most commonly found on websites and sometimes are con-
tained in booklets onsite. Christensen, Floyd, and Maffett (2017) use states
that implemented policies to disclose charge prices online and find that prices
charged fell by 7.3% on average for hip replacements and less than 1% (indis-
tinguishable from zero) for appendectomies. Tu and Lauer (2009) focus on a
price transparency initiative in New Hampshire which provides median price
estimates on a HealthCost website for about thirty common health services.
They find no evidence of effects.
The second group of papers make use of data from private companies who
are employed by firms to provide insurance plan-specific price transparency to
employees. These companies offer a website where beneficiaries can receive price
information at different providers that is specific to their insurance plan. The
information is created using historical claims for beneficiaries on the same plan.
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Lieber (2017) makes use of data from Compass Professional Health Services and
finds that using the website reduces prices paid by 10% - 17% but consumers
only shop for less than 20% of their care. Whaley et al. (2014) use data from
Castlight Health and find that using the website is associated with about 13%
reductions in prices paid for laboratory tests and advanced imaging. They find
that using the website is only associated with about a 1% decrease in prices
paid for clinician office visits.
As discussed in section 1, the important way in which my analysis differs
from these papers is that I make use of information that is given directly to
patients, and receipt of the information is acknowledged by the patients.3 In
the literature discussed here, the patient must choose to seek out the price
information, typically through a website, in order to obtain it. As such, the
economic mechanism most pertinent to the existing strand of research is search
and the associated costs. The data I use arise from a regulation that requires
price information to be given directly to the patient by the provider at the time
of service. This allows me to estimate the effects of a type of price transparency
that has gone unstudied by the previous literature.
1.3 Medicare Reform
To obtain estimates of the effects of price information that is given directly to
patients, I exploit a price information regulation pertaining to Medicare Part B
beneficiaries. This reform serves as plausibly exogenous variation in patients’
information sets.
3Robinson and Brown (2013) study a reference pricing initiative that mailed price informa-
tion to beneficiaries. That natural experiment included both an increase in price transparency
and a simultaneous change in benefit design.
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Medicare is the United States’ federal insurance program for the elderly.
Medicare Part A provides coverage for inpatient procedures and services while
Medicare Part B provides coverage for outpatient and non-institutional pro-
cedures and services. Price information is relevant to Medicare beneficiaries
because there are provisions of cost-sharing in Part B. Furthermore if Medicare
denies a claim, the provider may seek their entire charge amount from the ben-
eficiary, not just the Medicare allowed amount which is essentially fixed across
providers.
Medicare Part B rules require providers to inform patients when they think
a claim will be denied by Medicare.4 Notification must be given to the patient
by the provider prior to performing the procedure. This notification is achieved
by having the patient read and sign a standardized form called the Advance
Beneficiary Notice of Noncoverage (ABN). The timing of this information is
key. The information is given directly to the patient before they make their
medical decision. This gives the beneficiary a chance to decide if they want
the procedure performed with better information about the financial liability
prior to making their decision. The information does not itself guarantee denial.
It simply conveys to the patient that the provider believes that Medicare will
deny the claim. The actual denial outcome is decided by the Medicare claims
processors who do not take into consideration whether the patient received this
notification.
4Reasons for believing a procedure might be denied are that the beneficiary has met
the frequency limits for the procedure or the circumstances under which the procedure is
performed do not meet the Medicare standard for medical necessity as determined by Local
and National Coverage Determinations. For example, a patient might not have the proper
diagnosis, as exhibited by the ICD-9 diagnosis code, that Medicare would expect to see for
medical necessity.
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Both pre-reform and post-reform the incentive the provider has to use the
form is that, in the event of a denial, if there is not an ABN on file, the provider
may not seek reimbursement from the patient. In this sense, use of the form
is not mandatory. If the provider chooses not to use the form, they forgo
revenue, but they are allowed to make that choice. If the procedure is denied by
Medicare and there is an ABN on file, the provider is not restricted to charging
the Medicare allowed amount. They may charge the patient their charge price,
which can be significantly higher than the Medicare allowed amount.
Prior to 2008, providers did not have to reveal the price that they would
charge in the event of denial on the ABN. In March 2008, the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) announced that (accurate) prices must
be included on the ABN. This reform is an increase in price transparency and
thus the effect of this reform is interpreted as the effect of price transparency.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show the forms before and after the reform. The updated
form was released when the announcement was made, and mandatory use of
the new form occurred in March 2009. Between the announcement and the
implementation either form was acceptable, and after the implementation, only
the new form was acceptable notification of expected denial. We can see that
after the reform, there is a dedicated spot for the estimated cost that must be
pre-populated before the form is given to the patient. Thus prior to the reform,
beneficiaries who receive the information are only informed about the chance
of denial and not prices before making treatment decisions. On the 2002 ABN
there is a spot that allows the patient to write down an estimate of the cost
provided by the doctor. However, prior to the reform there is no requirement
that this estimate be populated nor accurate. After the reform, the prices had
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to be pre-populated and be accurate within 25% of the actual amount. After
the reform, patients are still informed about the chance of denial and are seeing
prices in advance of treatment. They are also given the option to not submit the
claim to Medicare and to pay the charge price upfront. Although in the data
we cannot say definitively whether patients are choosing this option or forgoing
care it is more likely they are forgoing care since the option to not bill Medicare
is a weakly dominated strategy by Option 1. Furthermore, by picking Option 2
the patient forfeits their right to appeal, making this option even less desirable.
I will focus solely on estimating the effects of the reform to the informational
content of the form, but this simple form serves many functions that might pique
the interest of researchers. It transfers financial liability from the provider to
the patient, it puts the burden of determining the necessity of medical care on
the patient,5 and it provides information to the patient that they might not
otherwise have had. In the data and empirical sections we will see variation
in use of this form that will raise questions about its other functions. In the
other chapters of this dissertation, I explore what more we can learn about the
provider/patient relationship using this Medicare regulation.
1.4 Theoretical Framework
In this section I derive predictions of how the increase in price information on
the ABN affects patients and providers using a theoretical model of medical
decision-making. These predictions serve to focus the empirical work. I model
how patients (section 1.4.1) and providers (section 1.4.2) make decisions under
the presence of price uncertainty. In section 1.4.3, I explain how the reform
5Shomaker and Link (2014) present an interesting discussion on the bioethics of this form.
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affects the components of the model and use comparative statics to arrive at
the predictions. The first prediction is that the reform causes patients who are
uncertain about prices to be less likely to receive medical care after being shown
high prices and are more likely to receive care after being shown low prices. The
second prediction highlights an endogeneity concern that must be addressed in
the empirical work. Specifically, the second prediction is that providers foresee
the effect of the reform on patients and adjust their decision to reveal prices
accordingly. Thus in the empirical strategy I propose a method for isolating
the effect of the information conditional on the provider not changing their
information dissemination decision.
Although the model is specific to the ABN, the innovation is that it explicitly
incorporates uncertainty in the out-of-pocket expense that is (partially) resolved
by the informational content of the ABN. The model is sequential, but it is not
dynamic. This model starts with a beneficiary at the doctor’s office who is
considering a specific medical procedure. I begin at this point because this is
where the information provided on the ABN is the most relevant.6 At this point
the provider acts first by deciding to give the beneficiary the ABN, and then the
beneficiary acts by deciding to have the medical procedure performed or not.
1.4.1 Beneficiary Utility
We have beneficiary i at provider p considering a medical procedure. Their
choice variable is whether to have the procedure performed Mi P t0, 1u. Their
ex-post utility from having the medical procedure performed is conditional on
6I abstract away from modeling what brought them to this point, including why they chose
that doctor, with what information they are equipped, and who suggested the procedure.
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whether the provider gives the patient the ABN form, Fi P t0, 1u:
uippMi  1|Fiq  vi  FiDifpCpq (1.1)
The payoff of not having the procedure performed is uippMi  0q  0. The first
term vi captures the beneficiary’s benefit from receiving the medical procedure.
This term varies across beneficiaries and is unobserved by the provider. The
second term FiDifpCpq captures the monetary cost the beneficiary has to pay for
the service. This term indicates that the beneficiary only pays, and knows they
only pay, in the event of denial, Di  1, and if they receive the form, Fi  1.
7 In
this case they must pay the provider’s charge price, Cp. For simplicity I assume
away the cost sharing payments if the claim is accepted by Medicare, Di  0. I
make this decision because in the empirical analysis I focus on procedures with
low Medicare allowed prices so any cost sharing will be minimal compared to the
full charge prices. The function fp.q is intended to capture the risk preference of
the beneficiary. The shape of this function is important in predicting the effect
of the reform.
The beneficiary is not certain about the denial outcome, Di, and the charge
price, Cp.
8 Their expectations of these terms are affected by the information
they receive on the form and are expressed by ErDi|Fis and ErfpCpq|Fis, re-
spectively. After the provider gives (or withholds) the form, the beneficiary
compares the expected utility of having the procedure done to the utility of
not having the procedure done. Assuming that Di and fpCpq are independent
7As per the Medicare rules regarding the ABN form discussed in section ??
8I do not explicitly model the formation of the variation in prices, I take it as given. For
literature substantiating the existence of price variation within a market, see Stigler (1961),
Diamond (1971), Burdett and Judd (1983), Hong and Shum (2006), Hortaçsu and Syverson
(2004), Sorensen (2001), and Tappata (2009).
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conditional on Fi then the beneficiary will choose Mi as follows:
Mi 
#
1 if vi ¡ FiErDi|FisErfpCpq|Fis
0 otherwise
(1.2)
This yields a cutoff point for vi above which beneficiaries will have the pro-
cedure done. Denoting the distribution of vi by Gp.q and assuming vi P R , the
probability a patient will have the procedure done is:
P pMi  1|Fiq  1  FiGpErDi|FisErfpCpq|Fisq (1.3)
1.4.2 Provider Payoff
The provider knows the beneficiary’s choice function along with the function
fp.q and chooses Fi so as to maximize expected payoff. The ex-post payoff the
provider receives is:
ΠpFiq Mipp1 DiqMA DiFiCpq  αFi   ξMip1 Diq  cMi (1.4)
The first terms captures the revenue collected by the provider. They only receive
payment if the beneficiary has the procedure done, Mi  1. The provider knows
that the beneficiary’s decision is dependent on whether the providers gives the
form. The payment amount is dependent on the denial outcome. If the claim is
accepted, Di  0, then the provider collects the Medicare allowed amount, MA.
If the claim is denied, Di  1, the provider collects their charge price, Cp, only if
they gave the form, Fi  1. The second term, αFi, captures the direct cost of
distributing the form.9 This cost is incurred if you give the form, regardless of
whether the patient has the procedure done. The term, ξMip1Diq, captures the
9According to physicians, one of the the largest direct costs associated with giving the
form is time.
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non-monetary payoff the provider receives from performing medical procedures.
This is intended to capture the altruistic concerns of the provider.10 Specifically,
this term indicates that a provider receives added benefit from a beneficiary who
gets a procedure done that is accepted by Medicare. This accepted by Medicare
condition is intended to capture that a provider gains non-monetary value by
performing medically necessary procedures. The final term cMi is intended to
capture the provider’s cost of performing the procedure.
Note that if the provider could perfectly observe Di then there would be no
reason to give the form to beneficiaries for whom Di  0. Giving the form, the
provider would incur the marginal cost and increase the chance that the person
chooses not receive care, potentially forgoing the revenue and the non-monetary
payoff. I do not assume that providers observe the denial outcome perfectly.
Along with potential uncertainty over the denial outcome, providers are also
uncertain about whether the beneficiary will choose to receive care if they give
the form. The provider will give the form according to the following rule:
Fi 
#




ErΠp1qs  ErpMipp1 DiqMA DiCpq  c  ξMip1 Diqq|Fi  1s (1.6)
ErΠp0qs  Erp1 DiqMA  ξp1 Diqs (1.7)
The provider’s decision to give the form is dependent on their expectation
of denial for the beneficiary and how the information affects the beneficiary’s
10discussed in Arrow (1963)
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probability of seeking care. The main takeaway from this exercise is that the
beneficiaries who receive the form are not random. They are selected by the
provider exactly based on how they are expected to respond. Thus estimating
how patients respond to the form using cross-sectional observational data is not
trivial. One methodology would be to find a valid instrument for the cost of
distributing the form, c. To circumvent this concern, I choose not to estimate
the effect of the form itself, instead I choose to estimate the effect of the increase
in price information contained on the form. The theoretical implications of this
change to the form are discussed in the follow subsection.
1.4.3 The Price Information Reform
Before the reform, the ABN does not give full information about the charge
price, and after the reform, the ABN reveals the charge price with certainty.
This affects the expectation of the financial liability terms in the beneficiary’s
utility. Prior to the reform, conditional on receiving information, the beneficiary
will have the procedure done according to the following rule:
Mi 
#
1 if vi ¡ FiErDi|FisErfpCpq|Fis
0 otherwise
(1.8)
After the reform, the beneficiary will have the procedure done if:
Mi 
#
1 if vi ¡ FiErDi|FisfpCpq
0 otherwise
(1.9)
The predictions of the model are as follows. Comparing Equation 1.8 to
Equation 1.9 we see that if fpCpq ¡ ErfpCpq|Fi  1s then the probability a
beneficiary chooses to receive medical care after seeing the ABN falls and vice
versa. What happens when the beneficiary observes the mean price depends
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on the properties of fp.q. In the case of risk neutrality, and properly specified
beliefs, the beneficiary’s decision will be unchanged upon viewing the mean
price. A simple application of Jensen’s inequality tells us that in the case where
fp.q is concave (convex) the beneficiary will be less (more) likely to have the
procedure performed given that they have properly specified beliefs about the
distribution of Cp. Although, we cannot be certain about the shape of fp.q, if
we simply assume that it is monotonically increasing then we can safely say that
if the price revealed is above a certain threshold, the probability the patient has
the procedure done falls and for prices below a certain threshold the probability
rises.
From the provider’s perspective, the reform affects the expected profit of
giving the form, and it only affects this profit through Mi. If Mip1q falls in
response to the reform then the expected profit of giving the form now falls
relative to before the reform, making it less likely that the provider will dis-
tribute the form. If Mip1q rises in response to the reform then the expected
profit of giving the form now rises relative to before the reform, making it more
likely that the provider will distribute the form. Thus, to estimate the change
in the probability a patient has the procedure conditional on receiving the form
empirically is not straightforward. This change contributes to the provider’s
payoff so it will also cause providers to adjust their information dissemination
which in turn affects the probability a patient has the procedure.
This model was designed to exhibit how patients would respond to the infor-
mation on the form and how physicians might in turn choose to use the form. It
is a simplified model and does not take into account external factors that would
influence the setting of the charge price. However it is useful to think through
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how the optimal charge price would be affected by the mechanisms in this ex-
ample. Notice the charge price, Cp, only enters the physician’s profit if they use
the document, or Fi  1. So let us consider maximizing ErΠp1qs, equation 1.6,
to think about the optimal charge price. The benefit to increasing the charge
price is a direct increase in what the physician collects. The potential downside
is deterring the patient and not receiving the payout. Prior to the reform this
model actually includes no downward pressure on the charge price since the
patient is only working off of their own beliefs to decide whether to have the
procedure done or not, not the charge price. Let’s just assume that prior to
the reform, the charge price is set based on external factors. After the reform,
the physician must reveal their charge price to the patient, and the price they
reveal does have the possibility of deterring (or enticing) the patient. All else
equal, we would expect that after the reform, physicians with high prices would
be likely to reduce their charge prices to combat the deterrence effect,11 and
it is possible that physicians with low prices might actually raise their charge
prices.
There are limitations of the model. They include 1) not explicitly model-
ing the choice of provider, 2) not modeling quality uncertainty that may be
(partially) resolved by price information, 3) not explicitly modeling dynamic
considerations of both the provider and beneficiary, and 4) not endogenously
determining how a beneficiary becomes informed. This first limitation is mit-
igated by recent work indicating that when beneficiaries are moved to higher
11This is similar to what Christensen, Floyd, and Maffett (2017) hypothesize to explain their
findings that physicians lower charge prices in response to increased charge price transparency.
They proffer the explanation that providers do not want to be viewed as “expensive”. The
model presented here explains why that might be the case. It is precisely because patients
incorporate the probability of paying that charge price into their decision-making process.
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cost sharing plans, they refrain from health care altogether instead of shopping
around. This is true even when the beneficiaries are equipped with a price
finding website (Brot-Goldberg et al., 2017). All these limitations would be
most pressing if the model were specified with structural estimation as the pur-
pose. However, the purpose here is to present a framework which highlights
and predicts the effects of information dissemination at the doctor’s office and
informs the regression equations. For this purpose, conditional on consistency
with the empirical facts, simplicity and clarity of the model is desired over com-
plexity included for realism. Where the model lacks in complexity of external
and dynamic considerations, it succeeds in explicitly including the individual
components of the out-of-pocket expense and the uncertainty surrounding these
terms.
1.5 Data
I use Medicare administrative claims data to estimate the effects of the reform
to the ABN. Specifically, I use the 5% CMS research identifiable claims and
enrollment files for years 2007 through 2009. These data contain enrollment,
residence, and basic demographic information for 5% of the Medicare popula-
tion, which is approximately 2.5 million beneficiaries. For each of the beneficia-
ries, the data contain detailed information for each claim submitted to Medi-
care including provider identifiers, provider location down to the nine digit zip
code, provider characteristics, health care common procedure codes (HCPCS),
procedure modifier code, diagnosis codes (ICD-9), submitted charges, allowed
charges, and Medicare payments.
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The crucial variable in this analysis is the procedure modifier code. The
value “GA” for this variable indicates that the patient was given the ABN form.
In this dataset, there are approximately 270 million procedures submitted to
Medicare by non-institutional medical providers over the three years. Of these
270 million, approximately 1.5 million have the modifier GA. In order to detect
the effect of the reform, it is necessary to narrow the dataset to the procedures
for which the ABN is actually used. I narrow the procedures on which I focus
by looking at the prevalence of this modifier by procedure code. Section 1.5.1
provides a discussion of the procedures selected for this research.
After narrowing the set of procedures, in section 1.5.2 I examine the preva-
lence of the procedure modifier code across providers to expose variation in use
of the ABN across providers that serves as the foundation for the empirical
strategy which is formally discussed in section 1.6.
1.5.1 Selection and Discussion of Procedures
To narrow the procedures on which I focus, I look at ABN form use by procedure.
Table 1.1 depicts for which procedures the ABN is most used.12 Specifically, it
presents the top fifteen procedures ranked by percentage with the GA modifier
in descending order. We see that the modifier accompanies a large percentage
of certain procedures. It is used commonly for preventive gynecological and pre-
ventive men’s health procedures, for chiropractic procedures, and for laboratory
tests. In the preferred analysis, I will focus on procedure code “G0101”.13
Procedure code “G0101” refers to screening pelvic examinations. They are
12Using a 10% random sample of the data to lessen the computational burden
13“G0101” and “Q0091” are typically performed together, so study of claims with the
“G0101” procedure code captures much of the utilization of “Q0091”
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preventive procedures for asymptomatic women to check for any abnormalities.
They are subject to frequency limitations. Specifically, they are covered once
every two years for low-risk women and once every year for high-risk women.
More frequent visits are considered to be medically unnecessary by Medicare
coverage determinations. In the event that the procedure is covered, beneficia-
ries are required to pay any portion of the Medicare allowed amount that falls
under their annual deductible of $150 and 20% of the allowed amount that falls
above the deductible.
A few reasons make this procedure code relevant for studying the effects of
the ABN. First we see that the denial rates are quite high for this procedure.
This makes the information on the ABN quite relevant for patients who receive
this procedure. These high denial rates are explained by a large portion of bene-
ficiaries receiving this procedure more frequently than biannually. Of the 71,385
beneficiaries that have the procedure done in 2007, 31.6% have the procedure
done in 2008, and 17.5% have these procedures done in both 2008 and 2009.
There is substantial persistence in the choice of provider. Of the patients who
have more than one visit, 85.8% visit the same provider on all occasions.
One might think that there is little uncertainty over the chance of denial
for this procedure given how well-defined the coverage is and since this is a
repeated procedure, any uncertainty will be resolved quickly over time. Figure
1.3 presents the denial rates by age. We see that there is high volatility in
the denials before the rates stabilize. This is consistent with the idea that
young beneficiaries are more uncertain about the coverage rules than their older
counterparts. Table 1.2 depicts the age distribution of the procedures. We see
that about 42% of the procedures come from beneficiaries who are 70 or younger
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and are still arguably learning the rules of coverage and hence will be affected
by the information contained on the ABN.
Table 1.3 presents summary statistics for this procedure over the three years
of data. It is a relatively low priced procedure. Medicare only reimburses about
$34 for this procedure when covered. However, the variation in the charge
prices is large with the mean being about $67 across all three years. The 99th
percentile is about $200 which is more than six times the first percentile. It is
denied about 30% of the time. This high denial and variation in charge prices
makes the information given on the ABN quite relevant to beneficiaries getting
this procedure done.
1.5.2 Variation in Form Use by Providers
Here I discuss variation in form use across providers which is crucial for my
identification strategy. For each provider, I calculate the percentage of claims
submitted with the form modifier before the reform. Figure 1.4 presents a
histogram of these percentages across all providers.14 We see huge variation in
this form use and that many providers always give the form to every patient
and that many providers never give the form to any patient. Figure 1.5 presents
the persistence of this phenomenon after the reform in a scatterplot. On the
horizontal axis is the percentage of claims with the form modifier before the
reform and on the vertical axis is the percentage of claims with the form modifier
after the reform. The scatterplot is weighted by the frequency of providers at a
specific point. The large circles at the extremes indicate that many of the firms
who never use the form before the reform persistently continue to not use the
14Providers with five or more claims are included in the histogram.
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form after the reform and likewise for the providers who always use the form.
There are a couple reasons that explain this extreme variation in form use.
CMS reports that a prominent cost of using the form is time. Time is required
to confirm the coverage determinations and to fill out the form. CMS estimates
that it takes approximately seven minutes for a provider to deliver each no-
tice. After soliciting providers for comments, some providers stated that seven
minutes is an underestimate and others stated that it was an overestimate,
indicating heterogeneity in the cost of delivering the form. The range in time
estimates is from 3 minutes to 15 minutes. This time cost of delivering the ABN
is confirmed by recent efforts from health IT firms to streamline the process. In
2014 a firm announced the launching of VitalABN whose “innovative design and
user interface saves time and frustration” in the ABN process.15 Thus providers
who never use the form may do so because the time cost is too high.
The second reason why providers might abstain from using this form alto-
gether is the effect this form has on deterring patients.16 In a release based
on CMS statistics from 2005, CMS 2008 estimates that 1.3 million physicians,
providers, practitioners, and suppliers potentially deliver this form and that this
form was distributed 40,302,506 times to beneficiaries in 2005. In the same re-
lease CMS estimates that up to one third of beneficiaries who received an ABN
chose not to receive the items and services.
A reason for why we might see this large group of providers who choose to
always disseminate the form is the inability to predict denials paired with the
desire to protect revenue. In this case, providers might choose to give the form
15see http://www.healthit.myindustrytracker.com/en/article/74194/taking-abn-validation-to-a-new-level-of-productivity-
and-automation-vitalware-l accessed on August 11, 2017
16This has both monetary consequences and consequences for altruism.
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to everyone in order to be able to collect payment if the claim ends up being
denied by Medicare.
What results is a situation where there are many providers not using discre-
tion when distributing the form and this serves at the basis for the identification
strategy. Since we cannot distinguish patients who did not get the document
from patients who got the document and refused care, we can use this variation
in provider use of the document to infer which patients are seeing the document
and which ones are not. We would expect that the providers who always give
their patients the ABN are the providers who will be affected by the reform
to it. Furthermore, since these providers are always giving the form to their
patients, any consequences of the reform on the utilization and prices of their
services will be driven by patient response to the changing information on the
form, not provider response to change their decision to use the form. The spe-
cific formulation of the empirical strategy using this insight is discussed in the
next section.
1.6 Empirical Strategy and Estimates of Aver-
age Effects
In this section, I explain the formulation of the difference-in-differences strategy
for obtaining the average effects of the reform (1.6.1) and present the estimates
of the average effects (1.6.2). The outcomes examined are total number of claims
submitted and average charge price. The findings are consistent with the model
predictions discussed in section 1.4. In section 1.6.2, I present the robustness
of the results to the definition of the treatment group and to the inclusion of
providers in the analysis.
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1.6.1 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy exploits the extreme variation in form use by providers to
specify a difference-in-differences estimation strategy. Specifically, the empirical
strategy takes advantage of the providers who always use and never use the ABN
form. The intuition is that beneficiaries who visit the providers who always use
the form are treated in the sense that they will start seeing prices after the
reform to the ABN takes place. On the other hand, beneficiaries who visit
providers who never use the form will not be affected by the reform. Thus a
comparison of how utilization and price outcomes change between these two
groups after the reform can be attributed to the additional price information.
For inference, the strategy employs a difference-in-differences approach where
providers are in the treatment group (henceforth “Always Users”) if they always
use the form before and after the reform, and providers are in the control group
(henceforth “Never Users”) if they never use the form before and after the re-
form. A cross sectional approach which simply compares the treatment group
the control group at a single time period might inadvertently pick up unob-
servables that are correlated with selection into these groups. The difference-
in-differences strategy compares trends in the two groups, not levels, and I can
also incorporate geographic and provider group fixed effects that are invariable
over time that help to alleviate this concern. An approach that solely looks
at changes among the Always Users before and after the reform might pick up
trends that would have occurred regardless of the reform. In a difference-in-
differences strategy, the inclusion of the Never Users helps to control for any
general trends that affect all Medicare providers.
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Table 1.4 presents summary statistics at the provider level for the Never
Users (top panel) and the Always Users (bottom panel). We see differences
between the two groups. Always Users have lower charge prices on average
than Never Users, slightly higher procedures submitted, and higher denial rates.
A cross sectional approach would attribute these differences to the use of the
form, which may in fact not be the case. For example, the use of the form
might drive prices down or providers with lower prices might be more likely to
use the form. We see that many of the Always Users are gynecologists which
may be explained by the portion of revenue that comes from these procedures.
Since these procedures might contribute more to a gynecologist’s revenue than
to a family practitioner’s, gynecologists might be more likely to use the form to
secure their revenue in the case of denials.
This difference-in-differences strategy relies on the assumption that utiliza-
tion and prices for the Always Users would have trended the same as the Never
Users in absence of the reform. Thus, along with my main causal regressions,
I perform pre-reform regressions and present graphs providing supporting evi-
dence that the providers in the treatment group were not trending differently
than the providers in the control group prior to the reform. I discuss the results
of these supporting regressions in tandem with the main regression estimates.
The main equation for estimation of the effect of price transparency on
utilization and charge prices is:
ykgzt  β0Postt β1Always Userk β2Always UserkPostt δg γz νkgzt
(1.10)
Where ykgzt is an outcome variable for provider k with tax ID g in zip code z
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at time period t. The variable Always Userk P t0, 1u indicates whether provider
k is a provider who always user the form. The coefficient of interest is β2 which
captures the difference in outcome trends between Always Users and Never
Users after the reform. The δg’s are fixed effects among providers with the
same tax identification number and the γz’s are fixed effects among providers
who operate in the same five digit zip code.17
1.6.2 Average Effects
Table 1.5 presents the estimates of the effect of price transparency on the total
number of claims providers submit. The dependent variables are the natural
logarithm of the variables of interest so the coefficients can be interpreted as
percentage changes in the outcomes. The inclusion of tax ID and zip code fixed
effects varies across the columns. The standard errors are clustered at the zip
code level. For the utilization outcome, the model does not clearly predict what
will be the sign of the effect on average. The empirical estimates confirm that
the effect sizes are negative on average. Specifically, the total number of claims
falls by 7.3% on average. I present the effects of price transparency on mean
charges prices in table 1.6. I find that charge prices fall by 3.4% on average.
To provide visual support that the effects are the result of the reform and not
from pre-existing trends, in figures 1.6 and 1.7, I plot coefficients to show that
there was not a pattern distinguishable from zero in the outcomes before the
reform. It is only after 2007 that we see the distinguishable patterns between the
two groups emerge. To remove noise due to seasonality in the graphs, I group the
17In the preferred specification, standard errors are clustered at the zip code level. In con-
sideration of the findings in Bertrand et al. 2004 regarding difference-in-differences estimation,
finer and broader clusterings were considered.
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data into six month periods. To test more finely for pre-existing differences in
trends between the two groups, I group the data in two month periods and runs
regressions on the pre-reform data to test for statistical differences. Table 1.7
displays the results of those regressions. Columns 1 and 2 have log(total claims)
as the outcome. Column 1 indicates that there were no statistically different
linear trends prior to the reform, and column 2 indicates that there were rarely
statistically different trends when controlling with time period dummies. Time
period five has a statistically higher bump for the treatment group. Since this
is a positive coefficient, it cannot explain the negative effect sizes that I find.
Columns 3 and 4 show the same with log(charge price) as the outcome.
There are two cutoffs chosen for the main specification, and I test the ro-
bustness of the estimates to these cutoffs. The first cutoff refers to whether a
provider has enough claims to assert whether they are an Always User or Never
User. In the main specification, I set this cutoff at five claims. In tables 1.8 and
1.9 I estimate the effects using differing cutoffs for total claims submitted and
charge prices, respectively. Column 2 presents the results for the main speci-
fication and the other columns show the results for other cutoffs. We see that
the sign of the results are robust to this choice. The second cutoff refers to the
definition of an Always User. The main specification is strict in the definition of
the treatment group. It defines an Always User to be a provider that gives the
form to every patient. In the next robustness check I relax that definition and
look at varying definitions of high users as the treatment group. Tables 1.10 and
1.11 present the results for total claims and charge prices, respectively. Column
1 presents the results for the main specification and the other columns relax
this strict definition. We see robustness in the effects across the specifications.
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1.7 Heterogeneity in Effects
Although I find an average negative effect on the number of claims submitted,
the model predicts that this effect size should vary with the prices shown. To test
this prediction, I group the providers into terciles depending on their average
charge price before the reform and allow the treatment effect to vary depending
on the tercile.
To test for heterogeneity in the effect of price transparency by prices I esti-
mate the following equation:
ykgzt β0  Postt   β1  Always Userk   β2  Always Userk  Postt
  Always Userk  Postt 
3̧
i2
αi1tk P tercileiu   δg   γz   νkgzt
(1.11)
The summation is over the upper two terciles. The regression is testing whether
the effect sizes at providers in the the upper two charge price terciles differ
statistically from the lowest tercile. The results of this regression are presented
in table 1.12 in column 1. The variable “Mid Prices” is a dummy that is one for
providers in the second tercile and zero otherwise. The variable “High Prices”
is a dummy that is one for providers in the highest tercile and zero otherwise.
Although the coefficients trend in the expected direction as we read down
the column, there are a few surprising results. First, the effect of the reform for
the lowest tercile providers are statistically indistinguishable from zero. This
is surprising because the model predicted that utilization might rise at these
providers. One explanation might be that providers were supplying price infor-
mation prior to the reform since their prices were low. As expected the effect
size for the highest tercile is large, negative, and statistically different from the
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lowest tercile. These results indicate that the effects are concentrated at the
high priced providers. Column 1 of table 1.13 shows the results of a similar
regression with charge prices at the outcome variable. We see no heterogeneity
in the effect on prices.
A second prediction of the model is that the reform should only have effects
for patients who are uninformed about prices. To test this prediction, I rank
providers by the percentage of claims that come from relatively new-to-Medicare
beneficiaries, meaning beneficiaries that are younger than 70 years old. I run a
regression to see if the effect size for providers who rank in the upper quartile of
this percentage is statistically different from those providers in the lower three
quartiles. The idea is that, since this is a repetitive preventive procedure, older
beneficiaries might be more informed about the prices and denial rates of this
procedure and hence the reform should have less of an effect on them. The
specific regression is
ykgzt β0  Postt   β1  Always Userk   β2  Always Userk  Postt
  β3  Always Userk  Postt  1tk P upper quartileu   δg   γz   νkgzt
(1.12)
The results of this regression are presented in table 1.12 column 2. The variable
“New to Medicare Beneficiaries” is a dummy that is one for providers who are in
this upper quartile and zero otherwise. The results confirm that the effect size is
higher for providers who service relatively new to Medicare beneficiaries. These
results are suggestive of the model prediction that the effects are concentrated on
the uninformed but certainly do not prove it. An alternative explanation for the
regression result is that younger people are more able to process information
than their older counterparts. Column 2 of table 1.13 shows the results of
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a similar regression with charge prices at the outcome variable. We see no
heterogeneity in the effect on prices.
In another test for heterogeneity, I run the regression 1.10 separately for
providers who are the only large provider in their zip code and for providers
who are one of at least two large providers in their zip code. Although I do not
explicitly take this into account in the model, this exercise provides suggestive
evidence of how the presence (or lack) of competitors change the effects of price
transparency.
Tables 1.14 and 1.15 display the results of these regressions for total number
of claims and charge prices, respectively. The first four columns present the
results for providers who are the only one in their zip code accounting for varying
fixed effects, and the last four columns present the results for providers who are
one of multiple providers in their zip code. We see that the price reductions are
concentrated to providers who face competitors in their zip code reduce prices
and that reductions in the number of claims are concentrated to providers who
are the only large provider in their zip code. One surprising result of the earlier
regressions was that both utilization and prices fall on average. The results
discussed here demonstrate that although both these reductions might occur
on average, they might not simultaneously occur at a single provider. The
results also provide further evidence that there are actual reductions in medical
care use, and that our findings are not just picking up patients switching from
providers in the treatment group to the control group.
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1.8 Conclusion
In this paper I make use of a Medicare Part B reform to expand our knowledge
of the effects of price transparency on health care utilization and prices. I
demonstrate that price information given directly to the patient in the doctor’s
office has consequences for health care spending. Consistent with a model of
medical decision-making that explicitly incorporates uncertainty over prices, I
find that price information given directly to the patients reduces both charge
prices and the number of claims providers submit, on average. I find that the
effects on the number of claims are more pronounced for providers with high
prices and for providers who service new-to-Medicare beneficiaries. Finally, I
find that the effect sizes vary with the competitive environment: providers who
face little competition in their zip code do not reduce prices and experience a
fall in claims, where the opposite is true for providers who face competition in
their zip code, who reduce prices and do not experience a fall in claims. For
these results, I focused on preventive gynecological procedures. Closely related
future research should extend this analysis to other procedures.
There are three reasons that could explain why this research found effects
on utilization when other research papers have found little or no effect of charge
price disclosure. First, the procedures explored in this research are preventive
procedures which are known to be among the most price elastic. Second, the
information is salient in that it is given directly to the patient; the patient does
not have to incur search costs in order to obtain this information from a website.
Third, the charge price information is given with an explanation of what the
charge price means. Specifically, the ABN tells the patient that the charge price
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is the price they will have to pay in the event of denial, making the price relevant
to them.
The findings suggest methods for improving the efficacy of price trans-
parency initiatives in the health care sector. Policies intending to implement
effective price transparency should focus more on price elastic procedures which
are typically performed in physician offices as opposed to current regulations
which require hospitals to post information. Second, given the complexity of
the pricing system, along with the prices, there should be information indicat-
ing how the presented price is relevant to the patient. With this information
the patient will be able to make a more informed decision about whether and
where to seek medical care. For example, this research indicates that giving
patients charge price information and telling them under what circumstances
they would have to pay the charge price makes the patient responsive to this
price. This research also demonstrates that giving price information directly
to patients is effective in reducing prices and utilization. Thus policies should
be more aggressive in delivering price information directly to patients to ensure
that patients are able to make price-based decisions. Future research could help
to identify which of these components make price transparency initiatives the
most effective.
There are a few limitations of this research. First, this research focuses on
the Medicare population. Although this allows me to study a national sample,
this population is older and has different medical care patterns than those with
commercial insurance, and hence it is not clear whether these results extend to
the general population. Second, the nature of the Medicare regulation restricts
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me to study the effects of price transparency using specific, low priced, preven-
tive, and arguably idiosyncratic procedures. I cannot say what the effects would
be for a set of procedures with more general applicability. Third, the claims
data do not contain detailed demographic information, so tests for heterogeneity
across patients with varying demographic characteristics is infeasible. Fourth,
given the limited time frame of the dataset, I am unable to make conclusions
about long term health outcomes. It could be the case that beneficiaries are
cutting back on either unnecessary medical care or necessary care upon receiv-
ing pricing information, and information on future health outcomes would help
to disentangle the two. More research is necessary to address these limitations.
This paper has uncovered a unique opportunity for future research that will
allow us to better understand price transparency from the provider’s perspec-
tive. The goal of this paper is to establish that giving price information directly
to patients has consequences for prices and utilization. Along the way in es-
tablishing this result, we have found a scenario where providers give price and
coverage information at their own discretion, and this decision is observable in
the dataset. This endogenous information dissemination decision was not the
focus of this paper but rather a complication that the empirical strategy sought
to overcome. In chapter two, I shift the focus towards this endogenous infor-
mation dissemination decision to understand price uncertainty in the health
care sector from the provider’s perspective. By understanding which provider
characteristics and patient characteristics influence the provider’s decision to
disseminate information, we can better understand how financial incentives and
altruistic incentives interplay in provider’s preferences. Furthermore, research
tends to take price uncertainty in the health care market as given, but research
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into the provider’s decision to disseminate information could help to explain
the reasons for the existence of price uncertainty in the first place. Is it that
providers do not know the information themselves and thus cannot provide the
information, or is it that providers strategically choose to withhold information?
Research using the setting and variation discovered in this paper can help to
answer these questions.
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1.9 Figures and Tables
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Figure 1.1: Advance Beneficiary Notice of Noncoverage Before the Reform
 
 Patient’s Name:                                                                                      Medicare # (HICN):     
  
ADVANCE BENEFICIARY NOTICE  (ABN) 
NOTE: You need to make a choice about receiving these health care items or services. 
 
 
We expect that Medicare will not pay for the item(s) or service(s) that are described below.  
Medicare does not pay for all of your health care costs.  Medicare only pays for covered items 
and services when Medicare rules are met.  The fact that Medicare may not pay for a particular 
item or service does not mean that you should not receive it.  There may be a good reason your 
doctor recommended it.  Right now, in your case, Medicare probably will not pay for –  
 
















The purpose of this form is to help you make an informed choice about whether or not you  
want to receive these items or services, knowing that you might have to pay for them yourself.  
Before you make a decision about your options, you should read this entire notice carefully. 
• Ask us to explain, if you don’t understand why Medicare probably won’t pay. 
• Ask us how much these items or services will cost you (Estimated Cost: $_________________), 
      in case you have to pay for them yourself or through other insurance.     
 
 
PLEASE CHOOSE ONE OPTION.  CHECK ONE BOX.   SIGN & DATE YOUR CHOICE. 
   Option 1.  YES.    I want to receive these items or services.  
  I understand that Medicare will not decide whether to pay unless I receive these items 
  or services.  Please submit my claim to Medicare. I understand that you may bill me for 
  items or services and that I may have to pay the bill while Medicare is making its decision.  
  If Medicare does pay, you will refund to me any payments I made to you that are due to me. 
  If Medicare denies payment, I agree to be personally and fully responsible for payment.  
  That is, I will pay personally, either out of pocket or through any other insurance that I have. 
  I understand I can appeal Medicare’s decision. 
 
  Option 2.  NO.    I have decided not to receive these items or services.  
 I will not receive these items or services. I understand that you will not be able to submit a 
 claim to Medicare and that I will not be able to appeal your opinion that Medicare won’t pay. 
 
 
 _____________ _            _________________________________________ 
            Date                              Signature of patient or person acting on patient’s behalf 
 
 
NOTE:  Your health information will be kept confidential.  Any information that we collect about you on this 
form will be kept confidential in our offices.  If a claim is submitted to Medicare, your health information on this form 
may be shared with Medicare.  Your health information which Medicare sees will be kept confidential by Medicare.  
 
OMB Approval No. 0938-0566      Form No. CMS-R-131-G      (June 2002) 
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Figure 1.2: Advance Beneficiary Notice of Noncoverage After the Reform
       (A) Notifier(s): 
      (B)  Patient Name:            (C) Identification Number: 
 
ADVANCE BENEFICIARY NOTICE OF NONCOVERAGE (ABN) 
NOTE:  If Medicare doesn’t pay for (D)_____________ below, you may have to pay. 
 
Medicare does not pay for everything, even some care that you or your health care provider have 
good reason to think you need. We expect Medicare may not pay for the (D)_____________ below.   
(D)                                  
 
 
(E) Reason Medicare May Not Pay: (F) Estimated















WHAT YOU NEED TO DO NOW:   
• Read this notice, so you can make an informed decision about your care.   
• Ask us any questions that you may have after you finish reading. 
• Choose an option below about whether to receive the (D)_____________listed above.  
Note:  If you choose Option 1 or 2, we may help you to use any other  
           insurance that you might have, but Medicare cannot require us to do this.  
(G) OPTIONS:             Check only one box.  We cannot choose a box for you. 
❏ OPTION 1.  I want the (D)__________ listed above.  You may ask to be paid now, but I 
also want Medicare billed for an official decision on payment, which is sent to me on a Medicare 
Summary Notice (MSN).  I understand that if Medicare doesn’t pay, I am responsible for 
payment, but I can appeal to Medicare by following the directions on the MSN.  If Medicare 
does pay, you will refund any payments I made to you, less co-pays or deductibles.   
❏ OPTION 2.   I want the (D)__________ listed above, but do not bill Medicare.  You may  
ask to be paid now as I am responsible for payment. I cannot appeal if Medicare is not billed.    
❏ OPTION 3. I don’t want the (D)__________listed above.  I understand with this choice       
 I am not responsible for payment, and I cannot appeal to see if Medicare would pay. 
(H) Additional Information: 
 
This notice gives our opinion, not an official Medicare decision.  If you have other questions 
on this notice or Medicare billing, call 1-800-MEDICARE (1-800-633-4227/TTY: 1-877-486-2048).       




According to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, no persons are required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control 
number.  The valid OMB control number for this information collection is 0938-0566.  The time required to complete this information collection is estimated to 
average 7 minutes per response, including the time to review instructions, search existing data resources, gather the data needed, and complete and review the 
information collection.  If you have comments concerning the accuracy of the time estimate or suggestions for improving this form, please write to: CMS, 7500 
Security Boulevard, Attn: PRA Reports Clearance Officer, Baltimore, Maryland 21244-1850.                                                                                                               
Form CMS-R-131 (03/08)                          Form Approved OMB No. 0938-0566 
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Beneficiary Age
Denial Rates by Age
This graph shows the denial rates by age. We see that they are quite noisy for younger
ages, jumping up to almost 40%, before smoothing out and leveling.
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Percentage of Pelvic Exams with ABN Form Modifier
ABN Use by Provider - Before Reform
This histogram presents the distribution of the proportion of pelvic examinations with
the ABN modifier across providers in the first six months of data (before the reform).
This is a measure of form use. The findings suggest that many providers are giving
the form to everyone without discretion, and many other providers refrain from using
the form altogether. Only providers with more than 5 claims are included to ensure
that the extremes are not an artifact driven by providers with only very few claims.
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0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Percentage with Modifier Before
ABN Use by Provider - Before and After Reform
This is a scatter plot of form use before and after the reform. It is weighted by the
number of firms at a specific point. The large circles on the ends of the diagonal indi-
cate that many providers persistently never use the form and many firms persistently
always use the form.
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-2 -1 1 2 3
Time Period Since Announcement
Difference in log(Claims) over Time
This is a plot of the coefficients estimating the differences in total number of claims
submitted between the Always Users and the Never Users after controlling for a level
difference. The coefficients are for six month periods relative to the first six months of
2008. The dots are the coefficient estimates and the vertical lines are the confidence
intervals. The dashes indicate the ends of the 90% confidence interval and the entire
line represents the 95% confidence interval.
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-2 -1 1 2 3
Time Period Since Announcement
Difference in log(Prices) over Time
This is a plot of the coefficients estimating the differences in mean charge prices
submitted between the Always Users and the Never Users after controlling for a level
difference. The coefficients are for six month periods relative to the first six months of
2008. The dots are the coefficient estimates and the vertical lines are the confidence
intervals. The dashes indicate the ends of the 90% confidence interval and the entire
line represents the 95% confidence interval.
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Table 1.1: ABN Form use by Procedure
HCPCS Code Procedure Name % Modifier % Denied Mean Charge ($) Mean Allowed ($) Count
G0101 Preventive Pelvic Exam 45 31 67.75 23.92 26,190
Q0091 Preventive Pap Smear 39 31 52.99 26.24 23,957
G0103 Prostate Cancer Screening 17 19 81.51 21.24 29,972
98940 Chiropractic Manipulative Treatment (1-2 Regions) 16 14 35.66 20.47 128,067
98942 Chiropractic Manipulative Treatment (5 Regions) 16 13 55.68 38.13 38,496
98941 Chiropractic Manipulative Treatment (3-4 Regions) 15 12 45.60 28.96 261,688
G0328 Colorectal Cancer Screening 13 19 45.11 17.85 7,492
77080 Hip, Spine or Central DEXA 13 12 177.08 47.13 54,520
G0145 Screening Cytopathology 13 25 80.48 27.16 12,971
G0123 Screening Cytopathology 11 25 66.87 20.76 10,191
85730 Hematology and Coagulation Procedure 11 31 33.02 5.86 17,581
98943 Chiropractic Manipulative Treatment (Extraspinal) 11 98 39.20 .55 6,320
84153 Prostate Specific Antigen 11 18 80.53 21.61 67,573
80061 Lipid Panel 11 8 67.34 13.51 369,956
99397 Routine Examination 10 99 153.78 .01 20,486
This table shows the top procedure codes that are accompanied by the ABN modifier using a 10% random sample of the
dataset for ease of computation.
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Table 1.2: Procedure Count by Age





































This table shows the distribution of procedures submitted by age. These procedures are
performed mostly on younger beneficiaries.
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Table 1.3: Part B Summary Statistics - Preventive Pelvic Examinations
mean sd min p1 p99 max count
2007
Charge Price 65.946 37.90 0.00 30.00 195.00 4000.00 78050
Allowed Price 34.615 3.30 0.00 27.19 42.39 46.69 53252
Denied 0.318 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 78050
ABN Modifier 0.464 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 78050
Black 0.051 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 78050
Non-White & Non-Black 0.029 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 78050
Age 73.265 6.13 65.00 65.00 89.00 101.00 78050
2008
Charge Price 67.006 74.50 0.00 30.00 200.00 17500.00 74873
Allowed Price 34.441 3.20 0.00 27.15 41.77 45.02 52087
Denied 0.304 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 74873
ABN Modifier 0.476 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 74873
Black 0.052 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 74873
Non-White & Non-Black 0.029 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 74873
Age 73.064 6.19 65.00 65.00 89.00 104.00 74873
2009
Charge Price 68.512 52.97 0.00 31.18 200.00 6750.00 72795
Allowed Price 34.134 3.00 0.00 26.95 40.73 44.07 51840
Denied 0.288 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 72795
ABN Modifier 0.483 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 72795
Black 0.054 0.23 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 72795
Non-White & Non-Black 0.037 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 72795
Age 73.017 6.22 65.00 65.00 90.00 101.00 72795
47
Table 1.4: Provider Summary Statistics by Form Use
mean sd min max count
Never Users
Percent Denied 0.298 0.22 0.00 1.00 377
Procedures Submitted 11.684 9.50 5.00 101.00 377
Mean Charge Price 65.361 31.54 22.00 211.00 377
Percentage New Patients 0.433 0.22 0.00 1.00 377
Percentage Black Patients 0.074 0.14 0.00 1.00 377
Percentage High Risk 0.050 0.16 0.00 1.00 377
Gynecologist 0.516 0.45 0.00 1.00 377
Participates in Medicare 0.967 0.17 0.00 1.00 377
Group Practice 0.096 0.21 0.00 1.00 377
mean sd min max count
Always Users
Percent Denied 0.344 0.20 0.00 0.88 317
Procedures Submitted 12.038 7.63 5.00 55.00 317
Mean Charge Price 60.868 33.73 29.55 222.73 317
Percentage New Patients 0.371 0.19 0.00 1.00 317
Percentage Black Patients 0.049 0.11 0.00 1.00 317
Percentage High Risk 0.074 0.15 0.00 1.00 317
Gynecologist 0.951 0.18 0.00 1.00 317
Participates in Medicare 0.886 0.31 0.00 1.00 317
Group Practice 0.051 0.19 0.00 1.00 317
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Table 1.5: Effect on Number of Claims Submitted to Medicare
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Always User  Post -.088 -.045 -.073 -.040
(.024) (.023) (.024) (.023)
Tax ID FE N N Y Y
Zip Code FE N Y N Y
Obs. 13088 13088 13088 13088
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the zip code level.
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table reports the effects of price transparency on the total number
of claims submitted to Medicare. The outcome is log(total claims) so
the coefficients can be interpreted as percentage effects.
Table 1.6: Effect on Charge Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Always User  Post -.023 -.032 -.034 -.034
(.013) (.011) (.010) (.011)
Tax ID FE N N Y Y
Zip Code FE N Y N Y
Obs. 13088 13088 13088 13088
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the zip code level.
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table reports the effects of price transparency on the total charges
submitted to Medicare. The outcome is log(mean charge price) so the
coefficients can be interpreted as percentage effects.
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Table 1.7: Pre-Reform Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Always User  Linear Time Trend .011 . -.0007 .
(.009) (.004)
Linear Time Trend -.020 . .004 .
(.006) (.002)
Always User  Time Period 2 . -.004 . .004
(.069) (.020)
Always User  Time Period 3 . .010 . -.011
(.069) (.018)
Always User  Time Period 4 . .021 . .025
(.070) (.019)
Always User  Time Period 5 . .151 . -.014
(.069) (.023)
Always User  Time Period 6 . .006 . -.019
(.070) (.022)
Always User  Time Period 7 . .043 . .010
(.065) (.022)
Time Period 2 . -.010 . -.013
(.044) (.015)
Time Period 3 . -.003 . .002
(.045) (.012)
Time Period 4 . -.029 . -.010
(.047) (.013)
Time Period 5 . -.011 . .008
(.045) (.014)
Time Period 6 . -.032 . .025
(.044) (.015)
Time Period 7 . -.165 . .009
(.044) (.016)
Tax ID FE Y Y Y Y
Obs. 5279 5279 5279 5279
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the zip code level.
10%,  5%, 1% significance
This table reports if there are any pre-reform differences in trends between Always Users
and Never Users. The outcome variable for the first two columns is log(total claims). The
first column tests if there is a differing linear trend, and the second column tests if there are
differing trends when the time trend is accounted for with flexible dummies. The third and
fourth columns test the same with log(mean charge price) as the outcome variable.
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Table 1.8: Effect on Number of Claims Submitted to Medicare - Robustness
¡ 3 ¡ 5 ¡ 7 ¡ 9 ¡ 11 ¡ 15
Always User  Post -.041 -.073 -.073 -.094 -.114 -.152
(.018) (.024) (.031) (.039) (.048) (.065)
Tax ID FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 20674 13088 9256 6671 4518 2670
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the zip code level.
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table reports the robustness of the effects of price transparency on the total
number of claims submitted to Medicare with regards to the provider inclusion
criterion. Column 1 sets the criterion to be three or more claims, column 2 to be
five or more etc.
Table 1.9: Effect on Charge Prices - Robustness
¡ 3 ¡ 5 ¡ 7 ¡ 9 ¡ 11 ¡ 15
Always User  Post -.027 -.034 -.026 -.029 -.038 -.086
(.009) (.010) (.012) (.015) (.018) (.019)
Tax ID FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 20674 13088 9256 6671 4518 2670
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the zip code level.
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table reports the robustness of the effects of price transparency on the mean
charge prices with regards to the provider inclusion criterion. Column 1 sets the
criterion to be three or more claims, column 2 to be five or more etc.
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Table 1.10: Effect on Number of Claims Submitted to Medicare - Robustness
1.00 .95 .90 .85 .80 .75 .70 .65
High Form Use  Post -.073 -.066 -.068 -.063 -.059 -.059 -.061 -.061
(.024) (.025) (.024) (.023) (.023) (.023) (.023) (.023)
Tax ID FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 13088 13606 14710 16451 18379 19154 20051 20728
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the zip code level.
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table reports the robustness of the effects of price transparency on the total number of claims
submitted to Medicare with regards to the definition of an “Always User”. Column 1 sets the criterion
to be the modifer accompanies 100% of claims, column 2 to be 95% of claims etc.
Table 1.11: Effect on Charge Prices - Robustness
1.00 .95 .90 .85 .80 .75 .70 .65
High Form Use  Post -.034 -.044 -.040 -.036 -.034 -.031 -.031 -.032
(.010) (.011) (.010) (.009) (.009) (.008) (.008) (.008)
Tax ID FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 13088 13606 14710 16451 18379 19154 20051 20728
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the zip code level.
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table reports the robustness of the effects of price transparency on mean charge prices with regards
to the definition of an “Always User”. Column 1 sets the criterion to be the modifer accompanies 100%
of claims, column 2 to be 95% of claims etc.
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Table 1.12: Heterogeneity in the Effect on the Number of Claims Submitted
to Medicare
(1) (2)
Always User  Post .017 -.010
(.038) (.024)
Always User  Post  Mid Prices -.064 .
(.059)
Always User  Post  High Prices -.133 .
(.057)
Always User  Post  New-to-Medicare Patients . -.123
(.054)
Tax ID FE Y Y
Zip Code FE Y Y
Obs. 13088 13088
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the zip code level.
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table reports the heterogeneous effects of price transparency on the
number of claims submitted to Medicare. The outcome for both columns
is log(total claims). Column 1 allows the effect size to vary by the charge
price of the provider and column 2 allows the effect to vary by the per-
centage of new-to-Medicare patients the provider services.
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Table 1.13: Heterogeneity in the Effect on Charge Prices
(1) (2)
Always User  Post -.039 -.042
(.017) (.012)
Always User  Post  Mid Prices .027 .
(.024)
Always User  Post  High Prices -.035 .
(.035)
Always User  Post  New-to-Medicare Patients . .036
(.028)
Tax ID FE Y Y
Zip Code FE Y Y
Obs. 13088 13088
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the zip code level.
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table reports the heterogeneous effects of price transparency on
charge prices. The outcome for both columns is log(mean charge price).
Column 1 allows the effect size to vary by the charge price of the provider
and column 2 allows the effect to vary by the percentage of new-to-
Medicare patients the provider services.
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Table 1.14: Effect on Number of Claims Submitted to Medicare by # of Providers
Only Provider in Zip Multiple Providers in Zip
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Always User  Post -.112 -.086 -.075 -.041 -.048 -.029
(.032) (.031) (.039) (.038) (.040) (.038)
Tax ID FE N Y N N Y Y
Zip Code FE N N N Y N Y
Obs. 7299 7299 5789 5789 5789 5789
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the zip code level.
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table estimates the effects of price transparency on log(total claims). The
first four columns restrict the regression to providers who are the only large
provider in their zip code. The second four columns restrict the regression to
providers in zip codes with multiple large providers.
Table 1.15: Effect on Charge Prices by # of Providers
Only Provider in Zip Multiple Providers in Zip
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Always User  Post -.020 -.026 -.017 -.031 -.033 -.036
(.018) (.016) (.020) (.015) (.014) (.014)
Tax ID FE N Y N N Y Y
Zip Code FE N N N Y N Y
Obs. 7299 7299 5789 5789 5789 5789
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the zip code level.
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table estimates the effects of price transparency on log(mean charge price).
The first four columns restrict the regression to providers who are the only large
provider in their zip code. The second four columns restrict the regression to
providers in zip codes with multiple large providers.
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Chapter 2
Information Disclosure in the
Presence of General Uncertainty:
Evidence from Medicare Part B
2.1 Introduction
The United States’ health care payment system is fraught with complexity. Pa-
tients are commonly complaining of unexpected medical bills, the consequences
of which can be quite severe. For example the Brookings Institute recently
hosted a seminar on “solving surprise medical bills”, meant to discuss the is-
sue of patients being hit with a bill from a out-of-network provider when they
had originally seen an in-network provider. There are also cases of individu-
als who have gone to emergency departments and are subsequently admitted
to the hospital only to find that their insurer will not pay because the admis-
sion did not meet the standard of medical necessity. As discussed in Gresenz
and Studdert (2004) and Tintinalli (2000), these denials can occur even when a
“prudent layperson” would have agreed that the symptoms meet the standard
for an emergency medical condition.
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Cases of unexpected medical bills can be financially devastating not only
because the insurer no longer picks up a percentage of the bill but because the
beneficiary may no longer be entitled to the prices negotiated by their insurer.
Instead the beneficiary may find themselves responsible for paying the list prices,
the price that an uninsured would have to pay, which are widely regarded as
exorbitant and tough to decipher (Reinhardt, 2006). In scenarios of medical
urgency, such financial shocks may be unavoidable. In less severe cases when
the beneficiary has time to make a less costly decision, and would have had they
been informed of the consequences, policy makers are seeing the possibility for
health care savings through increased information dissemination.
A commonly suggested policy to alleviate surprise bills is for physicians to
simply warn patients directly when a procedure will trigger an unexpected out-
of-pocket expense. This gives patients a chance to make a different, perhaps less
costly, decision which will in turn reduce spending. Such policies are appeal-
ing in that the information is salient and given from a trusted source. These
policies, however, rely heavily on the assumption that physicians can accurately
predict such scenarios. This may not be a sound assumption. Given the de-
sign of the payment system in health care there are numerous fee schedules
that physicians must consult to determine prices. It is at least the physician-
insurer pair, not the physician identity alone, that determines whether or not
a procedure will trigger an unexpected out-of-pocket expense. This is further
complicated by the possibility that patient utilization in the policy year can trig-
ger unexpected out-of-pocket expenses. For example, certain procedures might
be subject to frequency limitations, in which case the physician-insurer-patient
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triplet is necessary to concretely determine if a procedure will trigger an unex-
pected out-of-pocket expense. These complexities have the potential to make
it costly, if not impossible, for physicians to accurately identify when a pro-
cedure will trigger an out-of-pocket expense to the patient. Although policies
calling for physician notifications have been suggested, to my knowledge, there
is little empirical research examining the results and efficacy of such notification
policies.
In this paper, I empirically examine physician notification, or disclosure,
strategies under a health care policy that incentivizes physicians to warn pa-
tients about insurance non-coverage. Specifically, I examine the use of a Medi-
care Part B document that physicians use to inform patients that a claim will be
denied by Medicare. As per Medicare rules, the incentive to use the document
is that in the event of non-coverage, if the physician did not give the patient
this document then they may not seek payment from the patient. Initial exami-
nation of the data uncovers non-trivial strategies in distributing this document.
First, many physicians tend to over use this document, meaning that they give
this document to patients whose claims end up being ex-post accepted by Medi-
care, and inversely many physicians under use this document, meaning they do
not give it to patients whose claims end up being ex-post denied be Medicare.
In fact, some physicians employ a blanket distribution strategy, meaning they
give this document to every patient that walks in the door, and some physicians
never give the document to anyone. What makes this latter finding most sur-
prising is that all else equal, as per the Medicare rules, not giving the document
to patients who end up being denied is akin to leaving money on the table.
At first these strategies of both over and under disclosure are surprising, but
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they can be rationalized when considering the context. Suppose physicians and
patients cannot perfectly predict denials. Some physicians they might err in
the direction of giving this document to every patient in order to protect their
revenue. On the flip side, if this document can deter patients from having the
procedure done or it is costly to disseminate this information, then there is in-
centive to under use the document. At worst a physician might unintentionally
deter a patient who would have been covered by mistakenly giving them the
document. Deterring a patient from having the procedure performed has two
downsides for the physician. First it directly reduces revenue. Second it reduces
the provider payoff due to physician altruism, an important aspect of physician
decision-making first discussed by Arrow (1963) and subsequently incorporated
into models by Newhouse (1970), Woodward and Warren-Boulton (1984), and
Farley (1986). Physician altruism means that physicians gain utility from the
well-being of the patient, and if the patient refuses a procedure that the physi-
cian thinks is necessary, this will be at a cost to the physician. If both the
physician and the patient (or at least the patient) have no uncertainty over the
denial outcome, then giving the document to a patient who will be accepted by
Medicare should have no deterrence consequence, and physician dissemination
strategies should not depend on the presence of a deterrence consequence.
I test for the existence of general uncertainty over the denial outcome by
testing whether physicians’ dissemination strategies respond to changes in the
deterrence consequences of the document. I accomplish this by exploiting a
reform to the document that occurred in March 2008. The only change that
occurred as a result of the reform is the amount of information contained on
the document. At this time, the document was changed in a manner such that
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the deterrent aspect of the information changed differentially across physicians
with differing list prices. Exploiting this difference across providers and exam-
ining the within provider use of this document before and after the reform, I
show that physician’s form use strategies do respond to the deterrence conse-
quences in a manner consistent with the existence of uncertainty in the denial
outcome for both patients and physicians, otherwise referred to general uncer-
tainty. Specifically the reform requires physicians to post their prices in the
event of non-coverage on the document. Before the reform the deterrence effect
of the document was arguably homogeneous and after the reform the deterrence
effect is different for physicians with different prices. Examination of changes
in within physician document use allows me to control for fixed unobservable
physician characteristics that are determinants of form use and are correlated
with charge prices.
The predictions of the physician response to this reform are as follows. If it
is true that patients and physicians are not fully informed about the chance of
denial, then physicians who reveal high prices are more likely to deter patients
than physicians who reveal low prices. Since patients cannot predict denial,
this deterrence consequence would exist for both patients who would be ex-post
accepted and ex-post denied by Medicare, the former of which is more costly to
the physician. This implies that physicians with high prices should be less likely
to distribute the document after the reform. This also incentivizes physicians
to become better at predicting denials. If it is possible for physicians to become
better at predicting denials then we should see a reduction in form use for
patients who are ex-post accepted. If it is costly for physicians to predict denials,
then we should see an indistinguishable reduction in form use across the board
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for all patients regardless of the ex-post denial outcome. A competing hypothesis
that would lead to a contrary prediction is if patients know for certain that they
will not be denied and the charge price will not pertain to them, it could be that
the charge price conveys quality. This relationship between price and quality is
of much concern to health care experts (see Hussey, Wertheimer, and Mehrotra
(2013) and Phillips, Schleifer, and Hagelskamp (2016)). Physicians with high
prices would want to reveal their charge prices to patients whose claims will be
accepted, since disclosing this price will convey high quality and these patients
will know that they will not have to pay it. In this case, we would expect to
see physicians with high prices increase their use of the document in response
to the reform.
Many theoretical and empirical papers establish the importance of informa-
tion in determining economic outcomes. Perhaps the most well-known theoret-
ical papers discussing the role of information and the possible market failures
that exist without it are Stigler (1961) and Akerlof (1970). Empirical papers
have made use of mandatory disclosure policies to estimates the effects of infor-
mation on outcomes such as price and quality. Papers demonstrating the im-
portance of health care price disclosure include chapter one of this dissertation,
Whaley et al. (2014), and Christensen, Floyd, and Maffett (2017). Chernew,
Gowrisankaran, and Scanlon (2008) examined the effect of disclosure of hospital
quality report cards. Beyond the realm of health care, Jin and Leslie (2003)
examine the effects of restaurant quality report cards on restaurant quality.
All the aforementioned papers find non-negligible and meaningful results of the
effects of information disclosure.
While the importance of information disclosure is well-studied, there are few
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empirical papers examining factors that incentivize the voluntary disclosure, or
withholding, of information and how reality stacks up against the theoretical
predictions of voluntary information disclosure. This is perhaps due to the dif-
ficulty in finding data suitable for such a study. Theoretical papers that predict
quality disclosure patterns under voluntary disclosure include Grossman (1981),
Jovanovic (1982), and Milgrom (1981). The main takeaway is that, under re-
strictive conditions, suppliers have the incentive to disclose quality information
voluntarily since not disclosing will cause consumers to assume low quality. Jin
(2004) examines reasons for the failure of this “unravelling” prediction in HMO
quality disclosure. She attributes the empirical strategies to differing incen-
tives under varying levels of competition. Lewis (2011) examines the incentive
suppliers have to provide pictures on Ebay in order to reduce the burden of
asymmetric information on the online goods market. Most of the literature
on information disclosure patterns pertain to the disclosure of quality informa-
tion. Although closely related, one aspect that differentiates this paper from the
existing literature is the focus on the voluntary disclosure of price information.
In this paper, I find evidence that uncertainty over precisely the variable that
the supposed “informed” party is meant to disclose plays an important role in
explaining their disclosure strategies. Particular to the setting, I find evidence
that general uncertainty in the denial outcome, and the subsequent consequences
of making an ex-post mistake, can explain the surprising information disclosure
strategies of physicians. Once physicians have to reveal prices those with 10%
higher prices are 1.1 percentage points, or 3.3%, less likely to employ blanket
distribution of the document. This result suggests physicians know that patients
are deterred when they are shown high prices, and not enticed by supposed
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higher quality. Furthermore, I find no evidence that this reduction in form
use is concentrated to accepted claims. Indicating that it is very costly for
physicians to become informed about the denial outcome within procedure, and
they prefer to just stop using the document across the board than resolve the
uncertainty in the denial outcome.
From a policy perspective, these results indicate that there can be major
difficulties in implementing transparency policies, especially in complex and
integrated markets. In this case, physicians themselves do not fully know the
information they are supposed to give, and thus their optimal disclosure patterns
of blanket distribution or never using the document potentially mitigate the
intended purpose of the document. Economists should especially take note of
these results since these uncertainties are prevalent and should be considered
when modeling patient and physician decision-making. Baicker, Mullainathan,
and Schwartzstein (2015) have made important advances in rethinking how
we incorporate behavioral mistakes in evaluating the value of medical care into
patient decision-making, but more work is necessary to understand how mistakes
in calculating the marginal costs of medical enter both patient and physician
payoffs.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the Medicare regulation.
Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis. Section
5 provides a discussion of the results, section 6 explains how these results might
affect the results found in chapter 1, and section 7 concludes.
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2.2 Medicare Part B and the Information Re-
form
This research will focus on Medicare Part B services between 2007 and 2009.
Medicare is the United States’ federal insurance program for the elderly. Medi-
care Part A provides coverage for inpatient procedures and services while Medi-
care Part B provides coverage for outpatient and non-institutional procedures
and services. Together Medicare Part A and Medicare Part B comprise Tra-
ditional Medicare. Medicare Part C, or Medicare Advantage, provides the op-
portunity for a beneficiary to have their Medicare benefits administered by
a commercial insurance carrier. Approximately 55 million individuals receive
coverage through Medicare. As of 2016, 31% of the Medicare population are en-
rolled in Medicare Advantage plans according to the Kaiser Family Foundation
(2016). This is up from 19% in 2007, which is the time-frame most relevant to
this research.
Medicare Part B has cost-sharing components. There is an annual deductible
of $150 and a coinsurance rate of 20% above the deductible. This means that
even if Medicare covers the claim, there is potential for significant out-of-pocket
expense for the patient. Many beneficiaries purchase supplemental coverage
to insure against this cost-sharing risk. The Medigap plan is an example of
a supplemental policy that protects against the risk of cost-sharing. There
are also some beneficiaries who are dual enrolled in Medicaid and Medicare
which would also result in more generous coverage. Further still, there are
beneficiaries who are also enrolled in a supplemental insurance plan offered by
their employer. In chapter one, we discovered that even with many beneficiaries
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enrolled in supplemental coverage, beneficiaries respond to information about
denial which may not even be relevant to them. This finding further highlights
the consequences of such a complicated health care system.
Medicare Part B does not cover all procedures. Reasons a procedure might
be denied are that the beneficiary has met the frequency limitations for the
procedure or the circumstances under which the procedure is performed do not
meet the Medicare standard for medical necessity as determined by Local and
National Coverage Determinations. For example, a patient might not have the
proper diagnosis, as exhibited by the ICD-9 diagnosis code, that Medicare would
expect to see for medical necessity. Medicare is the is the most frequent denier
of medical claims, with a denial rate of 4.92% in 2013 according to the Ameri-
can Medical Association’s National Health Insurer Report Card as reported by
Policy and Medicine (2013).
There are two financial consequences when a procedure is not covered by
Medicare Part B or by health insurance in general. First the patient can be
held financially responsible for 100% of the bill. This means that deductibles,
copays, coinsurance rates, and out-of-pocket maximums no longer apply. Sec-
ond, and perhaps more burdensome, is that the physician may bill the patient
as an uninsured meaning they no longer have to abide by the price set between
themselves and the insurance company. This agreed upon price is referred to
as the allowed amount or negotiated price. This means that in the event of
denial the physician can charge their list price, or charge price, which is what
they would charge an uninsured individual. These list prices can be significantly
higher than the allowed amount, specifically in the case of Medicare where their
allowed amount are protected as being the lowest. Numerous media articles
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have documented the wide variation in, and apparent absurdity of, these list
prices even within the same local health care market. According to Reinhardt
(2006) charge prices across hospitals in California for the same procedure can
vary by as much as seventeenfold.
To mitigate the consequences of such financially damaging events, Medicare
created a standardized document that Part B physicians can use to inform
patients when they think a claim will be denied by Medicare. Notification must
be given to the patient by the provider prior to performing the procedure. This
notification is achieved by having the patient read and sign a standardized form
called the Advance Beneficiary Notice of Noncoverage (ABN). The document
serves two functional purposes. First the document serves as a transmittal
of information between the physician and patient. The physician is giving an
indication to the patient that they believe that the claim will be denied by
Medicare, and in the event of this denial, the patient will be responsible for
a higher financial liability than if the procedure were covered. The second
function is a transfer of liability for the denied claims from the physician to the
patient. Herein lies the direct monetary incentive for the physician to use the
form. Medicare rules state that in the event of a denial, if there is not an ABN
on file, the physician may not seek reimbursement from the patient. When the
physician gives this document to the patient, and the patient agrees to go ahead
with the procedure, the patient is accepting the financial liability in the event of
denial. If the physician does not give the document and the procedure is denied
the physician cannot bill the patient and thus assumes financial responsibility
for the denial. It is in this sense that the use of the form is not mandatory.
If the physician chooses not to use the form, they forgo revenue, but they are
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allowed to make that choice. The physician must keep the signed ABN on file
and produce it in the event of an audit by Medicare.
The functions of this document ought to be of interest to economists. The
information transmittal has demand consequences since it gives the beneficiary
a chance to update their beliefs about the utility of the procedure and then
decide if they want the procedure performed. A report from the head of family
practitioners released by the Office of Management and Budget estimates that
as many as one third of the patients choose not to receive medical care after
receiving this information (OMB, 2008). The incentives to use (or not use) the
document are magnified if the physicians themselves cannot accurately predict
denials. If these demand consequences do exist, then there are nontrivial costs
and benefits for physicians to use this document that reflect physician prefer-
ences, and the patterns of use of this document can shed light on the relative
importance of these costs and benefits in explaining physician interaction with
patients.
In March 2008, it was announced by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) that the document must now list the prices that would be
charged in the event of non-coverage. This change affects only the information
transmittal function of the document, and it keeps the transfer of liability aspect
the same. Heterogeneity in the list price causes heterogeneity in the effect of
this increase in information across physicians which I can exploit to better
understand physician incentives to disclose information. By seeing how within
physician use of the document changes after the reform across providers, we can
examine how the consequences of information influence the decision to disclose
information. Figure 1.1 of chapter 1 shows the document prior to the change
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and figure 1.2 of chapter 1 shows the document after the change. Voluntary use
of the new document, instead of the old one, existed between March 2008 and
March 2009. Starting in March 2009, the only accepted ABN document was
the updated one.
2.3 Data Sources and Summary Statistics
The ideal data for this analysis are administrative claims data along with the
filled out and signed ABN forms kept by the physicians. This would ensure that
we could see which patients were given the form and their choice of whether
to go ahead with the procedure. We would also be able to see which prices
were filled in on the document. However given that collection of the documents
from a representative number of physicians is infeasible, I have found a way to
analyze the use of the document through available data sources.
The main dataset used in the empirical analysis is the 5% carrier claims
research identifiable file for 2007 through 2009 which is distributed by CMS.
The 5% carrier claims file contains administrative claims information for all
the Medicare Part B procedures submitted to Medicare on behalf of 5% of the
Medicare beneficiaries. This is approximately 2.5 million beneficiaries. These
data contain the unencrypted National Provider Identifier (NPI) of the per-
forming physician, physician location down to the nine digit zip code, health
care common procedure codes (HCPCS),1 procedure modifier codes, diagnosis
codes (ICD-9), submitted charges, allowed charges, and Medicare payments.
The procedure modifier code is the crucial variable for this analysis. The value
1HCPCS codes are Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes enhanced to include
Medicare specific procedure codes.
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“GA” for this variable indicates that the patient was given the ABN form.
To obtain more detail about the patient, I use the 5% CMS enrollment files
for years 2007 through 2009. These data contain enrollment, residence, and
basic demographic information for the same 5% of the Medicare population
that is found in the claim files. For each of these beneficiaries, the enrollment
data contain the enrollment date, race, gender, birth date, and the number of
months that the premium was paid by the state. This latter variable indicates
which of the beneficiaries are dual-eligible for Medicaid since the options for the
state to pay the premium is only available for dual-eligibles.
To supplement the Medicare claims data with more detailed information
about the physicians, I incorporate physician characteristics from the National
Provider Identifier database. The dataset includes variables such as the gen-
der of the physician, and the NPI enumeration date, which can proxy for the
experience of the provider.
The main benefit of these data is the large national sample which supports
the generality of the results. Also, the size of the data allows for analysis at the
procedure level since most procedures are well-represented in the dataset. Pro-
cedures vary in meaningful potentially unobserved ways that change economic
incentives, thus analysis of procedures separately when feasible is a sound de-
cision. However, as alluded to, there are two main limitations of the dataset
for this analysis. First we only see the claims that were submitted to Medicare,
and we do not see which patients who were given the document but decided not
to get the procedure completed. Thus when we see a fall in the percentage of
claims submitted to Medicare with the form modifier, we cannot be sure if this
is due to a change in physicians’ strategies to distribute the form or a change
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in patients’ decisions to submit the claim upon receipt of the document. In the
empirical analysis I suggest a method for isolating the change in the physician
strategies from the patient decisions. The second limitation is that we do no
actually see the price that is filled in on the document. However, I do see the
charge price on the claim. I infer this as the price that is placed on the document
since in the event of denial this is what the physician can charge. Although this
may not be the price listed on the form, it serves as an upper bound. Also, as
we will see in the empirical work, this submitted charge price is statistically and
economically meaningful in predicting use of the ABN document which helps
to validate this decision to use it for this analysis.
The crucial variable in this analysis is the procedure modifier code. The
value “GA” indicates, and only indicates, that the patient was given the ABN
prior to the physician performing the procedure. In this dataset, there are ap-
proximately 270 million procedures submitted to Medicare by non-institutional
medical providers over the three years. Of these 270 million, approximately
1.5 million have the modifier GA. Table 1.1 of chapter 1 shows the procedures
for which this document is most commonly used. For computational feasibility,
the table is generated using a 10% random sample of the data. As expected,
this document is most used for procedures with relatively high denial rates.
Specifically it tends to be used most for preventive procedures and chiropractic
procedures.
In the main body of the paper, we will focus on the use of the document for
preventive Pap smears, HCPCS code Q0091. This procedure code specifically
refers to the collection of the specimen which is then sent to the lab. It does
not include the laboratory analysis of the specimen. Furthermore this code
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is specific to preventive Pap smears, not diagnostic ones which are performed
when the patient is symptomatic. Preventive Pap smears test for abnormalities
and are mostly used for the early detection of cervical cancer. Medicare covers
preventive Pap smears once every two years for the general population and once
every year for patients who are deemed to be high risk. A high risk patient is
one who has a history of cervical cancer or has had an abnormal Pap smear in
the past three years.
Table 2.1 depicts the summary statistics for Pap smears during the three
time periods relevant to the reform. The top panel present summary statistics
for claims before the reform. The middle and bottom panel present summary
statistics for claims during the voluntary and mandatory use of the new docu-
ment, respectively. Table 2.2 shows summary statistics for the selected sample
of Pap smears that are used for estimation. This selected sample excludes pro-
cedures from patients less than 65 years old.2 Since the empirical analysis will
make use of within physician variation in use of the document, I exclude claims
from physicians who do not perform at least one procedure in each time pe-
riod. I also exclude procedures from physicians for whom the NPI data are
unavailable.
Turning our attention to the summary statistics for the sample selected for
analysis in table 2.2 we see a high denial rate. These preventive Pap smears
are denied at a rate of about 34% before the reform with a decline to 30% over
time, however even from this table we can see something surprising about the
use of the document. While the rate of denial is 34% before the reform, the
2It is possible for individuals to obtain Medicare prior to turning age 65 if they have certain
illnesses including amyotrophic laterals sclerosis (ALS) and end-stage renal disease (ESRD).
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prevalence of the ABN document is even higher at a rate of about 50%. This is
our first hint that physician use of this document is not as simple as one would
expect. In fact, while the denial rate falls, the use of the document rises. The
diagnosis code attached to the procedure indicates whether the claim is from a
high risk patient. We see that 6.7% of the procedures are performed on high
risk patients. Perhaps as expected, most of these procedures were performed
by gynecologists, about 83%. The average allowed amount is $24.91, however
this includes all the zeros for claims that were denied. The allowed amount
conditional on being accepted is $37.80, which represents the fee that Medicare
has set for this procedure. There is slight variation in this amount since certain
providers are entitled to more given their specific status as Medicare providers.
We also see substantial variation in the charge price which helps the argument
that once physicians have to reveal this price, we should expect to see variation
in their responses. The mean charge price is $49.67 with a standard deviation
of $17.91 and a maximum value of $363.00 before the reform.
2.4 Empirical Analysis of Physician Strategies
In this section I perform empirical analysis to first demonstrate that physician
use of this document is not trivial and then demonstrate that their strategies
are consistent with the existence of general uncertainty and a deterrence effect.
The physician dissemination strategies are presented and discussed in section
2.4.1. The remainder of section 2.4 presents econometric analysis that makes
use of the reform to the ABN and within physician variation in dissemination
strategies before and after the reform to demonstrate that physicians respond in
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a manner consistent with the existence of general uncertainty and a deterrence
effect. Specifically in section 2.4.2, I aim to show that once physicians must
reveal prices on the document, the physicians with higher prices cut back on
their use of the document. In section 2.4.3, I demonstrate that this decrease in
form use was not only concentrated on procedures that end up being accepted
by Medicare. Physicians cut back their form use for both denied and accepted
claims, indicating that the inability to predict denials prevails even when the
cost of making a mistake changes.
2.4.1 Physician Strategies
For initial investigation, I first present visual representation of physician strate-
gies for using the document. Specifically, for each physician,3 I compute what
percentage of their procedures are accompanied with the procedure modifier
code indicating that the patient received the ABN. Figure 2.1 is a histogram
that depicts the distribution of these percentages across physicians that perform
preventive pap smears.
We see that there are three striking strategies for using this form. A large
percentage of providers never give the document, a large percentage always give
the document, and the remaining providers use this document with discretion.
These strategies are interesting because they are not consistent with the denial
rates. Remember this document should only be distributed when the claim will
be denied, so if the denial rates were the same as the form use rate then use of
this document would be as expected. Figure 2.2 shows the same histogram as
figure 2.1 in the top panel with a histogram of the denial rates in the bottom
3I identify distinct physicians by distinct pairs of NPI and five digit zip codes in the dataset.
73
panel. This is our first indication that use of this document is interesting. If
the physicians were using the form as expected then the two histograms should
be perfectly aligned.
Figure 2.2 does not allow us to match form use rates to denial rates for a
given physician. To see this we turn to figure 2.3 which is a scatter plot of the
form use rates and the denial rates. Each point represents the form use rate
and denial rate observed for a physician. The scatter plot is weighted by the
frequency of physicians located at the form use-denial rate pair. If the physicians
were using this form as intended, every point should be on the 45 line. Points
above (below) the 45 line indicate that physicians are over (under) using the
document. In this simple bivariate scatterplot, we actually see little correlation
between the prevalence of the document and the ex-post denial rates.
We have uncovered that some physicians give the document when the claim
ends up being accepted by Medicare and that some do not give the document
even when the claim ends up being denied by Medicare. The simple two-by-
two table 2.3 presents the extent of this finding. We see that of the 113,591
pap smears submitted to Medicare, approximately 34.8% incorrectly had the
modifier attached and 15.1% incorrectly did not have the modifier attached.
The difference between these two percentages suggest that while physicians err
in both directions, the tendency if to err on the side of over-distributing the
document instead of under-distributing.
The finding that physicians are both over-using and under-using the docu-
ment is surprising for a few reasons. First it indicates that physicians are not
able to perfect predict denial rates. Since a physician can only receive payment
in the event of denial, it makes sense that they would err on the side of giving
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the document to protect their revenue. On the other hand, the finding that
physicians do not attach the modifier to procedures that end up being denied is
shocking because it suggests that physicians are unnecessarily forgoing revenue.
However, this too can be explained rationally by physician payoff optimization.
First off, there is a direct cost associated with distributing the document. It is
predicted that it takes seven minutes on average to give this document and for
a patient to read and sign it. This can be time consuming when the average
doctor’s visit is about sixteen minutes. Another rationalization for underusing
the document is the possibility that the form will deter patients from getting
the procedure done. Physicians who are altruistic may not want to deter any
patients, even those who will be denied because they want them to get the
procedure done for medical reasons. Physicians really would not want to deter
patients who will be accepted by Medicare, and if they cannot accurately pre-
dict denial, this is a real risk. So some physicians might choose to under-use the
document to avoid this deterrence aspect. However, if patients know whether
their claim will be accepted regardless of receipt of the document, then the
deterrence effect should not be important and perhaps it is simply the cost of
distributing the form that explains the under-use.
In the following sections I perform empirical analysis that demonstrates the
deterrence effect does play an important role in explaining the physician strate-
gies. I show that when the deterrence effect of the document rises, physicians
cut back on their use of the document.
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2.4.2 Effect on Form Use after Reform
The reform discussed in section 2.2 changed only the deterrence effect of the
reform. The reform did nothing to change the administrative function of the
document. It simply changed the amount of information put on the document
for patients to read. Specifically, after the reform it is mandatory to include
prices that would have to be paid in the event of denial on the document. Placing
prices on the document makes the deterrence effect higher for physicians with
higher prices. If they do in fact care about his deterrence effect, then these
physicians should reduce their use of the document. Figure 2.4 shows how
the prevalence of the ABN changed over time for different terciles of charge
price. The lowest line depicts the highest tercile of charge prices. The first
vertical line represents the announcement of the reform, when the use of the
new form was voluntary, and the latter vertical line represents the when use
of the new form was mandatory. We can see that the prevalence of the form
modifier for claims with high charge prices fell after the voluntary use of the
new document. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the analogous trend restricting the
data to claims that are ex-post denied and accepted, respectively. It appears
that use of the document fell for both sets of claims, which indicates that even
when the costs of the distributing the document rise, physicians do not become
better at identifying which claims will be denied. This hints at the potentially
high costs of learning this outcome. Although these figures are suggestive that
physicians do respond to the deterrence effect by reducing their use of the form,
econometric analysis is necessary to control for variables that might confuse the
interpretation of these figures. However these figures do show that the trends
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in form use across providers with differing prices were similar before the reform,
which leads credence to the claim that it inndeed was the reform that caused
the subsequent differences between the groups.
In this section, I use the reform and econometric analysis to formally test
if physicians with higher prices did indeed reduce their use of the document
after the reform relative to physicians with lower prices. It is also possible and
likely that physicians might reduce their prices in response to this reform, as
demonstrated in chapter 1, thus in the regressions I will use the pre-reform price
in the regressions to avoid this issue of simultaneous causality.
The main equation for estimation is:
Fipt  Gpβ0   β1Vt   β2VtlnpP̄p,t1q   β3Mt   β4MtlnpP̄p,t1q   β5Xi   δp   νiptq
(2.1)
The outcome variable Fipt is a binary indicator of whether the form modifier
appeared on the procedure performed on patient i by physician p in time period
t. The vector Xi contains patient characteristics available in this dataset, and
δp is a physician fixed effect which controls for unobservable physician charac-
teristics that remain constant over time. The inclusion of the physician fixed
effect ensures that we are capturing within physician variation in the use of the
document. This greatly aids in the interpretation of the results because simple
cross-sectional analysis in health care is threatened by differing unobserved de-
mand factors, attitudes towards health, and physician preferences. The variable
P̄p,t1 is average submitted charge price, or the list price, of physician, p, before
the reform. The equation is estimated with three time periods: before the re-
form, after the voluntary use of the new document, Vt, and after the mandatory
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use of the new document, Mt.
The coefficients β1 and β3 pick up changes in form use after the voluntary
and mandatory use, respectively. The main coefficients of interest are β2 and β4
which capture the heterogeneity in the effect of the reform across differing aver-
age list prices. The coefficients β2 and β4 capture the effects of the voluntary use
of the new document and its mandatory use, respectively. A negative (positive)
estimate of these coefficients would imply that physicians use the document
less (more) the higher the charge price in response to having to include prices
on the document. In the presence of uncertainty over the denial outcome, we
would expect these coefficients to be negative implying that high-priced physi-
cians restrain their use of the document relative to low-priced physicians due to
their increased probability of deterring a patient from going through with the
procedure if they reveal a high price.
Since the outcome variable is binary, the function Gp.q captures the appro-
priate functional transformations to perform analysis. I will not consider the
commonly used probit model, since the inclusion of physician fixed effects will
cause those results to be biased and/or inconsistent as a result of the inciden-
tal parameters problem discussed by Neyman and Scott (1948). Instead I will
present the results for a linear probability model which provides ease of interpre-
tation and the results of a conditional logit model as discussed in Chamberlain
(1980), which, due to the functional form of the logistic density, does not suffer
from the same difficulties encountered using a probit model with fixed effects.
The fixed effects logit estimates will result in fewer observations since the es-
timation procedure cannot include observations from physicians for whom the
outcome variable does not change. Thus the physicians who always use and
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never use the document over the time frame of the dataset are dropped in the
fixed effect logit results. However, by nature this conditional logit procedure
does not provide estimates for the fixed effects, only estimates of the β’s, thus
translation of the coefficients into marginal effects of the probability of success
requires assumptions about the values of the fixed effects. It is for this rea-
son that the linear probability model might be more useful for interpretation.
This point in favor of the linear probability model with fixed effects is made in
Ketcham, Lucarelli, and Powers (2015).
Table 2.4 shows the results of the regression. The first column estimates
a linear probability model including physician characteristics in lieu of fixed
effects. The second column uses fixed effects. The difference between the two
columns highlights the importance of the inclusion of fixed effects. The third and
fourth columns are the analogous conditional logit model estimates. The logit
results are not the coefficients in the logistic model but rather the marginal effect
on the probability of “success” for the outcome variable with all other variables
at their mean values. The results are estimated using a 2% Winsorization of
the charge prices. This resolves the issue of obvious outliers and mistakes in
the data. For example, in one case the submitted charge is suspiciously coded
as the same number as the procedure code.
Before turning our attention to the coefficients of most interest, there are
other coefficients that are interesting. We see suggestive evidence that physi-
cians are at least partially informed about how to use the document. This is
demonstrated by the fact that claims that end up being denied are more likely to
have the ABN.4 This is also demonstrated by the fact that “High Risk” claims
4One could argue a reverse causality between the presence of the form modifier and the
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are less likely to have the form modifier. A high risk patient is one who has
a had a history of cervical cancer or has had an abnormal pap smear in the
past three years and thus is able to have the procedure covered by Medicare
more frequently than those who general risk. We also see that physicians are
less likely to give the document to patients who have more of their annual pre-
mium paid by the state, which is only possible if the patient is dual eligible for
Medicaid and Medicare. This is informative both about the income level of the
patient and the generous insurance coverage held by the patient.
We also see interesting results when we turn our attention to characteris-
tics that capture information about the physician. The variable “Day Since
Physician NPI Enumeration Date” is the number of days since the physician
was given their National Provider Identifier (NPI) at the date they performed
the procedure.5 It proxies for the experience of the physician. We see that
more experienced physicians are more likely to give the document which per-
haps indicates that it take time for physicians to learn to use the document
which was indicated to me in email exchanges with physicians. Looking at the
fixed physician characteristics in columns 1 and 3, we see that use of the doc-
ument varies significantly by physician specialty. Specifically, gynecologists are
much more likely to use the document. This is consistent with the incentive to
protect revenue since more of the gynecologists revenue will be driven by such
gynecological procedures.
denial outcome. It could be that physicians have a better sense of what will be denied and
then distribute the form or it could be that the Medicare administrative contractors (MACs)
are more likely to deny when they see the form modifier. At the time of these data, it is
expressly stated that denial decisions will not take into account the presence of the form
modifier.
5This variable is censored because NPIs were given out starting in 2005.
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The coefficients of interest appear in the first two rows. Once controlling
for physician fixed effects, we see that physicians with high prices reduced their
use of the document after the document must include prices. We see that this
cutback occurred most prominently after the voluntary use of the new document
and with no evidence of changes occurring after the mandatory use of the new
document.
As suggested, the results are consistent with the story that physicians re-
spond to the demand consequences and scale back their use of the document
when they must reveal prices. However, there is a sample selection issue here
to be addressed because it might threaten the validity of the physician behav-
ior story. Since in the Medicare claims dataset, we only observe claims that
end up being submitted to Medicare, the sample we have results from both the
physician decision to use the document and the patient decision to submit the
claim. So it is possible that physicians are not changing their behavior, and that
the findings are merely consistent with patients choosing not to submit claims
for higher priced procedures. To address this concern, I look at changes in the
provider’s overall strategy to disseminate information and how that changes af-
ter the reform. Specifically, I aggregate the claims for a provider in each period
and deem the provider an “Always User” in the period if 100% of their claims
have the form modifier. This decision to give the document to every patient
most likely physician driven and not patient driven. When we see that all the
procedures from a certain physician once had the form modifier and now do not,
we can be more certain that this change is a result of the physician’s decision
to no longer distribute the document to everyone and not merely a change in
the patients decision to submit the claim.
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For this purpose I estimate the following equation:
Apt  Gpβ0   β1Vt   β2VtlnpP̄p,t1q   β3Mt   β4MtlnpP̄p,t1q   β5Xpt   δp   νptq
(2.2)
Now there is one observation for each physician in each period. The outcome
variable Apt is equal to one if 100% of the claims from physician p in period t
have the form modifier.6 The vector Xpt includes average patient variables that
vary for physician p over time. The results are presented in table 2.6. The first
two columns show the results of a linear probability model and the second two
show the results of a conditional logit model. We see evidence corroborating
our previous findings and hypothesis that physicians with high prices do find
the strategy of over-distributing less attractive after the reform.
One concern that might affect the results is whether some physicians do
not know to use the document. This possibility is suggested by the increased
form use for physicians with more experience. To address this issue, I check
for robustness of the result to the number of claims that a physician submits.
In table 2.7 I show the results of equation 2.1 separately for providers with at
least 3, 10, and 15 claims over the time frame of the dataset, respectively. The
rationale is that large physicians who perform many of these procedures are
more likely to be informed about the Medicare rules including the existence of
this document. The first three columns present linear probability estimates and
the latter three are logit model estimates. Similarly in table 2.8, I present the
results of the estimation results of equation 2.2 for physicians with at least 1, 2,
and 5 claims in each time period, respectively. We see robustness of the result
6This is the large atom of providers at 100% in the histogram
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that physicians with higher prices are less likely to use the document after the
reform.
2.4.3 Did Physicians Become Better at Predicting De-
nials?
In the previous section I demonstrated that providers respond to the deterrence
consequence by distributing the document less frequently when the deterrence
consequences are higher. The question remains whether physicians are getting
the form distribution more ”correct” after the reform. When the cost of making
an ex-post over-use mistake rises one response is for physicians to invest in
getting the answer right. To test this hypothesis I run an equation similar to
equation 2.1, but the outcome variable is now an indicator of whether or not the
physicians got the form use “right”, meaning they gave the form and the claim
was denied or they did not give the form and the claim was accepted. Referring
back to table 2.3, the claims on the diagonal are “right” and the claims off the
diagonal are not.
The results of this regression are shown in columns one and three of table 2.9.
The columns show the linear probability and conditional logit results, respec-
tively. We see that although physicians cut use of the document as demonstrated
by the previous section, they do not seem to get better at getting the answer
“right”. The probability of making an ex-post mistake is unchanged after the
reform. Physicians are not more likely to distribute the reform correctly after
the reform. This suggests that physicians decrease their use of the document
across the board when the deterrence consequences rise, and that the costs of
resolving this uncertainty are potentially high. Recalling that this is a within
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procedure analysis, this indicates that perhaps within procedure it is difficult
for physicians to decipher which claims will be denied.
To confirm this suggestion, I check whether the decrease in form use is
more pronounced for ex-post accepted claims. If physicians are able to predict
denials, we would expect that they would reduce their use of the document for
procedures that will be accepted by Medicare, because they would not want to
deter those procedures more than denied procedures. To check this, I estimate
the following enhanced version of equation 2.1.
Fipt  Gpβ0   β1Vt   β2VtlnpP̄p,t1q   β3VtlnpP̄p,t1qCipt   β4Mt   β5MtlnpP̄p,t1q
 β6MtlnpP̄p,t1qCipt   β7Xi   δp   νiptq
(2.3)
This equation tests whether higher priced providers change their use of the doc-
ument more for accepted (covered) claims, Cipt  1, relative to denied claims.
7
The idea is that if they can predict accepted claims, they should be cutting back
form use more for accepted claims. The results are in columns two and four of
table 2.9. We do not find evidence that physicians cut back on their use of the
document for accepted claims more than for denied claims. These regressions
support the previous implication that when the deterrence effect of using the
document rises, physicians tend to scale back their use across the board. They
do not become better at distributing it accurately. This could imply that the
costs of definitively learning who will be accepted and denied are large. Recall
that this analysis focuses on a specific procedure, so while physicians might have
an idea of what will be denied across different procedures, these results suggest
7The estimation of equation 2.3 contains all the interactions of Vt, Mt, lnpPptq and Cipt.
These interactions are excluded from the writing of equation 2.3 in the interest of concise
presentation.
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that they have difficulty when it come to predicting which claims will be denied
within procedure.
2.5 Discussion
The findings in this paper support revisiting how uncertainty enters physician
decision-making. When it comes to uncertainty over the financial costs of med-
ical care, we have typically thought that the patient is uninformed while the
physician is perfectly informed. In this setting, even though Medicare was ask-
ing physicians to do something quite simple in warning patients when a claim
would be denied, we find that it was actually quite difficult for physicians to
implement. This uncertainty physicians face in predicting denials results in ex-
treme notification strategies that could mitigate the purpose of the information.
Specifically, some physicians chose to never warn patients about the potential for
denial, and some physicians chose to always warn patients about the potential
for denial.
The finding that physicians stop using the document liberally when the
chance of deterring a patient rises indicates that the physician strategies arise
from rational incentives as opposed to random influences. The physicians know
that even patients that would be ex-post accepted by Medicare do not know
this for certain, and thus if they give them the document they might deter the
patients from receiving the care. Thus in order to avoid this loss, physicians with
higher deterrence consequences decide to cut back their use of the document. If
patients could accurately predict denial or if physicians could accurately convey
whether a claim would be denied, then there would be no consequences of
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warning patients that they might have to pay for denials when they end up
being accepted because they would know that they would be accepted.
Physicians scale back use of this document similarly for both accepted and
denied claims. Meaning uncertainty over the probability of denial remains un-
changed even after the cost of making a mistake rises. This indicates that the
cost of predicting the denials is high. Thus this uncertainty actually results in
an unexpected a benefit to some patients. Since the uncertainty causes some
physicians to not use the document, these patients who experience denials and
do not receive the document are not responsible for payment on the denied
claims. Instead the physicians have to bear the cost of these procedures.
For policy purposes, these results highlight the difficulties of notification
policies that would require physicians to warn patients about insurance cov-
erage. Such policies are very difficult to implement and make clear in such
a complicated health care system. Even though the incentives might be such
that physicians are incentivized to get the notifications right, the costs might
be prohibitive.
This research also provides insight into why there is substantial price opacity
in health care. In this paper we saw that physicians with high charges prices
stopped using the document once they had to pre-populate the document with
the prices. Thus this research provides evidence that physicians are aware that
revealing high prices can deter patients. Patients even respond to information
about prices that are not relevant to them, and physicians choose to not reveal
the prices in an effort to mitigate these demand responses. The existence of this
demand consequence and the physicians’ strategic response should be considered
by policymakers who advocate for increased price transparency in health care.
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2.6 Tieback to Chapter One
This paper finds empirical evidence that physicians with higher prices choose
to not reveal prices in anticipation of the demand consequences. This speaks to
the external validity of the results from chapter 1 which estimated the effects
of price transparency on utilization and prices. In chapter 1, we focused on the
always users and never users of the document as treatment and control groups,
respectively, in a difference-in-differences strategy to estimate the effects of price
transparency. I provided suggestive evidence that this method was internally
valid since the crucial identification assumption is that the trends in the group
would have been the same in absence of the reform.
This difference-in-differences method used in chapter 1 provides an estimate
of the treatment effect on the treated. Namely, it provides the effect of price
transparency on the always users. The results from chapter 2 indicate that
physicians with high prices are more likely to refrain from being always users
in anticipation of the demand consequences, and thus this treatment effect on
the treated is most likely an underestimate of the effect of price transparency
on the utilization at physicians who were not in the treatment group.
In an attempt to adjust the estimated effect from chapter 1 to extrapolate
to the physicians not in the treatment group, we turn our attention to the
heterogeneity in prices results found in table 1.12 of chapter 1. Using these
results a naive calculation of the average treatment effect for all physicians would
be the average of the effects for the low, middle, and high tercile price groups.
This would yield an estimated average effect of a 5.95% reduction in utilization
in response to price transparency. However these price terciles were constructed
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using the physicians in the treatment and control groups. Considering now
all the physicians in the dataset (not just the Always or Never Users) using
these same cutoffs, 27.71% of these physicians would be categorized as having
low prices, 38.11% as having middle prices, and 34.18% as having high prices.
Taking the heterogeneity results from chapter 1 and using these weights, the
extrapolated treatment effect is roughly estimated to be .2771 1.7%  .3811
6.4%   .3418  13.3%  6.5%. This estimate takes into account the fact
that the physicians excluded from the analysis in chapter 1 tend to have higher
prices. This is of course a rough extrapolation and ignores differences beyond
the price effects that might have caused physicians to not be always users, but
it highlights that the results in chapter 1 are arguably a lower bound on the
magnitude of the effect of price transparency due to the results in this chapter
that physicians withhold price information specifically to avoid the demand
consequence.
2.7 Conclusion
This research contributes to the modest empirical literature on voluntary in-
formation disclosure strategies. Specifically this research examines disclosure
strategies when the distributor of information is not fully-informed. In this pa-
per, I examine how physicians respond to incentives to distribute information
warning patients about expected insurance noncoverage. I show that the physi-
cian strategies are consistent with general uncertainty over the outcome they are
presumed to know. Many physicians employ a blanket strategy of distributing
the information to all patients and many physicians choose to never give the
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warning.
Furthermore, I find evidence that physicians are aware of the possibility of
“scaring off” patients who would be ex-post accepted with this warning. In
response to this negative demand consequence, physicians cut back on their
dissemination of this warning, however since they are unable to predict who
will be denied, they scale back on their use of this warning across the board for
all patients. This indicates that for some physicians, the loss in demand of their
services outweighs the financial incentive to use the document which mitigates
the informational purpose of the document.
The results highlight some of the difficulties of implementing disclosure poli-
cies in health care. While targeted information may be the best, there is
a trade-off between giving detailed information and knowing the information
with certainty. Providers might be unable to accurately predict when an event
will trigger an unexpected out-of-pocket expense. This should be taken into
account when trying to determine the efficacy of such disclosure policies in
complicated markets like health care. Future research that studies the effects
of information in the health care market should not assume that physicians are
fully-informed but instead should consider how the information disclosure will
affect both physician and patient behavior.
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2.8 Figures and Tables
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Table 2.1: Procedure Level Summary Statistics - Preventive Pap Smears - All
mean sd min p1 p99 max count
Beform Reform
ABN 0.394 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 90111
High Risk Claim 0.059 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 90111
Patient Age 69.438 10.99 20.00 31.00 89.00 103.00 90111
Patient Black 0.071 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 90111
Months State Paid Premium 1.574 4.00 0.00 0.00 12.00 12.00 90111
Days Since NPI Enumeration 488.549 200.13 0.00 78.00 934.00 1012.00 88421
Submitted Charge Price 51.191 25.36 0.00 12.00 119.00 4500.00 90111
Allowed Amount 24.705 18.34 0.00 0.00 48.30 108.24 90111
Claim Denied 0.334 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 90111
Allowed Amount Given Accepted 37.105 6.72 1.64 14.00 48.43 108.24 59996
Physician Female 0.495 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 87861
Gynecologist 0.681 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 90111
Family Practitioner 0.134 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 90111
Internal Medicine 0.104 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 90111
Participating Physician 0.879 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 90111
During Voluntary Use of New ABN
ABN 0.396 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 78940
High Risk Claim 0.059 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 78940
Patient Age 68.928 11.19 18.00 30.00 89.00 104.00 78940
Patient Black 0.076 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 78940
Months State Paid Premium 1.645 4.07 0.00 0.00 12.00 12.00 78940
Days Since NPI Enumeration 863.451 202.97 7.00 375.00 1299.00 1375.00 77658
Submitted Charge Price 53.485 35.10 0.00 15.00 133.00 4500.00 78940
Allowed Amount 26.977 18.15 0.00 0.00 49.12 54.11 78940
Claim Denied 0.289 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 78940
Allowed Amount Given Accepted 37.958 6.82 0.01 14.60 49.12 54.11 56103
Physician Female 0.508 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 77637
Gynecologist 0.673 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 78940
Family Practitioner 0.136 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 78940
Internal Medicine 0.101 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 78940
Participating Physician 0.890 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 78940
During Mandatory Use of New ABN
ABN 0.405 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 65513
High Risk Claim 0.060 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 65513
Patient Age 68.575 11.30 19.00 30.00 89.00 100.00 65513
Patient Black 0.081 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 65513
Months State Paid Premium 1.696 4.11 0.00 0.00 12.00 12.00 65513
Days Since NPI Enumeration 1191.421 210.73 43.00 563.00 1609.00 1681.00 64648
Submitted Charge Price 55.123 22.71 0.00 15.00 140.00 500.00 65513
Allowed Amount 27.244 17.92 0.00 0.00 48.39 51.85 65513
Claim Denied 0.281 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 65513
Allowed Amount Given Accepted 37.898 6.54 0.25 15.00 48.39 51.85 47095
Physician Female 0.517 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 64627
Gynecologist 0.689 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 65513
Family Practitioner 0.128 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 65513
Internal Medicine 0.094 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 65513
Participating Physician 0.909 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 65513
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Table 2.2: Procedure Summary Statistics - Preventive Pap Smears for Analysis
mean sd min p1 p99 max count
Before Reform
ABN 0.498 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 42919
High Risk Claim 0.067 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 42919
Patient Age 73.331 6.16 65.00 65.00 89.00 100.00 42919
Patient Black 0.047 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 42919
Months State Paid Premium 0.616 2.61 0.00 0.00 12.00 12.00 42919
Days Since NPI Enumeration 492.820 201.74 0.00 78.00 939.00 1012.00 42919
Submitted Charge Price 49.667 17.91 0.00 12.00 114.00 363.00 42919
Allowed Amount 24.911 18.66 0.00 0.00 48.30 79.00 42919
Claim Denied 0.341 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 42919
Allowed Amount Given Accepted 37.802 6.43 3.00 13.00 48.98 79.00 28283
Physician Female 0.480 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 42919
Gynecologist 0.826 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 42919
Family Practitioner 0.058 0.23 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 42919
Internal Medicine 0.065 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 42919
Participating Physician 0.868 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 42919
During Voluntary Use of New ABN
ABN 0.518 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 38391
High Risk Claim 0.072 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 38391
Patient Age 73.136 6.19 65.00 65.00 90.00 104.00 38391
Patient Black 0.049 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 38391
Months State Paid Premium 0.575 2.53 0.00 0.00 12.00 12.00 38391
Days Since NPI Enumeration 875.444 196.28 98.00 454.00 1301.00 1375.00 38391
Submitted Charge Price 51.285 18.77 0.00 14.00 114.00 375.00 38391
Allowed Amount 27.326 18.49 0.00 0.00 49.12 54.11 38391
Claim Denied 0.295 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 38391
Allowed Amount Given Accepted 38.755 6.47 1.00 14.00 49.12 54.11 27069
Physician Female 0.490 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 38391
Gynecologist 0.827 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 38391
Family Practitioner 0.056 0.23 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 38391
Internal Medicine 0.064 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 38391
Participating Physician 0.886 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 38391
During Mandatory Use of New ABN
ABN 0.528 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 32281
High Risk Claim 0.072 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 32281
Patient Age 73.029 6.17 65.00 65.00 90.00 100.00 32281
Patient Black 0.052 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 32281
Months State Paid Premium 0.590 2.56 0.00 0.00 12.00 12.00 32281
Days Since NPI Enumeration 1212.740 189.38 425.00 805.00 1611.00 1681.00 32281
Submitted Charge Price 52.606 19.47 0.00 15.00 116.00 375.00 32281
Allowed Amount 27.236 18.41 0.00 0.00 48.39 51.85 32281
Claim Denied 0.297 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 32281
Allowed Amount Given Accepted 38.728 6.08 3.00 15.00 48.39 51.85 22702
Physician Female 0.492 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 32281
Gynecologist 0.830 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 32281
Family Practitioner 0.060 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 32281
Internal Medicine 0.059 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 32281
Participating Physician 0.904 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 32281
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0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Percentage of Pap Smears with ABN Form Modifier
ABN Use by Physician
This figure is a histogram of the ABN use across physicians. For each physician, I
calculate the percentage of their claims that have the ABN form modifier attached,
and this is a histogram representing those percentages. To convince that the atoms
near zero and one are legitimate strategies and not artifacts of physicians with a few
number of claims, I only include physicians with at least 15 claims in this histogram.
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0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Denial Rates by Physician
These histograms taken together depict that the ABN use and denial rates are not the
same as would be expected if physicians were using this document as intended. The
top panel is the same histogram presented in figure 2.1. The bottom panel presents a
histogram of the denial rates across physicians.
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0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Percentage Denied
Denial Rate and ABN Rates by Physician 
This figure presents a scatterplot of the (denial rate, ABN percentage) pair for each
physician. The scatterplot is weighted by the frequency of physicians at the specific
location. Points above (below) the 45 line indicate physicians that are over (under)
using the document. There also does not appear to be much correlation between the
two variables.
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Table 2.3: Denial Outcome by ABN Modifier Attached
ABN
Claim Denied No Yes Total
No 38,163 39,481 77,644
Yes 17,146 18,801 35,947
Total 55,309 58,282 113,591
This table shows how accurately the ABN modifier and the denial outcome are aligned.
The diagonal terms depict the cases when the ABN modifier was correctly attached
(unattached). The off diagonal represent cases where the ABN was either incorrectly
used or incorrectly not used.
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1/2007 Voluntary Use, 3/2008 Mandatory Use, 3/2009
Time
Bottom price tercile Middle price tercile
Top price tercile
ABN Prevalence by Charge Prices
This figure presents a trend in the prevalence of the ABN modifier by charge price
terciles. The first vertical line represents the point at which voluntary use of the new
document occurred and the second vertical line represents when mandatory use of the
new document occurred. We see that after the voluntary use, the prevalence of the
form modifier fell for the most expensive claims relative to the less expensive claims.
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1/2007 Voluntary Use, 3/2008 Mandatory Use, 3/2009
Time
Bottom price tercile Middle price tercile
Top price tercile
ABN Prevalence by Charge Prices - Denied Claims
This figure presents a trend in the prevalence of the ABN modifier on denied claims by
charge price terciles. The first vertical line represents the point at which voluntary use
of the new document occurred and the second vertical line represents when mandatory
use of the new document occurred. We see that after the voluntary use, the prevalence
of the form modifier for denied claims fell for the most expensive claims relative to
the less expensive claims.
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Bottom price tercile Middle price tercile
Top price tercile
ABN Prevalence by Charge Prices - Accepted Claims
This figure presents a trend in the prevalence of the ABN modifier on accepted claims
by charge price terciles. The first vertical line represents the point at which volun-
tary use of the new document occurred and the second vertical line represents when
mandatory use of the new document occurred. We see that after the voluntary use,
the prevalence of the form modifier for accepted claims fell for the most expensive
claims relative to the less expensive claims.
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Table 2.4: Effect of the Reform on Form Prevalence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Charge Price)  After Voluntary Price Disclosure -.003 -.021 -.002 -.017
(.013) (.009) (.014) (.006)
Log(Charge Price)  After Mandatory Price Disclosure .004 .010 .005 .007
(.012) (.009) (.014) (.004)
After Voluntary Use -.008 .086 -.014 .067
(.049) (.035) (.057) (.026)
After Mandatory Use -.026 -.034 -.033 -.022
(.048) (.033) (.055) (.017)
Claim Denied .024 .007 .028 .004
(.005) (.002) (.006) (.002)
High Risk Claim .009 -.020 .010 -.012
(.017) (.006) (.019) (.004)
Patient Age 1.00e-05 .0003 .00004 .0002
(.0003) (.0002) (.0004) (.00007)
Patient Black -.071 -.005 -.082 -.003
(.012) (.005) (.013) (.003)
Months State Paid Premium -.014 -.001 -.016 -.001
(.001) (.0004) (.001) (.0004)
Log(Days Since Physician NPI Enumeration Date) .061 .028 .071 .017
(.011) (.005) (.013) (.003)
Log(Charge Price) -.001 . -.005 .
(.020) (.023)
Physician Female .015 . .017 .
(.012) (.013)
Gynecologist .202 . .220 .
(.029) (.034)
Family Practitioner -.180 . -.232 .
(.031) (.039)
Internal Medicine -.250 . -.372 .
(.031) (.041)
Participating Physician .001 . -.0002 .
(.014) (.016)
Const. -.103 .307 . .
(.119) (.034)
Obs. 113591 113591 113488 49056
Physician FEs N Y N Y
R2 .132 .757 . .
This table presents the results of equation 2.1 where the outcome variable is a binary
indicator of whether a procedure has the ABN form modifier. The first two columns
present the results of a linear probability model, where column 1 includes observable
physician characteristics, and column 2 includes physician fixed effects. Columns 3
and 4 present the analogous conditional logit results. The conditional logit results
report the marginal changes on the probability of success using the mean values of the
other variables.
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Table 2.5: Physician Summary Statistics - Preventive Pap Smears
mean sd min p1 p99 max count
Before Reform
Procedures Performed 4.645 4.86 1.00 1.00 23.00 80.00 9240
Always User 0.328 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Percentage Denied 0.299 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Percent Black 0.052 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Percent High Risk 0.058 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Mean Age of Patient 72.885 4.19 65.00 65.00 85.29 99.00 9240
Mean Months Premiums Paid by State 0.667 2.11 0.00 0.00 12.00 12.00 9240
Physician Female 0.500 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Gynecologist 0.718 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Family Practitioner 0.113 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Internal Medicine 0.104 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Participating Physician 0.866 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
During Voluntary Use of New ABN
Procedures Performed 4.155 4.21 1.00 1.00 20.00 56.00 9240
Always User 0.363 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Percentage Denied 0.269 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Percent Black 0.054 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Percent High Risk 0.061 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Mean Age of Patient 72.734 4.26 65.00 65.00 85.00 95.00 9240
Mean Months Premiums Paid by State 0.630 2.11 0.00 0.00 12.00 12.00 9240
Physician Female 0.500 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Gynecologist 0.716 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Family Practitioner 0.113 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Internal Medicine 0.104 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Participating Physician 0.882 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
During Mandatory Use of New ABN
Procedures Performed 3.494 3.44 1.00 1.00 17.00 62.00 9240
Always User 0.391 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Percentage Denied 0.276 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Percent Black 0.056 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Percent High Risk 0.060 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Mean Age of Patient 72.676 4.48 65.00 65.00 86.00 95.00 9240
Mean Months Premiums Paid by State 0.656 2.20 0.00 0.00 12.00 12.00 9240
Physician Female 0.500 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Gynecologist 0.718 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Family Practitioner 0.114 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Internal Medicine 0.104 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
Participating Physician 0.902 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9240
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Table 2.6: Effect on Reform on the Probability a Physician is an Always User
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Charge Price)  After Voluntary Price Disclosure -.036 -.036 -.110 -.114
(.014) (.014) (.039) (.041)
Log(Charge Price)  After Mandatory Price Disclosure .011 .011 .044 .045
(.013) (.013) (.039) (.041)
After Voluntary Use .175 .173 .522 .537
(.055) (.055) (.151) (.157)
After Mandatory Use -.014 -.013 -.089 -.088
(.052) (.052) (.152) (.157)
Percentage Denied . -.009 . -.025
(.008) (.021)
Percent High Risk . -.011 . -.041
(.022) (.053)
Mean Age of Patient . -.0002 . -.0005
(.0007) (.002)
Percent Black . -.011 . -.031
(.018) (.056)
Mean Months Premiums Paid by State . -.002 . -.005
(.002) (.005)
Obs. 27720 27720 7251 7251
Physician FEs Y Y Y Y
R2 .751 .751 . .
This table presents the results of equation 2.2 where the outcome variable is a binary
indicator of whether a physician always uses the ABN form modifier. The first two
columns present the results of a linear probability model. Columns 3 and 4 present the
analogous conditional logit results. The conditional logit results report the marginal
changes on the probability of success calculated using the mean values of the other
variables.
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Table 2.7: Robustness of the Form Use Decision to the Size of the Physician
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Charge Price)  After Voluntary Price Disclosure -.021 -.011 -.007 -.017 -.010 -.008
(.009) (.011) (.013) (.006) (.005) (.006)
Log(Charge Price)  After Mandatory Price Disclosure .010 .007 .005 .007 .003 .002
(.009) (.011) (.012) (.004) (.004) (.005)
After Voluntary Use .086 .047 .033 .067 .043 .035
(.035) (.042) (.051) (.026) (.022) (.023)
After Mandatory Use -.034 -.022 -.015 -.022 -.008 -.005
(.033) (.041) (.048) (.017) (.017) (.020)
Claim Denied .007 .008 .005 .004 .004 .003
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.002)
High Risk Claim -.020 -.023 -.027 -.012 -.012 -.015
(.006) (.007) (.008) (.004) (.005) (.006)
Patient Age .0003 .0001 .0003 .0002 .00007 .0001
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.00007) (.00007) (.00008)
Patient Black -.005 -.004 -.002 -.003 -.003 -.0009
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Months State Paid Premium -.001 -.002 -.002 -.001 -.001 -.0009
(.0004) (.0005) (.0005) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004)
Log(Days Since Physician NPI Enumeration Date) .028 .031 .030 .017 .016 .016
(.005) (.006) (.007) (.003) (.004) (.004)
Const. .307 .335 .358 . . .
(.034) (.040) (.046)
Physician FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 113591 85203 66196 49056 40280 32455
R2 .757 .748 .748 . . .
This table presents the robustness of equation 2.1 to size of the physician. The number of total claims a physician submits is
used as an inclusion criteria. Columns 1,2,3 sets the minimum number of claims for inclusion to 3, 10, and 15, respectively.
The first three columns are the results from a linear probability model and the last three columns present the results of the
analogous conditional logit model. The conditional logit results report the marginal changes on the probability of success
calculated using the mean values of the other variables.
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Table 2.8: Robustness of the Physician Always User Decision to the Size of the Physician
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Charge Price)  After Voluntary Price Disclosure -.036 -.047 -.099 -.114 -.149 -.294
(.014) (.021) (.044) (.041) (.057) (.271)
Log(Charge Price)  After Mandatory Price Disclosure .011 .025 -.001 .045 .081 -.012
(.013) (.021) (.039) (.041) (.058) (.107)
After Voluntary Use .173 .219 .423 .537 .676 1.220
(.055) (.082) (.168) (.157) (.221) (1.117)
After Mandatory Use -.013 -.066 .041 -.088 -.225 .133
(.052) (.079) (.152) (.157) (.224) (.430)
Percentage Denied -.009 -.024 -.027 -.025 -.059 -.068
(.008) (.016) (.041) (.021) (.035) (.100)
Percent High Risk -.011 .002 .022 -.041 .013 .019
(.022) (.038) (.085) (.053) (.084) (.165)
Mean Age of Patient -.0002 -.0003 -.00005 -.0005 -.0009 -.003
(.0007) (.001) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.006)
Percent Black -.011 .005 .059 -.031 .048 .071
(.018) (.041) (.123) (.056) (.103) (.269)
Mean Months Premiums Paid by State -.002 -.001 .008 -.005 -.003 .026
(.002) (.003) (.010) (.005) (.009) (.031)
Physician FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 27720 14025 4047 7251 4086 1227
R2 .751 .733 .728 . . .
This table presents the robustness of equation 2.2 to size of the physician. The number of total claims a physician submits
is used as an inclusion criteria. Columns 1, 2, and 3 set the minimum number of claims in a period for inclusion to 1, 2,
and 5, respectively for a linear probability model. The last three columns report the analogous results for a conditional logit
model. These results report the marginal changes on the probability of success calculated using the mean values of the other
variables.
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Table 2.9: Effect of Reform on the Probability of Getting the Form Use “Right”
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Charge Price)  After Voluntary Price Disclosure -.014 -.024 .018 -.012
(.013) (.015) (.023) (.010)
Log(Charge Price)  After Mandatory Price Disclosure .023 .016 -.0006 .006
(.014) (.014) (.025) (.006)
Log(Charge Price)  After Voluntary Price Disc  Accepted . .005 . .002
(.014) (.006)
Log(Charge Price)  After Mandatory Price Disc  Accepted . -.009 . -.003
(.015) (.006)
After Voluntary Use .056 .096 -.054 .046
(.049) (.057) (.088) (.038)
After Mandatory Use -.083 -.057 .032 -.022
(.054) (.055) (.095) (.022)
Claim Denied .073 .032 .824 .015
(.014) (.036) (.038) (.007)
High Risk Claim -.038 -.020 .001 -.008
(.011) (.006) (.013) (.005)
Patient Age .0004 .0003 .0001 .0001
(.0002) (.0002) (.0005) (.00007)
Patient Black 1.00e-05 -.005 .003 -.002
(.008) (.005) (.015) (.002)
Months State Paid Premium .0006 -.001 .002 -.0006
(.0007) (.0004) (.001) (.0004)
Log(Days Since Physician NPI Enumeration Date) -.027 .028 -.034 .010
(.007) (.005) (.013) (.006)
Const. .627 .282 . .
(.045) (.050)
Obs. 113591 113591 64583 49056
Physician FEs Y Y Y Y
R2 .243 .757 . .
This table presents the result of equation 2.1 with the outcome variable changed to be a binary indicator of whether the
form modifier and the denial rate are consistent with each other. In other words, the outcome of these columns is whether
the physician got the form use “right”. These results are presented in columns 1 and 3 for a linear probability model and
conditional logit model, respectively. Columns 2 and 4 present the results of equation 2.3 for a linear probability model and




The Effect of Insurance
Coverage Information on
Utilization of Health Care for
New Medicare Enrollees
3.1 Introduction
The United States’ health care system is complicated and patients navigate this
system largely uninformed. Health insurance plans are becoming more complex.
With the confusion over what procedures are covered, where the procedures are
covered, and how much of the procedures are covered, the value in informing
patients about aspects of their insurance plans is becoming more apparent.
While some may think the value lies in conveying the subtle details of a plan, it
is possible that many would benefit from simply learning the basics about how
health insurance works. Given the complexity of insurance plans, it is infeasible
to supply beneficiaries with full information that would allow them to perfectly
predict their medical bills. This necessitates further research to understand
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what information is best to give and for whom the information will be the most
effective.
In this paper, I examine the effect of receiving notification within the first
six months of enrollment that Medicare does not cover all procedures on fu-
ture utilization of medical care. I exploit the use of a standardized Medicare
Part B document created by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) that Part B physicians use to warn patients when a procedure may not
be covered by Medicare. The physicians are incentivized to use this document
because it grants them permission to charge beneficiaries for the full cost of the
procedure in the event that Medicare denies (does not cover) the procedure.
Even though the document is used to convey the physician’s belief about the
coverage of a specific procedure, the document does convey simple and salient
information about Medicare that beneficiaries might retain when they consider
future medical care. Namely the document conveys that Medicare does not pro-
vide coverage for all procedures, and the beneficiary has to sign this document
indicating their understanding of this information.
The literature has established that individuals do respond to changes in
salient insurance coverage characteristics. Examples of this research include the
famed Rand Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) which remains the gold stan-
dard for establishing the price elasticity of demand for medical care (Manning
et al., 1987). More recent work on this topic includes Kowalski (2016) who
examines the distribution of price elasticities revealing that there are higher
elasticities than the HIE suggest, and Brot-Goldberg et al. (2017) who leverage
a recent shift to a high deductible insurance plan at a large self-insured firm.
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Even though individuals do respond to changes in insurance coverage character-
istics, there is mounting evidence that they are making seemingly suboptimal
decisions. For example, Brot-Goldberg et al. (2017) show that even though
individuals do respond to the increased deductible, patients reduce both valu-
able and invaluable care, and that a large percentage of the reduction in care
comes from the ex-ante sickest population who experience a low shadow price
of care. In the theoretical literature, Baicker, Mullainathan, and Schwartzstein
(2015) incorporated the possibility for patient mistakes into a model of medical
decision-making. I contribute to this literature by examining how insurance
information revelation, while leaving the benefit design the same, can result in
similar changes in medical care utilization.
The effect of revealing that insurance does not cover all procedures is unclear.
If beneficiaries already know that Medicare does not cover all procedures then
there should be no effect. However if beneficiaries do not know this then there
are differing possibilities for what may happen. Beneficiaries might take the
effort to learn which procedures are covered and thus reduce their consumption
of non-covered care. On the other hand, once they realize that Medicare does not
cover everything they may find themselves unable to perfectly predict denials
and instead they could scale back on both covered and non-covered medical
care in an effort to avoid high medical bills. It is also possible that beneficiaries
might increase their utilization of medical care in response to this information.
Once they realize that physicians will warn them when a claim will be denied,
they may have more confidence in going to the doctor resulting in an increase
in accepted medical care utilization. Reductions in non-covered medical care
could arguably be considered a good thing. Non-covered care is medical care
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that CMS has deemed to be medically unnecessary. Thus reductions in this
type of care could be seen as reductions in wasteful spending. Changes in the
utilization of covered care could be seen as an unintended consequence since the
purpose of the document is to warn about the possibility of non-covered care.
Reductions in covered care could be seen as especially bad since this would
represent an unintended reduction in medically necessary care.
Empirical work is necessary to disentangle these possibilities from one an-
other. The econometric strategy exploits variation in the dissemination of this
document across Medicare beneficiaries. The strategy tests whether receipt of
this document within the first six months of Medicare enrollment is associated
with changes in medical care utilization in the subsequent two years. To as-
suage concerns about the endogeneity of the dissemination of this document,
I control for patient demographic characteristics, state fixed effects, and most
importantly, medical care utilization in the first six months using a rich claims
dataset.
To further address concerns about endogeneity, I perform two types of sup-
plemental regressions. The first set shows that the estimated effects of the
information are indistinguishable from zero for emergency department utiliza-
tion. This indicates that the control variates adequately account for differences
in underlying health status. The second type of regression shows that the same
strategy yields no distinguishable effects for Medicare beneficiaries who have
been enrolled for five years. We would expect this since these beneficiaries have
most likely already learned the information contained in the document. If there
were endogeneity between receipt of the document and future utilization, then
we would expect to estimate an effect even for this more experienced population.
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The results suggest that receiving this warning of non-coverage within the
first six months of enrollment is effective in reducing health care spending on
average, and the reductions occur in the utilization of non-covered procedures.
Specifically, receipt of the notification is associated with a 10.8% decrease in to-
tal submitted charges and a 5.0% decrease in total submitted claims on average.
This breaks down into a significant 13.8% average decrease in denied charges
and a statistically insignificant 6.2% average decrease in accepted amounts.
However, these average associations mask the heterogeneous changes in the
utilization of covered procedures. When allowing for the association to vary
by demographic characteristics, I find that this notification results in lower ac-
cepted medical care for beneficiaries in low income primary care markets and
markets with low education levels. These results support the hypothesis that
some beneficiaries are unable to predict what will be denied, and they cut back
on all types of medical care in order to avoid large medical bills. This nega-
tive consequence of the information is concentrated on already disadvantaged
populations.
That the negative consequences of this information are borne by the low-
income and less-educated populations should give pause to policymakers. This
cost likely arises from the fact that this information is only partial, not full,
information. The information simply states that Medicare does not cover all
procedures, but it does not explicitly make clear when procedures will be cov-
ered. This forces the beneficiaries to introduce the probability of denial into
their medical care decisions or to pay the cost of figuring out when procedures
will be covered. Those who choose the former will inevitably cut back on all
medical care, even that which is deemed ex-post necessary. Policymakers should
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consider that partial information in this complicated market does have the po-
tential to harm individuals.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses Medi-
care, section 3 discusses the data, section 4 presents the empirical strategy and
results, section 5 concludes.
3.2 Medicare Part B and the Information Reg-
ulation
Medicare Part B is the setting for this research. Part A is coverage for in-
patient hospital stays and Part B provides coverage for non-institutional and
non-overnight medical care. The Advance Beneficiary Notice of Noncoverage
(ABN) which is discussed in extensive detail in the first two chapters of this
dissertation, was created by CMS for Medicare Part B physicians to warn ben-
eficiaries who visit them that Medicare does not cover all procedures. The
purpose of this notification is to let beneficiaries know that in the event that
Medicare does not cover the procedure, the beneficiary will be liable for the
costs. The reason the notification is used for Part B procedures and not Part
A is because the document is meant to give beneficiaries a chance to consider
whether or not the procedure is necessary. This decision is only feasible in a
non-urgent setting.
This document was designed to be procedure specific and created assuming
the physician could perfectly predict when Medicare denials would occur. As
uncovered in previous chapters, this document is not used as simply as it should
be used. The incentives are such that some physicians over-use this document
and some physicians under-use this document reflecting their inability to predict
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denials and heterogeneity in the associated costs of disseminating this document.
What results is variation in receipt of the document by arguably similar patients.
Essentially what results is that some beneficiaries go to the doctor’s office and
receive a document telling them that Medicare does not cover all procedures
and other similar patients go to the doctor’s office and do not receive this
notification. This variation is exploited in this paper to uncover the effects of
this warning on the utilization of medical care by these beneficiaries.
3.3 Data
For this research, I use administrative insurance claims data to observe benefi-
ciary medical care utilization, demographic data to capture beneficiary hetero-
geneity in preference for and ability to pay for medical care, and data containing
physician characteristics to control for heterogeneity in beneficiary preference
for specific types of medical care. These data taken together allow me to uncover
the association between receipt of the notification and future utilization while
controlling for current utilization, demographics (reflecting risk and preference),
and physician characteristics which might be associated with the dissemination
of the notification.
The administrative claims data I use are the 5% research identifiable admin-
istrative claims data made available by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) from 2007-2009. It provides details about the health insurance
claims for a random 5% of Traditional Medicare (Part A and Part B) beneficia-
ries. This is approximately 2.5 million patients. I use the carrier, outpatient,
and MedPAR files to examine non-institutional (Part B) claims, outpatient,
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and inpatient claims, respectively. The important utilization variables I see for
each claim, are the claim date, procedure codes (HCPCS), procedure modifier
codes, the submitted charges, and the Medicare allowed amounts. For the out-
patient and inpatient claims I can see which claims resulted from the emergency
department.
The claims data provide minimal demographic information about the bene-
ficiary, such as race and age, but they do provide detailed geographic location
information. Thus to include a more rich set of demographic information, I
merge the Primary Care Service Area (PCSA) definitions into the claims data
along with aggregate demographic information for each PCSA. The PCSAs are
primary care markets as defined by the Dartmouth Atlas group using the 100%
Medicare claims files. The demographic variables available at the PCSA level
include, but are not limited to, the mean household income, the percentage
of individuals who are college educated, the percentage of individuals who are
black, and the percentage of individuals who are female.
The claims data do provide some administrative characteristics about the
performing physicians such as the specialty, Medicare participation status, and
whether the physician is a group practitioner. Most importantly the claims data
include the unencrypted National Provider Identifier (NPI). Thus I enhance our
knowledge of the physicians by using this NPI to merge in the NPI database.
This database allows us to see the gender of the physician and the enumeration
date of the physician which proxies for physician experience.
The goal of this paper is to understand how beneficiaries who are new to
Medicare respond to information about coverage, and this motivates the se-
lection of the sample of interest. Given the time frame of the dataset, this
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study focuses on Medicare enrollees that enrolled within the first six months of
calendar year 2007. I can identify these beneficiaries and their medical claims
using the 5% Beneficiary Enrollment file which contains information about the
Medicare coverage start dates. This selection is made to ensure that the benefi-
ciaries are relatively new to Medicare and that there is adequate time remaining
in the data set to investigate their future utilization. Focusing on this group,
I observe each beneficiary for the first two and a half years of their enrollment
in Medicare. I use the first six months of enrollment to construct independent
variables and the subsequent two years to construct the dependent variables. I
also restrict the sample to beneficiaries that enrolled at age 65. This removes
individuals who became eligible for Medicare prior to 65 due to end-stage renal
disease, ALS, and long-term disability.1
The main independent variable of interest is whether the beneficiary received
the notification of noncoverage within the first six months of Medicare. In order
to have seen this document, the beneficiary would have had to go to a Part B
physician, thus the sample is restricted to beneficiaries who had at least one Part
B medical claim within the first six months of enrollment. Of these beneficiaries,
I identify which ones received the notification using the procedure modifier
code. There is a specific procedure modifier code, “GA”, which appears in the
claims dataset when the beneficiary receives the notification of noncoverage.
This modifier code means and only means that the beneficiary received the
notification of noncoverage.
In the main body of the paper, I will restrict the sample to males. The
analogous results for females are presented in the Appendix. I choose to focus
1The results are robust to the inclusion of this group.
114
on the utilization of males because form use is very highly correlated with the
receipt of preventive gynecological procedures. For this group of procedures
the notification is used about 40% of the time (the next highest percentage
is 17%).2 The group of females who receive these procedures are arguably a
selected sample and the controls do not appear to adequately account for this
endogeneity. There is the potential for a similar issue with men, but there is
not a similar procedure for males that is such an outlier for notification use as
these gynecological procedures for females. After this restriction to males, we
are left with a sample of 10,151 individuals.
One caveat to keep in mind is that I only see medical claims submitted
to Medicare and not medical care that patients received elsewhere or chose
to not submit. Thus there could be individuals who received the notification
of noncoverage during a particular doctor’s visit but chose not to receive the
medical care, and thus they would be coded as not having seen the document.
I discuss the potential ramifications of this sample selection issue for the results
in section 3.4.3.
3.3.1 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 presents a summary of the main independent and dependent vari-
ables. The top panel summarizes the independent variables constructed using
the claims from the first six months of enrollment in Medicare for each of the
beneficiaries in the sample. The middle panel summarizes the independent
2How the notification affects the delivery of preventive gynecological procedures is dis-
cussed in chapters 1 and 2.
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demographic variables obtained at the PCSA level. The bottom panel summa-
rizes the dependent variables which are constructed using the claims from the
subsequent two years of enrollment in Medicare.
The critical independent variable in table 3.1 is “Received ABN”. It is a
binary indicator of whether any of the claims from the beneficiary in the first
six months of enrollment were accompanied with the procedure modifier code
indicating that the beneficiary was given the notification of noncoverage. In the
sample, 12.3% of the beneficiaries received this document warning them that
Medicare does not cover all procedures. Notice that the minimum number of
Part B procedures in the first six months is one, indicating that only beneficiaries
who received medical care in the first six months are included in the sample.
This is because these are the only beneficiaries for whom it is possible to receive
the notification. This focus on beneficiaries who received care within the first
six months explains the low percentage of black beneficiaries in the sample since
this is conditional on use. This reflects the relatively lower utilization of medical
by black individuals on average (see Currie and Gruber (1996) and Dunlop et al.
(2002)).
The aim of this paper is to uncover how receipt of this document is associated
with future utilization of medical care. The measures of future utilization are
found in the bottom panel and are constructed using the medical claims that
occur after the first six months of enrollment but before the first two and a
half years. This cutoff is due to the time frame of the dataset. The dependent
variables reflect the high utilization of medical care by Medicare beneficiaries.
The probability that a patient had a Part B claim given that they had one in
the first six months is about 95%. The data also reflect the high utilization
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of emergency department visits among the elderly population (see Pines et al.
(2013), Roberts, McKay, and Shaffer (2008), and Samaras et al. (2010)).
I consider more independent variables as controls for endogeneity between
the receipt of the form and the outcome variables. These control variables in-
clude demographic variables, utilization variables, and variables characterizing
the types of physicians seen the patient. The latter category is to control for
heterogeneity in physician preference to use the document. The variable “Aver-
age Experience of Physicians” is computed using the number of days since the
physician received their NPI. This is a proxy for the experience of the physician,
however it is censored since NPIs were only introduced in 2005. We see that
the average percentage of female physicians seen by a beneficiary in this group
is 12.7%. This number is lower than the national average of the percentage
of female physicians for two reasons. First this sample includes males only so
certain specialties with high concentrations of female physicians are excluded.
Second this number also reflects beneficiary gender preference for physicians
(see Kelly (1980) and Kerssens, Bensing, and Andela (1997)). We must also
keep in mind that these are claims from 2007 - 2009 when the percentage of
female physicians was lower than today.
Another independent variable of interest is the Charlson index. This is a risk
adjustment measure accepted and used by practitioners and medical researchers
to help to control for underlying differences in propensities to consumer medical
care caused by differences in latent health status. This index is calculated by
attaching cardinal scores ranging from 0 to 6 to different diagnoses which are
identified using the ICD-9 diagnosis codes. The scores are then summed for
each beneficiary reflecting the possibility that a beneficiary suffers from more
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than one of these diagnoses. This sum is the resulting Charlson Index, and it
takes integer values from zero to 25. In this sample, the maximum value we see
for this index is 19.
The difference between the “Days Submitted Part B Claim” and “Part B
Procedures” reflects the quantity of procedures that are performed in a given
medical visit since it is possible that a beneficiary has multiple procedures per-
formed in a single visit to the doctor.
One might notice that the allowed amounts and the denied charges do not
sum to the total charges. This is because I do not include the price adjustment
(the difference between the charge amount and the Medicare allowed amount
for a procedure) in the denied charges. The denied charges are the sum of
submitted charges that were flat out denied 100% by Medicare. The allowed
amounts is the sum of the total payment the physician is entitled to given the
Medicare fee schedule. Thus the difference between the sum of the allowed
amounts and the denied charges and the total Part B charges reflects the huge
discrepancy between charge prices and Medicare negotiated prices, which is an
area garnering much interest among health care researchers.3
The variable “Dual Eligible” reflects whether the beneficiary is dual eligible
for Medicaid. It is an individual indicator of poverty and is constructed using
the number of months that the beneficiary has their Medicare premium paid
by the state. Women, those under 65, and those receiving end-of-life care are
more likely to be dual-eligible (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2007),
which explains the relatively low percentage of dual eligibles in the table.
3The variability in charge prices across physicians and geographic regions is another strik-
ing feature of the US health care system and is (partially) reflected in the difference between
the 99th percentile and the 1st percentile of Part B charges.
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3.4 The Association Between Noncoverage No-
tification and Future Utilization
In this section I examine how receiving the document within the first six months
of Medicare enrollment is associated with utilization of medical care in the sub-
sequent two years. In section 3.4.1, I discuss the main equations of interest which
are estimated using ordinary least squares and present the estimates in section
3.4.2. In section 3.4.3 I explain the main threats to a causal interpretation of
the results and my strategies for supporting this causal interpretation.
3.4.1 Main Strategy
The equation of interest is:
Yims  β0   β1Ai   β2Di   β3Dm   β4Ui   δs   εims (3.1)
Where Yims is an outcome variable measuring utilization over the two years
of Medicare enrollment after the first six months of enrollment for beneficiary i,
residing in PCSA m, in state s. The variable Ai is a binary indicator that takes
value one if the beneficiary received the notification of noncoverage in the first
six months of enrollment and zero otherwise. Thus the coefficient of interest
is β1. It reflects whether there is a statistically and economically significant
difference in future utilization between beneficiaries who receive the noncover-
age notification within the first six months and those who do not. The term
Di includes demographic variables for beneficiary i that are available in the
claims data. The term Dm includes demographic variables that are aggregated
to the PCSA levels. These demographic variables are included to control for
correlations between the receipt of the noncoverage document and beneficiary
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characteristics. The term Ui includes measures of utilization in the first six
months of Medicare enrollment for beneficiary i. These variables are included
to control for correlations between receipt of the noncoverage document, under-
lying health status, and preferences for medical care. The term Ui also includes
dummy variables that capture the specialty mix of the physicians seen by the
beneficiary. This further controls for beneficiary preference for types medical
care and helps to quash endogeneity resulting from certain specialties of physi-
cians being more likely to use the notification of noncoverage. The term δs
includes state level fixed effects to control for unobserved geographic variation
in utilization of medical care. The final term εims includes unobserved hetero-
geneity in variables that affect the outcome but are not explicitly included in
the equation.
To test for heterogeneity in the association between receipt of the noncover-
age notification and future utilization of medical care I estimate the following
equation.
Yims  β0   β1Ai   β2Ai Dm   β3Di   β4Dm   β5Ui   δs   εims (3.2)
Which is the same as equation 3.1 with the addition of the third term,
β2AiDm. The coefficient β2 captures whether the association between receipt
of the form and future utilization varies by demographic variable Dm. Since this
research focuses on the effects of information, the most interesting variables to
study for heterogeneous effects are those that capture the beneficiaries ability to
internalize and respond to the information. Thus I examine the heterogeneity
of the association between information and utilization with respect to education
levels and income levels which are only available at the PCSA level.
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The outcome variables I examine are measures of total utilization (charges
and procedure counts), utilization of accepted medical care, and utilization of
denied medical care. The split between accepted and denied medical care indi-
cates how well this document does as curbing denied care which is the intended
target verses accepted care which is viewed as medically necessary. Ideally we
would like to see changes in the use of denied services and not accepted services.
Reductions in accepted services would mean that patients cut back on all types
of medical care when they learn that Medicare is perhaps not as generous as
they hoped.
Equations 3.1 and 3.2 are estimated using ordinary least squares. I take
the natural logarithm of all the outcome variables, less the binary indicators,
to mitigate the biases caused by outliers and to aid in the interpretation of the
results. For the binary outcomes, I estimate a linear probability model to avoid
the inconsistency caused by incidental parameters when including state fixed
effects as discussed by Neyman and Scott (1948). Thus most of the coefficients
are interpreted as percent changes while the linear probability coefficients are
interpreted as percentage point changes. The standard errors in the main results
are clustered at the PCSA level to control for correlations in the unobservables
within the primary care markets.
3.4.2 Results
Table 3.2 reports the association between receipt of the notification of non-
coverage and total utilization of Part B services in the following two years by
estimating equation 3.1. The outcome is the natural logarithm of the total
Part B charges submitted to Medicare. The coefficient of interest is presented
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in the first row and the columns increasingly control for differing levels of co-
variates. Column one only includes the receipt of the document as a regressor
and indicates that receipt of the form is associated with a 51.4% increase in
the probability of receiving medical care. The second column further controls
for demographic variables. We see that dual eligibles consume more medical
care which is a well-known phenomenon likely reflecting their lower monetary
marginal cost of medical care. Those who reside in PCSAs with higher mean
household incomes consume more medical care even after controlling for prior
utilization. However these demographic variables do not greatly change the co-
efficient of interest which indicates that there is little association between the
demographic variables and the receipt of the notification. The third column
further controls for prior utilization measures. After controlling for these co-
variates, the sign of the association changes and the receipt of the document is
associated with a 10.3% decrease in the probability of receiving medical care.
This coefficient is significant at the 10% level. The sign of the association
changes not when we control for demographic variables, but rather when we
control for prior utilization measures indicating that there is a positive correla-
tion between receipt of the document and underlying health risk or preference
for medical care. The fourth column includes state fixed effects which further
depresses the coefficient to -10.8% and improves the statistical significance to
the 5% level.
The outcome of total charges is comprised of both the amount of care a
patient receives and the prices charged for that care. To attempt to disentangle
the two, in table 3.3 I present the same regression equations but with the natural
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logarithm of the total number of Part B procedures as the outcome. This re-
moves the variation in the previous utilization measure resulting from variation
in prices. We see a similar pattern as in the previous table. After controlling for
the most covariates we see that the receipt of the notification of noncoverage is
associated with a 5.0% decrease in the total number of procedures received by
the beneficiary in the following two years. This is significant at the 10% level.
This outcome of total procedure count is comprised of the number of days a
beneficiary receives care and the total number of medical procedures they receive
on that day. To try to disentangle these two, in table 3.4 I present the same
regression equations but with the natural logarithm of the total number of days
that the beneficiary receives Part B medical procedures as the outcome. We
see a similar progression in the coefficient of interest culminating in a negative
association of 3.5% , but it is not significant in the last column.
To get at a similar question at the use of care versus the intensity, table
3.5 reports the association between receipt of the notification of noncoverage
and the probability of submitting a Part B claim in the subsequent two years
of enrollment. The outcome is a binary indicator that takes value one if the
beneficiary received Part B medical care and zero otherwise. The equation is
estimated using ordinary least squares making this a linear probability model.
We see a similar progression in the coefficients, and in the final column receipt
of the notification is associated with a 1.2 percentage point decrease in the
probability of receiving Part B medical care in the following two months which
is significant at the 5% level.
The main purpose of the notification is to deter utilization of denied med-
ical care, not the utilization of accepted medical care. To get at whether the
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document appears to be effective at achieving this goal, I re-estimate the equa-
tions focusing on denied charges and denied procedure counts as the outcomes
in tables 3.6 and 3.8, respectively and accepted charges and accepted procedure
counts in tables 3.7 and 3.9, respectively. We see that receipt of the document is
associated with a 13.8% decrease in denied Part B charges and a 6.8% decrease
in denied procedures. We also see that the receipt of the document is associ-
ated with a decreases in utilization of allowed medical care (-6.2% for charges
and -3.3% for procedure counts), however these decreases are not statistically
significant.
In table 3.10 I present the heterogeneity of the results with respect to income
of the beneficiary using equation 3.2. The outcomes differ across the columns
and are log(total charges), log(total denied charges), log(total allowed charges),
log(total procedures), log(denied procedures), and log(accepted procedures), re-
spectively. In columns 1 and 4, we see that the negative association between the
receipt of the notification and utilization of Part B medical care is less severe for
higher income populations. When we look at columns 3 and 6 we see that this
heterogeneity is mostly driven by heterogeneity in the utilization of accepted
procedures. This indicates that although on average we saw no significant asso-
ciation between the receipt of the document and utilization of accepted medical
care, that there is a significant decrease for low income populations and this
decrease is mitigated across the population by the higher income populations.
Table 3.11 presents the heterogeneity of the results with respect to edu-
cation levels of the beneficiary. We see similar results as we saw for income
heterogeneity. Areas with a lower percentage of college educated individuals
are more likely to have a negative association between receipt of the document
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and utilization of medical care relative to areas with a higher percentage of
college educated individuals. We see similar effects on utilization of accepted
care as we did in the previous table. For interpretation of these results, consider
the mean value for the percentage college graduates which is 11.247. Using the
results of column 3, for this level of education the association between receipt
of the notification is associated with a 7.6% decrease in accepted charges. If we
increase this level of education by 10% to 12.371, then the association becomes
-4.3%.
3.4.3 Internal Validity of Causal Inference
In the previous section, we saw that the receipt of the notification is associated
with reductions in future utilization of medical care after controlling for covari-
ates that capture demographic, current utilization, and geographic differences
across beneficiaries. In this section, I discuss the main threats to a causal inter-
pretation of this association and provide suggestive evidence that they are not
material in invalidating a causal interpretation.
As discussed in section 3.3, one threat is a sample selection issue which
affects the measurement of the main independent variable. Specifically, we only
see claims from beneficiaries that were submitted to Medicare. Importantly, we
do not see when a beneficiary received the document and chose to not have the
procedure performed. Thus a beneficiary who always turns down the procedure
when they receive the document will be coded as not having seen the document,
and the main independent variable is understated in a non-random fashion.
Working through how this might affect the results, it is most plausible that this
issue would result in an overestimation of the effect size since the patients who
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choose to get the care done and submit the claim most likely have a higher value
for medical care and will show up in the dataset as having seen the document.
So we would expected to see a positive correlation between our independent and
dependent variables given this source of endogeneity. Since we actually see in
the results that the association is negative this complication is not critical.
The main threat to internal validity is selective dissemination of the doc-
ument. It is possible that the form dissemination decision is endogenous to
unobservable beneficiary characteristics that drive utilization. It could be the
case that, once controlling for the covariates, physicians are simply giving the
document to patients who would receive lower amounts of medical care to begin
with. However it makes more sense that physicians would selectively give the
document to patients with higher utilization. Physicians who face beneficiaries
with a higher taste for medical care should be more likely to use this document,
not less, to protect their revenue. This is because these patients are more likely
to have denied claims due to exceeding frequency limitations or not meeting the
requirements for medical necessity. Indeed, the regression results indicate this
upward direction of bias. Physicians appear to give this document more often
to patients with higher utilization of medical care all else equal. It is when we
control for measures of this prior utilization that we find a negative correlation
between the form dissemination and utilization. Again since we find a nega-
tive association after controlling for these covariates, this source of endogeneity
cannot explain the results. However, it still could be that case that this nega-
tive coefficient is overstated, and these results represent a lower bound on the
magnitude of the negative effect.
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One suggestive test to show that the control covariates are sufficient in con-
trolling for latent underlying differences in health is to test whether there is an
association between the receipt of the notification of noncoverage and utilization
of emergency department (ED) services. If the form is being disseminated dis-
proportionately to patients with differing unobserved health states conditional
on the control variates, then we should see a significant association between the
form dissemination and emergency visits. If not, then we should see no associa-
tion. The idea is that ED use is medically urgent and thus not affected by beliefs
about prices. Table 3.12 shows the estimates of equation 3.1 with measures of
ED utilization as the outcomes. In column 1, the outcome is a binary indicator
if whether the beneficiary had an ED visits in the following two years. We see
that although there is a negative association between receipt of the noncoverage
document and ED use, the association is not significant. In column 2, the out-
come is the natural logarithm of total submitted ED charges for the beneficiary
in the following two years. Again, although we see a negative association, the
association is not statistically significant indicating no distinguishable difference
between the two populations. Table 3.13 show the results of equation 3.2 with
ED utilization measures as the outcomes. Columns 1 and 3 show heterogeneity
in the effect on the probability of an ED claim and the total ED charges across
income levels, respectively. Columns 2 and 4 show heterogeneity in the effect
on the probability of and ED claims and the total ED charges across education
levels, respectively. We see no evidence of significant associations, except for
column 2 where the coefficient is significant at the 10% level.
Another suggestive test to support a causal interpretation is to see how the
results change when we focus on more experienced beneficiaries. The idea is
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that the correlation between the receipt of the document and future utilization
is driven by both the informational transmittal and the selective dissemination
of the form. If we focus on experienced beneficiaries, the information transmit-
tal should be negligible since you would expect they would already have learned
the information. Thus the remaining correlation should be attributable to the
endogenous dissemination of the document. In table 3.14 I present the regres-
sion results for equation 3.1 using only beneficiaries who enrolled in the first
six months of 2002, five years prior to the sample of interest. We see that for
this sample there is no significant association between receipt of the notification
and future utilization. This results supports the claim that the covariates ad-
equately control for any selective dissemination of the document and that the
negative correlation we are picking up for the new beneficiaries is the effect of
the information.
In further support of the causal effect, given burden estimate documents
prepared by the Office of Management and Budget concerning this notification
(2008), we do know that at least some of the variation in its use is caused by
supply side variables such as the monetary and time costs associated with using
the document. Not all of the variation in the dissemination of the document
is driven solely by patient characteristics. An alternate approach would be to
find an appropriate instrument derived from supply side conditions. Ideas for
such instruments might include wages for medical secretaries, and instruments
for the amount of physical time it takes to disseminate the document. We leave
this approach for future research.
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper made use of a Medicare Part B notification to estimate the as-
sociation between warning patients that Medicare does not cover all Part B
procedures within the first six months of enrollment and future utilization of
Part B medical care. The empirical strategy exploited cross-sectional variation
in the receipt of this document across Medicare beneficiaries. The main threat
to a causal interpretation of the association is selective dissemination of the
document by physicians to beneficiaries with unobserved differences in under-
lying propensity to consume medical care. I control for these differences using
measures of prior utilization and the Charlson Index as a risk adjustment. I
also show that after controlling for these covariates there is no significant dif-
ference in the utilization of ED care, indicating that the covariates adequately
control for differences in underlying health status. I also show that this empir-
ical strategy yields no distinguishable effect for more experienced beneficiaries
who should not be affected by the information. These secondary results sup-
port a causal interpretation of the negative association between the warning of
noncoverage and future utilization for new Medicare enrollees.
The empirical results indicate that receipt of this warning is associated with
a 10.8% reduction in Part B submitted charges in the subsequent two years of
enrollment. This reduction in charges is achieved mostly by a 13.8% reduction in
denied charges which is the type of utilization that is targeted by this document.
This means that this type of information is successful at reducing potentially
unnecessary medical spending. On average utilization of accepted medical care
falls, but it is not statistically significant.
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Although this information is effective in reducing the utilization of unneces-
sary medical care, the results also highlight a potential negative consequence of
this type of information dissemination. There is suggestive evidence that upon
receipt of this document, low income beneficiaries and beneficiaries with low
levels of education do reduce their utilization of accepted medical care. The
low income results could indicate that these populations are concerned about
being hit with a large medical bill so the risk of being denied is not worth it,
and they reduce their use of medical care altogether. The education results
could indicate that these populations are not able to fully understand the no-
tification and what is covered, and they inadvertently cut back on necessary
medical care. The potential for this document to adversely effect these already
high risk populations should be of concern to policy makers when considering
the implementation of information dissemination in such a complicated system.
These results highlight the potential negative consequences of information dis-
semination that places the burden of decision-making squarely on the shoulders
of the patients as discussed in Shomaker and Link (2014).
These results were derived using a sample including only males. To speculate
how these results might change for females, I would expect that the average
effects of the coverage information on utilization would be dampened for females
since there is evidence that they are less able to substitute home care for market
medical care as discussed in Sindelar (1982). Thus they may be less likely to be
dissuaded from using medical care even when they find out that the costs are
higher than they previously thought.
As mentioned, the main limitation of this work is the potential for endoge-
nous information dissemination of the document. Although we took steps to
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assuage concerns about this endogeneity, future work should search for supply
side instruments that might exogenously shift the use of the document across




Table 3.1: Beneficiary Summary Statistics
mean sd min p1 p99 max count
Independent Variables Constructed from First Six Months of Claims
Received ABN 0.123 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 10151
Demographic Variables
Black Beneficiary 0.066 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 10151
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary 0.045 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 10151
Dual Eligible 0.075 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 10151
Utilization Variables
Charlson Index 1.695 2.69 0.00 0.00 9.00 19.00 10151
Part B Charges 3107.219 6975.22 0.02 45.17 31693.93 175437.00 10151
Days Submitted Part B Claim 5.847 6.20 1.00 1.00 30.00 80.00 10151
Part B Procedures 17.342 22.97 1.00 1.00 99.00 756.00 10151
Part B Allowed Amounts 1040.752 2332.05 0.00 0.00 8137.06 95358.50 10151
Part B Denied Charges 397.175 1753.04 0.00 0.00 6170.02 54020.07 10151
Inpatient Charges 2436.497 19645.36 0.00 0.00 66363.00 767534.00 10151
Outpatient Charges 2159.007 11656.39 0.00 0.00 40480.26 426408.91 10151
Emergency Department Charges 135.189 655.51 0.00 0.00 2554.00 23462.98 10151
Summary Variables of Physicians Seen
Average Experience of Physicians 428.344 146.43 0.00 88.38 775.23 892.50 10151
% Female Physicians 0.127 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 10151
% Group Physicians 0.160 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.95 10151
Independent Demographic Variables from Primary Care Service Areas
Mean HH Income 56274.584 18886.59 15691.20 27929.73 117822.77 196972.35 10151
Percent College Grad 11.247 5.16 1.13 3.23 26.32 34.07 10151
Percent High School Grad 20.156 6.21 2.87 6.03 34.40 45.29 10151
Dependent Utilization Variables Constructed from Following Two Years of Claims
Had Part B Visit 0.949 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 10151
Part B Charges 12943.511 22276.84 0.00 0.00 101954.61 488909.16 10151
Part B Procedures 71.927 80.05 0.00 0.00 389.00 1058.00 10151
Days Submitted Part B Claim 24.248 23.53 0.00 0.00 114.00 246.00 10151
Part B Allowed Amounts 4433.466 7456.59 0.00 0.00 33771.47 173526.75 10151
Part B Denied Charges 1158.674 4467.25 0.00 0.00 14158.85 177854.94 10151
Part B Allowed Procedures 64.176 72.16 0.00 0.00 351.00 841.00 10151
Part B Denied Procedures 7.751 16.38 0.00 0.00 69.00 442.00 10151
Had Emergency Department Visit 0.299 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 10151
Emergency Department Charges 573.977 1944.50 0.00 0.00 7839.50 75613.00 10151
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Table 3.2: Submitted Part B Charges in Following Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Saw ABN in First Six Months .514 .503 -.103 -.108
(.062) (.062) (.054) (.055)
Black Beneficiary . -.174 -.031 -.098
(.094) (.090) (.090)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary . -.480 -.288 -.257
(.127) (.111) (.112)
Dual Eligible . .468 .181 .174
(.098) (.094) (.095)
Log(Mean Household Income) . .416 .337 .399
(.132) (.115) (.130)
Percent College Grad . .001 -.0003 .003
(.009) (.008) (.008)
Percent High School Grad . -.005 -.008 -.00009
(.006) (.005) (.006)
Charlson Index . . .019 .021
(.009) (.009)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) . . -.256 -.271
(.049) (.049)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) . . .246 .263
(.059) (.059)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) . . .200 .192
(.060) (.060)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) . . .472 .468
(.031) (.031)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) . . -.019 -.015
(.009) (.009)
Log(Inpatient Charges) . . .057 .058
(.012) (.012)
Log(Outpatient Charges) . . .110 .111
(.006) (.006)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) . . -.115 -.113
(.015) (.015)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months . . .0003 .0002
(.0002) (.0002)
% Female Physicians First Six Months . . .095 .094
(.092) (.090)
% Group Physicians First Six Months . . -.045 .021
(.126) (.127)
Coverage Start Month Dummies N Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix N N Y Y
State FEs N N N Y
Obs. 10151 10151 10151 10151
R2 .005 .013 .251 .267
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 where the outcome is the natural log-
arithm of the total submitted Part B charges for the beneficiary in the two years
following the initial six months of enrollment. Columns 1 through 4 account for an
increasing number of control variables.
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Table 3.3: Part B Procedures in Following Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Saw ABN in First Six Months .419 .414 -.051 -.050
(.036) (.036) (.029) (.030)
Black Beneficiary . -.159 -.071 -.115
(.055) (.048) (.048)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary . -.305 -.184 -.172
(.068) (.059) (.061)
Dual Eligible . .354 .161 .157
(.057) (.052) (.052)
Log(Mean Household Income) . .271 .206 .226
(.076) (.061) (.068)
Percent College Grad . .001 -.0003 .0008
(.005) (.004) (.004)
Percent High School Grad . -.001 -.004 -.002
(.003) (.003) (.003)
Charlson Index . . .019 .020
(.005) (.005)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) . . -.261 -.265
(.025) (.025)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) . . .189 .201
(.031) (.032)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) . . .318 .308
(.031) (.031)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) . . .233 .229
(.014) (.014)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) . . -.016 -.014
(.005) (.005)
Log(Inpatient Charges) . . .031 .032
(.007) (.007)
Log(Outpatient Charges) . . .059 .061
(.004) (.004)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) . . -.066 -.066
(.009) (.009)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months . . .0002 .0002
(.00009) (.00009)
% Female Physicians First Six Months . . .050 .050
(.047) (.047)
% Group Physicians First Six Months . . -.085 -.051
(.069) (.070)
Coverage Start Month Dummies N Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix N N Y Y
State FEs N N N Y
Obs. 10151 10151 10151 10151
R2 .011 .021 .329 .344
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 where the outcome is the natural log-
arithm of the total number of Part B procedures for the beneficiary in the two years
following the initial six months of enrollment. Columns 1 through 4 account for an
increasing number of control variables.
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Table 3.4: Days with a Part B Claim in Following Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Saw ABN in First Six Months .335 .335 -.038 -.035
(.031) (.031) (.024) (.025)
Black Beneficiary . -.139 -.068 -.098
(.044) (.038) (.038)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary . -.291 -.170 -.165
(.054) (.047) (.049)
Dual Eligible . .348 .155 .151
(.047) (.041) (.042)
Log(Mean Household Income) . .217 .156 .154
(.059) (.047) (.053)
Percent College Grad . .002 .0007 .001
(.004) (.003) (.003)
Percent High School Grad . .003 -.001 -.0001
(.003) (.002) (.002)
Charlson Index . . .018 .019
(.004) (.004)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) . . -.206 -.211
(.020) (.020)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) . . .369 .373
(.025) (.025)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) . . .103 .101
(.024) (.025)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) . . .178 .176
(.011) (.011)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) . . -.009 -.007
(.004) (.004)
Log(Inpatient Charges) . . .028 .029
(.005) (.005)
Log(Outpatient Charges) . . .053 .054
(.003) (.003)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) . . -.059 -.058
(.007) (.007)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months . . .0002 .0002
(.00007) (.00007)
% Female Physicians First Six Months . . .055 .054
(.037) (.037)
% Group Physicians First Six Months . . -.047 -.027
(.056) (.056)
Coverage Start Month Dummies N Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix N N Y Y
State FEs N N N Y
Obs. 10151 10151 10151 10151
R2 .01 .022 .356 .37
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 where the outcome is the natural log-
arithm of the total number of days that the beneficiary submitted Part B procedures
in the two years following the initial six months of enrollment. Columns 1 through 4
account for an increasing number of control variables.
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Table 3.5: Probability of Part B Visit in Following Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Saw ABN in First Six Months .020 .019 -.013 -.012
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.005)
Black Beneficiary . -.005 .007 .005
(.009) (.009) (.009)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary . -.015 -.007 -.004
(.012) (.011) (.011)
Dual Eligible . .007 -.002 -.0009
(.009) (.009) (.009)
Log(Mean Household Income) . .007 .007 .017
(.012) (.011) (.013)
Percent College Grad . .0005 .0004 .0004
(.0008) (.0008) (.0008)
Percent High School Grad . .0002 -.0001 .0005
(.0006) (.0005) (.0006)
Charlson Index . . -.001 -.001
(.0008) (.0008)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) . . -.030 -.031
(.005) (.005)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) . . .015 .015
(.006) (.006)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) . . .007 .007
(.006) (.006)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) . . .047 .047
(.004) (.004)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) . . -.0006 -.0001
(.0009) (.0009)
Log(Inpatient Charges) . . .002 .002
(.001) (.001)
Log(Outpatient Charges) . . .005 .005
(.0005) (.0005)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) . . -.005 -.004
(.001) (.001)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months . . 9.93e-06 1.00e-05
(.00002) (.00002)
% Female Physicians First Six Months . . .004 .004
(.010) (.010)
% Group Physicians First Six Months . . .008 .014
(.012) (.012)
Coverage Start Month Dummies N Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix N N Y Y
State FEs N N N Y
Obs. 10151 10151 10151 10151
R2 .0009 .002 .135 .146
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 where the outcome is a binary indicator
of whether the beneficiary had a Part B visit in the two years following the initial six
months of enrollment, making this a linear probability model. Columns 1 through 4
account for an increasing number of control variables.
137
Table 3.6: Denied Part B Charges in Following Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Saw ABN in First Six Months .541 .505 -.129 -.138
(.080) (.079) (.079) (.080)
Black Beneficiary . .072 .171 .145
(.121) (.122) (.121)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary . -.559 -.413 -.478
(.150) (.145) (.148)
Dual Eligible . .461 .230 .172
(.121) (.121) (.121)
Log(Mean Household Income) . .896 .715 .568
(.153) (.144) (.160)
Percent College Grad . -.020 -.018 -.009
(.010) (.010) (.010)
Percent High School Grad . -.035 -.033 -.020
(.007) (.007) (.008)
Charlson Index . . .032 .031
(.012) (.012)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) . . -.013 -.031
(.051) (.052)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) . . .207 .228
(.075) (.075)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) . . .207 .217
(.073) (.073)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) . . .070 .053
(.030) (.030)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) . . .092 .086
(.013) (.013)
Log(Inpatient Charges) . . .042 .046
(.017) (.017)
Log(Outpatient Charges) . . .075 .081
(.011) (.010)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) . . -.068 -.072
(.022) (.022)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months . . -.0001 -.0001
(.0002) (.0002)
% Female Physicians First Six Months . . .040 .024
(.114) (.114)
% Group Physicians First Six Months . . .036 .012
(.184) (.185)
Coverage Start Month Dummies N Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix N N Y Y
State FEs N N N Y
Obs. 10151 10151 10151 10151
R2 .004 .021 .11 .126
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 where the outcome is the natural loga-
rithm of the total denied Part B charges for the beneficiary in the two years following
the initial six months of enrollment. Columns 1 through 4 account for an increasing
number of control variables.
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Table 3.7: Allowed Part B Amounts in Following Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Saw ABN in First Six Months .588 .578 -.061 -.062
(.062) (.063) (.051) (.052)
Black Beneficiary . -.392 -.213 -.270
(.107) (.093) (.093)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary . -.512 -.304 -.282
(.136) (.117) (.120)
Dual Eligible . .451 .145 .136
(.106) (.098) (.099)
Log(Mean Household Income) . .412 .366 .424
(.142) (.114) (.130)
Percent College Grad . .0009 -.003 -.002
(.010) (.007) (.008)
Percent High School Grad . .003 -.003 .002
(.006) (.005) (.006)
Charlson Index . . .014 .016
(.009) (.009)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) . . -.502 -.511
(.048) (.049)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) . . .179 .183
(.058) (.058)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) . . .254 .248
(.058) (.058)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) . . .717 .712
(.030) (.030)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) . . -.027 -.023
(.009) (.009)
Log(Inpatient Charges) . . .057 .058
(.012) (.012)
Log(Outpatient Charges) . . .107 .109
(.006) (.006)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) . . -.109 -.108
(.016) (.016)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months . . .0003 .0003
(.0002) (.0002)
% Female Physicians First Six Months . . .064 .062
(.087) (.086)
% Group Physicians First Six Months . . -.114 -.062
(.125) (.126)
Coverage Start Month Dummies N Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix N N Y Y
State FEs N N N Y
Obs. 10151 10151 10151 10151
R2 .006 .014 .336 .35
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 where the outcome is the natural loga-
rithm of the total allowed Part B amounts for the beneficiary in the two years following
the initial six months of enrollment. Columns 1 through 4 account for an increasing
number of control variables.
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Table 3.8: Part B Denied Procedures in Following Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Saw ABN in First Six Months .239 .227 -.066 -.068
(.033) (.033) (.032) (.031)
Black Beneficiary . .013 .056 .044
(.046) (.046) (.046)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary . -.202 -.145 -.158
(.057) (.055) (.056)
Dual Eligible . .194 .105 .089
(.049) (.047) (.046)
Log(Mean Household Income) . .356 .275 .223
(.062) (.058) (.065)
Percent College Grad . -.005 -.005 -.002
(.004) (.004) (.004)
Percent High School Grad . -.008 -.008 -.004
(.003) (.002) (.003)
Charlson Index . . .013 .013
(.005) (.005)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) . . -.060 -.064
(.019) (.019)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) . . .073 .079
(.029) (.029)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) . . .159 .162
(.027) (.028)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) . . .029 .023
(.011) (.011)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) . . .046 .044
(.005) (.005)
Log(Inpatient Charges) . . .019 .020
(.007) (.007)
Log(Outpatient Charges) . . .030 .032
(.004) (.004)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) . . -.030 -.031
(.009) (.009)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months . . 1.00e-05 1.46e-08
(.00008) (.00008)
% Female Physicians First Six Months . . .065 .059
(.045) (.045)
% Group Physicians First Six Months . . -.067 -.073
(.072) (.072)
Coverage Start Month Dummies N Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix N N Y Y
State FEs N N N Y
Obs. 10151 10151 10151 10151
R2 .005 .02 .135 .151
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 where the outcome is the natural loga-
rithm of the total number of denied Part B procedures for the beneficiary in the two
years following the initial six months of enrollment. Columns 1 through 4 account for
an increasing number of control variables.
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Table 3.9: Part B Allowed Procedures in Following Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Saw ABN in First Six Months .446 .441 -.034 -.033
(.038) (.038) (.031) (.031)
Black Beneficiary . -.247 -.149 -.192
(.063) (.053) (.053)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary . -.340 -.208 -.191
(.075) (.065) (.067)
Dual Eligible . .357 .146 .144
(.062) (.056) (.056)
Log(Mean Household Income) . .258 .208 .251
(.082) (.064) (.072)
Percent College Grad . .0004 -.002 -.003
(.005) (.004) (.004)
Percent High School Grad . .001 -.003 -.002
(.003) (.003) (.003)
Charlson Index . . .020 .021
(.005) (.005)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) . . -.331 -.334
(.026) (.026)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) . . .172 .184
(.033) (.033)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) . . .325 .313
(.032) (.032)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) . . .320 .316
(.015) (.015)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) . . -.027 -.025
(.005) (.005)
Log(Inpatient Charges) . . .032 .034
(.007) (.007)
Log(Outpatient Charges) . . .065 .067
(.004) (.004)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) . . -.072 -.071
(.009) (.009)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months . . .0003 .0002
(.00009) (.00009)
% Female Physicians First Six Months . . .032 .032
(.048) (.048)
% Group Physicians First Six Months . . -.095 -.054
(.073) (.074)
Coverage Start Month Dummies N Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix N N Y Y
State FEs N N N Y
Obs. 10151 10151 10151 10151
R2 .011 .02 .364 .378
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 where the outcome is the natural loga-
rithm of the total number of allowed Part B procedures for the beneficiary in the two
years following the initial six months of enrollment. Columns 1 through 4 account for
an increasing number of control variables.
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Table 3.10: Heterogeneity in Results by Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Saw ABN in First Six Months -4.501 -4.472 -4.741 -2.473 -1.758 -2.699
(1.908) (2.652) (1.815) (1.067) (1.070) (1.131)
Saw ABN  log(Median HH Income) .402 .397 .429 .222 .155 .244
(.174) (.243) (.166) (.097) (.098) (.103)
Black Beneficiary -.100 .143 -.273 -.116 .043 -.193
(.090) (.121) (.093) (.048) (.046) (.053)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary -.251 -.472 -.276 -.169 -.156 -.187
(.112) (.148) (.120) (.061) (.056) (.067)
Dual Eligible .170 .167 .132 .154 .087 .141
(.095) (.121) (.099) (.052) (.046) (.056)
Log(Mean Household Income) .351 .521 .374 .200 .205 .222
(.133) (.163) (.133) (.070) (.067) (.073)
Percent College Grad .003 -.009 -.002 .0008 -.002 -.003
(.008) (.010) (.008) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Percent High School Grad -.0001 -.020 .002 -.002 -.004 -.002
(.006) (.008) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Charlson Index .021 .030 .015 .020 .013 .021
(.009) (.012) (.009) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) -.271 -.031 -.511 -.265 -.064 -.334
(.049) (.052) (.049) (.025) (.019) (.026)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) .261 .227 .182 .201 .079 .183
(.059) (.075) (.059) (.032) (.029) (.033)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) .194 .219 .250 .309 .163 .314
(.060) (.073) (.059) (.031) (.028) (.032)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) .468 .053 .712 .229 .023 .316
(.031) (.030) (.030) (.014) (.011) (.015)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) -.015 .086 -.024 -.014 .044 -.025
(.009) (.013) (.009) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Log(Inpatient Charges) .058 .046 .058 .032 .020 .034
(.012) (.017) (.012) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Log(Outpatient Charges) .111 .081 .109 .061 .032 .067
(.006) (.010) (.006) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) -.113 -.072 -.107 -.066 -.030 -.071
(.015) (.022) (.016) (.009) (.009) (.009)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months .0002 -.0001 .0003 .0002 -1.15e-06 .0002
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.00009) (.00008) (.00009)
% Female Physicians First Six Months .092 .022 .059 .048 .058 .030
(.090) (.114) (.086) (.047) (.045) (.048)
% Group Physicians First Six Months .014 .005 -.070 -.055 -.076 -.058
(.127) (.185) (.126) (.070) (.072) (.074)
Coverage Start Month Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 10151 10151 10151 10151 10151 10151
R2 .268 .126 .35 .344 .151 .379
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.2 with the interaction variable of inter-
est, Dm, being the median household income in the primary care service area of the
beneficiary. The outcomes of columns 1-3 are log(total charges), log(denied charges),
and log(allowed charges) for the following two years, respectively. The outcomes of
columns 4-6 are log(total procedures), log(denied procedures), and log(allowed proce-
dures) for the following two years respectively.
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Table 3.11: Heterogeneity in Results by Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Saw ABN in First Six Months -.424 -.278 -.414 -.210 -.110 -.223
(.150) (.195) (.140) (.080) (.075) (.083)
Saw ABN  Percent College Grad .027 .012 .030 .014 .004 .016
(.011) (.015) (.011) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Black Beneficiary -.099 .145 -.271 -.116 .044 -.192
(.090) (.121) (.093) (.048) (.046) (.053)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary -.256 -.478 -.281 -.172 -.158 -.191
(.111) (.148) (.120) (.060) (.056) (.067)
Dual Eligible .171 .170 .133 .155 .089 .142
(.095) (.121) (.099) (.052) (.046) (.056)
Log(Mean Household Income) .400 .568 .426 .227 .223 .251
(.130) (.160) (.130) (.068) (.065) (.072)
Percent College Grad -.0003 -.010 -.006 -.001 -.003 -.005
(.008) (.011) (.008) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Percent High School Grad -.0004 -.020 .001 -.002 -.004 -.002
(.006) (.008) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Charlson Index .021 .031 .015 .020 .013 .021
(.009) (.012) (.009) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) -.271 -.031 -.511 -.265 -.064 -.334
(.049) (.052) (.048) (.025) (.019) (.026)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) .262 .228 .183 .201 .079 .184
(.059) (.075) (.058) (.032) (.029) (.033)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) .193 .218 .250 .309 .163 .314
(.060) (.073) (.058) (.031) (.028) (.032)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) .468 .053 .712 .229 .023 .316
(.031) (.030) (.030) (.014) (.011) (.014)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) -.015 .086 -.024 -.014 .044 -.025
(.009) (.013) (.009) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Log(Inpatient Charges) .058 .046 .058 .032 .020 .033
(.012) (.017) (.012) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Log(Outpatient Charges) .111 .081 .109 .061 .032 .067
(.006) (.010) (.006) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) -.113 -.072 -.107 -.065 -.030 -.071
(.015) (.022) (.016) (.009) (.009) (.009)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months .0002 -.0001 .0003 .0002 -9.15e-07 .0002
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.00009) (.00008) (.00009)
% Female Physicians First Six Months .092 .023 .059 .049 .059 .030
(.090) (.114) (.086) (.047) (.045) (.048)
% Group Physicians First Six Months .017 .010 -.067 -.053 -.073 -.056
(.127) (.185) (.126) (.070) (.072) (.074)
Coverage Start Month Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 10151 10151 10151 10151 10151 10151
R2 .268 .126 .35 .344 .151 .379
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.2 with the interaction variable of interest,
Dm, being the percent of individuals that are college graduates in the primary care
service area of the beneficiary. The outcomes of columns 1-3 are log(total charges),
log(denied charges), and log(allowed charges) for the following two years, respectively.
The outcomes of columns 4-6 are log(total procedures), log(denied procedures), and
log(allowed procedures) for the following two years respectively.
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Table 3.12: Emergency Department Utilization in Following Two Years
(1) (2) )
Saw ABN in First Six Months -.011 -.093
(.013) (.092)
Black Beneficiary .034 .334
(.017) (.121)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary -.074 -.529
(.018) (.130)
Dual Eligible .115 .983
(.018) (.133)
Log(Mean Household Income) .040 .344
(.022) (.159)
Percent College Grad -.001 -.008
(.001) (.010)
Percent High School Grad .0006 .002
(.001) (.008)
Charlson Index .003 .027
(.002) (.013)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) -.023 -.159
(.007) (.049)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) .005 .073
(.011) (.076)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) .023 .162
(.010) (.069)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) .008 .046
(.004) (.026)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) -.0007 -.006
(.002) (.013)
Log(Inpatient Charges) .057 .416
(.003) (.020)
Log(Outpatient Charges) .089 .611
(.001) (.010)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) -.072 -.489
(.004) (.026)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months -8.46e-06 -.00007
(.00003) (.0002)
% Female Physicians First Six Months .014 .068
(.016) (.113)
% Group Physicians First Six Months .006 .115
(.026) (.189)
Coverage Start Month Dummies Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix Y Y
State FEs Y Y
Obs. 10151 10151
R2 .309 .308
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 where the outcome of column 1 is a
binary indicator of whether the beneficiary had an emergency department (ED) visit
in the two years following the initial six months of enrollment. The outcome of column
2 is the natural logarithm of the total ED charges submitted in those same two years.
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Table 3.13: Heterogeneous Associations with ED Visits in Following Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Saw ABN in First Six Months -.192 -.048 -1.217 -.323
(.424) (.029) (3.073) (.213)
Saw ABN  log(Median HH Income) .017 . .103 .
(.039) (.281)
Saw ABN  Percent College Grad . .003 . .020
(.002) (.017)
Black Beneficiary .034 .034 .333 .333
(.017) (.017) (.121) (.121)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary -.073 -.074 -.528 -.528
(.018) (.018) (.130) (.130)
Dual Eligible .114 .114 .981 .980
(.018) (.018) (.133) (.133)
Log(Mean Household Income) .038 .040 .332 .345
(.023) (.022) (.162) (.159)
Percent College Grad -.001 -.002 -.008 -.011
(.001) (.001) (.010) (.010)
Percent High School Grad .0006 .0006 .002 .002
(.001) (.001) (.008) (.008)
Charlson Index .003 .003 .027 .027
(.002) (.002) (.013) (.013)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) -.023 -.023 -.159 -.159
(.007) (.007) (.049) (.049)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) .005 .005 .072 .072
(.011) (.011) (.076) (.076)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) .023 .023 .163 .163
(.010) (.010) (.069) (.069)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) .008 .008 .046 .046
(.004) (.004) (.026) (.026)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) -.0007 -.0007 -.006 -.007
(.002) (.002) (.013) (.013)
Log(Inpatient Charges) .057 .057 .416 .416
(.003) (.003) (.020) (.020)
Log(Outpatient Charges) .089 .089 .611 .611
(.001) (.001) (.010) (.010)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) -.072 -.072 -.489 -.489
(.004) (.004) (.026) (.026)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months -8.59e-06 -9.29e-06 -.00007 -.00007
(.00003) (.00003) (.0002) (.0002)
% Female Physicians First Six Months .013 .013 .067 .066
(.016) (.016) (.113) (.113)
% Group Physicians First Six Months .006 .005 .113 .112
(.026) (.026) (.189) (.189)
Coverage Start Month Dummies Y Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix Y Y Y Y
State FEs Y Y Y Y
Obs. 10151 10151 10151 10151
R2 .309 .309 .308 .308
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.2 where the outcomes are a binary indi-
cator of whether the beneficiary had an ED visit (columns 1 and 2) and the log(total
ED charges) (columns 3 and 4) in the two years following the initial six months of
enrollment. Column 1 and 3 present heterogeneity with respect to income and columns
2 and 4 present heterogeneity with respect to education level.
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Table 3.14: Associations for Experienced Medicare Beneficiaries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Saw ABN in First Six Months -.042 -.018 -.014 .003 -.005 .010
(.043) (.073) (.042) (.025) (.030) (.026)
Black Beneficiary -.127 -.006 -.195 -.079 .034 -.128
(.081) (.110) (.082) (.046) (.044) (.048)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary .011 -.045 .004 -.012 -.041 -.009
(.097) (.151) (.092) (.051) (.056) (.053)
Dual Eligible -.008 -.116 -.002 .051 -.003 .050
(.080) (.114) (.080) (.046) (.044) (.048)
Log(Mean Household Income) .418 .369 .437 .275 .151 .304
(.100) (.158) (.096) (.058) (.062) (.060)
Percent College Grad -.008 .002 -.004 -.005 -.001 -.004
(.006) (.010) (.006) (.003) (.004) (.004)
Percent High School Grad -.009 -.027 -.002 -.004 -.011 -.002
(.005) (.007) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Charlson Index .018 .032 .018 .023 .020 .023
(.006) (.011) (.006) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) -.301 -.044 -.601 -.289 -.066 -.372
(.041) (.052) (.037) (.021) (.019) (.021)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) .174 .364 .103 .141 .128 .108
(.049) (.074) (.047) (.027) (.029) (.028)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) .207 .213 .216 .373 .192 .363
(.052) (.074) (.049) (.028) (.029) (.029)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) .500 -.023 .888 .258 -.011 .392
(.037) (.036) (.034) (.017) (.014) (.017)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) -.003 .116 -.006 -.010 .050 -.019
(.007) (.012) (.007) (.004) (.005) (.004)
Log(Inpatient Charges) .034 .028 .033 .020 .017 .020
(.010) (.015) (.010) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Log(Outpatient Charges) .071 .071 .068 .042 .028 .045
(.005) (.009) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.003)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) -.095 -.082 -.090 -.058 -.032 -.061
(.014) (.021) (.014) (.008) (.009) (.008)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months .0002 .0001 .0002 .0001 .00003 .0001
(.0001) (.0002) (.0001) (.00008) (.00008) (.00008)
% Female Physicians First Six Months .032 .125 .040 .034 .054 .030
(.078) (.114) (.073) (.043) (.043) (.044)
% Group Physicians First Six Months .122 .067 .163 -.007 -.127 .044
(.105) (.170) (.100) (.060) (.066) (.063)
Coverage Start Month Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 10668 10668 10668 10668 10668 10668
R2 .28 .142 .4 .386 .184 .424
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 when only beneficiaries who enrolled in
Medicare in the first six months of 2002 are considered. The outcomes of columns
1-3 are log(total charges), log(denied charges), and log(allowed charges) for the fol-
lowing two years, respectively. The outcomes of columns 4-6 are log(total procedures),




Appendix for Chapter 3
A.1 Results for Females
In this appendix, I present the analogous tables from chapter 3 for females who
enrolled in Medicare at age 65 within the first six months of 2007. I do not focus
on this group in the main body of the paper because of the extreme use of the
notification of noncoverage for gynecological visits. The propensity of certain
types of females to get these procedures skews the independent variable in ways
that do not seem to be adequately controlled for by the inclusion of variables
representing utilization of gynecological services. However, it could be the case
that females simply do not respond to this information.
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Table A.1: Beneficiary Summary Statistics
mean sd min p1 p99 max count
Independent Variables Constructed from First Six Months of Claims
Received ABN 0.181 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 14312
Demographic Variables
Black Beneficiary 0.078 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 14312
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary 0.048 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 14312
Dual Eligible 0.104 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 14312
Utilization Variables
Charlson Index 1.356 2.45 0.00 0.00 9.00 19.00 14312
Part B Charges 3074.757 7161.09 9.63 55.00 27543.64 248246.02 14312
Days Submitted Part B Claim 6.660 6.53 1.00 1.00 32.00 81.00 14312
Part B Procedures 18.984 22.99 1.00 1.00 109.00 487.00 14312
Part B Allowed Amounts 1048.844 2250.06 0.00 0.00 7648.42 93772.42 14312
Part B Denied Charges 390.596 1846.12 0.00 0.00 5750.00 81781.00 14312
Inpatient Charges 1671.756 15324.52 0.00 0.00 45404.00 521950.00 14312
Outpatient Charges 2258.748 11535.07 0.00 0.00 39750.12 524017.84 14312
Emergency Department Charges 111.401 463.67 0.00 0.00 2249.00 9081.25 14312
Summary Variables of Physicians Seen
Average Experience of Physicians 425.374 138.32 0.00 104.71 752.75 894.00 14312
% Female Physicians 0.238 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 14312
% Group Physicians 0.156 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.96 14312
Independent Demographic Variables from Primary Care Service Areas
Mean HH Income 56035.089 19418.59 15691.20 27538.20 121675.89 196972.35 14312
Percent College Grad 11.199 5.18 1.28 3.12 26.14 35.67 14312
Percent High School Grad 20.045 6.28 2.87 6.17 34.78 45.29 14312
Dependent Utilization Variables Constructed from Following Two Years of Claims
Had Part B Visit 0.960 0.20 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 14312
Part B Charges 13378.061 23517.60 0.00 0.00 106663.08 750594.56 14312
Part B Procedures 80.437 88.01 0.00 0.00 432.00 1184.00 14312
Days Submitted Part B Claim 27.967 25.53 0.00 0.00 121.00 310.00 14312
Part B Allowed Amounts 4724.658 8195.05 0.00 0.00 34633.22 251958.59 14312
Part B Denied Charges 1168.746 3767.96 0.00 0.00 14771.19 150322.67 14312
Part B Allowed Procedures 71.752 80.02 0.00 0.00 390.00 1119.00 14312
Part B Denied Procedures 8.685 16.42 0.00 0.00 72.00 559.00 14312
Had Emergency Department Visit 0.304 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 14312
Emergency Department Charges 566.641 1848.45 0.00 0.00 7584.00 77982.42 14312
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Table A.2: Females: Submitted Part B Charges in Following Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Saw ABN in First Six Months .521 .504 -.006 -.022
(.041) (.041) (.038) (.038)
Black Beneficiary . -.125 -.069 -.104
(.076) (.068) (.071)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary . -.273 -.099 -.106
(.092) (.084) (.088)
Dual Eligible . .318 .048 .042
(.069) (.063) (.063)
Log(Mean Household Income) . .340 .306 .289
(.093) (.079) (.088)
Percent College Grad . -.004 -.012 -.002
(.006) (.005) (.005)
Percent High School Grad . -.015 -.020 -.007
(.004) (.004) (.004)
Charlson Index . . .008 .008
(.007) (.007)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) . . -.216 -.225
(.038) (.038)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) . . .268 .286
(.051) (.051)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) . . .103 .096
(.051) (.051)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) . . .493 .489
(.028) (.028)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) . . -.008 -.008
(.007) (.007)
Log(Inpatient Charges) . . .045 .045
(.010) (.010)
Log(Outpatient Charges) . . .097 .099
(.004) (.004)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) . . -.125 -.125
(.012) (.012)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months . . .0004 .0005
(.0001) (.0001)
% Female Physicians First Six Months . . .095 .120
(.057) (.057)
% Group Physicians First Six Months . . .123 .103
(.104) (.105)
Coverage Start Month Dummies N Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix N N Y Y
State FEs N N N Y
Obs. 14312 14312 14312 14312
R2 .008 .016 .268 .279
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 where the outcome is the natural log-
arithm of the total submitted Part B charges for the beneficiary in the two years
following the initial six months of enrollment. Columns 1 through 4 account for an
increasing number of control variables.
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Table A.3: Females: Part B Procedures in Following Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Saw ABN in First Six Months .387 .377 -.009 -.016
(.025) (.025) (.022) (.022)
Black Beneficiary . -.083 -.039 -.073
(.044) (.037) (.038)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary . -.192 -.072 -.076
(.056) (.048) (.050)
Dual Eligible . .213 .053 .049
(.041) (.035) (.035)
Log(Mean Household Income) . .192 .171 .175
(.058) (.046) (.051)
Percent College Grad . -.001 -.005 -.00005
(.004) (.003) (.003)
Percent High School Grad . -.008 -.011 -.003
(.003) (.002) (.002)
Charlson Index . . .013 .013
(.004) (.004)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) . . -.217 -.217
(.020) (.020)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) . . .191 .205
(.028) (.028)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) . . .260 .247
(.027) (.027)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) . . .250 .247
(.013) (.013)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) . . -.011 -.011
(.004) (.004)
Log(Inpatient Charges) . . .024 .024
(.006) (.006)
Log(Outpatient Charges) . . .054 .056
(.003) (.003)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) . . -.075 -.075
(.007) (.007)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months . . .0002 .0002
(.00008) (.00008)
% Female Physicians First Six Months . . .036 .052
(.031) (.031)
% Group Physicians First Six Months . . .019 .012
(.059) (.059)
Coverage Start Month Dummies N Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix N N Y Y
State FEs N N N Y
Obs. 14312 14312 14312 14312
R2 .014 .021 .339 .349
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 where the outcome is the natural log-
arithm of the total number of Part B procedures for the beneficiary in the two years
following the initial six months of enrollment. Columns 1 through 4 account for an
increasing number of control variables.
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Table A.4: Females: Days with a Part B Claim in Following Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Saw ABN in First Six Months .307 .302 -.004 -.007
(.021) (.021) (.018) (.018)
Black Beneficiary . -.104 -.055 -.079
(.035) (.029) (.030)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary . -.182 -.061 -.072
(.045) (.038) (.039)
Dual Eligible . .197 .043 .041
(.033) (.028) (.028)
Log(Mean Household Income) . .147 .138 .122
(.046) (.036) (.040)
Percent College Grad . .0007 -.003 -.0005
(.003) (.002) (.002)
Percent High School Grad . -.003 -.006 -.002
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Charlson Index . . .011 .011
(.003) (.003)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) . . -.177 -.177
(.016) (.016)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) . . .366 .370
(.022) (.022)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) . . .062 .059
(.021) (.021)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) . . .192 .190
(.010) (.010)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) . . -.006 -.006
(.003) (.003)
Log(Inpatient Charges) . . .023 .024
(.005) (.005)
Log(Outpatient Charges) . . .050 .051
(.002) (.002)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) . . -.065 -.065
(.006) (.006)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months . . .0002 .0002
(.00006) (.00006)
% Female Physicians First Six Months . . .043 .052
(.025) (.025)
% Group Physicians First Six Months . . .020 .011
(.047) (.048)
Coverage Start Month Dummies N Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix N N Y Y
State FEs N N N Y
Obs. 14312 14312 14312 14312
R2 .013 .02 .366 .373
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 where the outcome is the natural log-
arithm of the total number of days that the beneficiary submitted Part B procedures
in the two years following the initial six months of enrollment. Columns 1 through 4
account for an increasing number of control variables.
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Table A.5: Females: Probability of Part B Visit in Following Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Saw ABN in First Six Months .026 .025 -.0004 .0002
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Black Beneficiary . -.014 -.008 -.009
(.007) (.007) (.007)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary . -.007 -.002 -.001
(.008) (.008) (.009)
Dual Eligible . .002 -.008 -.007
(.006) (.006) (.006)
Log(Mean Household Income) . .004 .003 .003
(.007) (.007) (.008)
Percent College Grad . .0002 -.0003 .0003
(.0005) (.0005) (.0005)
Percent High School Grad . -.0004 -.0009 .0001
(.0004) (.0003) (.0004)
Charlson Index . . -.002 -.001
(.0007) (.0007)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) . . -.034 -.035
(.004) (.004)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) . . .014 .016
(.005) (.005)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) . . .006 .005
(.005) (.005)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) . . .047 .047
(.003) (.003)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) . . -.0004 -.0003
(.0006) (.0006)
Log(Inpatient Charges) . . .0005 .0004
(.0008) (.0008)
Log(Outpatient Charges) . . .003 .003
(.0003) (.0003)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) . . -.005 -.005
(.001) (.001)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months . . .00003 .00004
(1.00e-05) (1.00e-05)
% Female Physicians First Six Months . . .013 .014
(.006) (.006)
% Group Physicians First Six Months . . .017 .020
(.010) (.010)
Coverage Start Month Dummies N Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix N N Y Y
State FEs N N N Y
Obs. 14312 14312 14312 14312
R2 .003 .004 .131 .143
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 where the outcome is a binary indicator
of whether the beneficiary had a Part B visit in the two years following the initial six
months of enrollment, making this a linear probability model. Columns 1 through 4
account for an increasing number of control variables.
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Table A.6: Females: Denied Part B Charges in Following Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Saw ABN in First Six Months .646 .582 .043 .028
(.055) (.054) (.055) (.055)
Black Beneficiary . -.076 -.011 .014
(.095) (.091) (.093)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary . -.067 .096 .021
(.113) (.109) (.113)
Dual Eligible . .153 .002 -.041
(.081) (.079) (.079)
Log(Mean Household Income) . .665 .598 .430
(.122) (.114) (.124)
Percent College Grad . -.018 -.021 .001
(.008) (.007) (.008)
Percent High School Grad . -.052 -.050 -.023
(.005) (.005) (.006)
Charlson Index . . .0009 -.002
(.011) (.011)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) . . .043 .018
(.044) (.045)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) . . .289 .307
(.067) (.067)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) . . .135 .150
(.061) (.061)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) . . .071 .066
(.026) (.026)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) . . .079 .074
(.010) (.010)
Log(Inpatient Charges) . . .044 .044
(.014) (.014)
Log(Outpatient Charges) . . .071 .073
(.008) (.008)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) . . -.091 -.093
(.017) (.017)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months . . .0002 .0003
(.0002) (.0002)
% Female Physicians First Six Months . . .122 .148
(.071) (.071)
% Group Physicians First Six Months . . -.053 -.140
(.144) (.143)
Coverage Start Month Dummies N Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix N N Y Y
State FEs N N N Y
Obs. 14312 14312 14312 14312
R2 .008 .031 .132 .146
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 where the outcome is the natural loga-
rithm of the total denied Part B charges for the beneficiary in the two years following
the initial six months of enrollment. Columns 1 through 4 account for an increasing
number of control variables.
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Table A.7: Females: Allowed Part B Amounts in Following Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Saw ABN in First Six Months .589 .573 .015 -.008
(.043) (.043) (.037) (.037)
Black Beneficiary . -.223 -.146 -.198
(.080) (.069) (.071)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary . -.246 -.079 -.100
(.099) (.087) (.092)
Dual Eligible . .300 .008 .007
(.073) (.063) (.064)
Log(Mean Household Income) . .296 .269 .260
(.100) (.079) (.090)
Percent College Grad . .006 -.005 .0009
(.006) (.005) (.005)
Percent High School Grad . -.003 -.012 -.002
(.004) (.003) (.004)
Charlson Index . . .009 .009
(.007) (.007)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) . . -.463 -.462
(.038) (.038)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) . . .216 .226
(.051) (.051)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) . . .117 .107
(.049) (.049)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) . . .781 .776
(.027) (.027)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) . . -.008 -.008
(.007) (.007)
Log(Inpatient Charges) . . .032 .033
(.010) (.010)
Log(Outpatient Charges) . . .097 .099
(.004) (.004)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) . . -.126 -.126
(.012) (.012)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months . . .0005 .0005
(.0001) (.0001)
% Female Physicians First Six Months . . .071 .093
(.056) (.056)
% Group Physicians First Six Months . . .090 .072
(.104) (.105)
Coverage Start Month Dummies N Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix N N Y Y
State FEs N N N Y
Obs. 14312 14312 14312 14312
R2 .01 .015 .36 .368
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 where the outcome is the natural loga-
rithm of the total allowed Part B amounts for the beneficiary in the two years following
the initial six months of enrollment. Columns 1 through 4 account for an increasing
number of control variables.
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Table A.8: Females: Part B Denied Procedures in Following Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Saw ABN in First Six Months .308 .285 .036 .027
(.024) (.024) (.024) (.023)
Black Beneficiary . -.002 .028 .032
(.038) (.035) (.035)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary . -.076 .002 -.022
(.045) (.042) (.043)
Dual Eligible . .076 .018 .003
(.032) (.031) (.031)
Log(Mean Household Income) . .277 .250 .193
(.052) (.048) (.052)
Percent College Grad . -.009 -.010 -.0007
(.003) (.003) (.003)
Percent High School Grad . -.019 -.019 -.007
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Charlson Index . . .004 .002
(.004) (.004)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) . . -.038 -.044
(.017) (.017)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) . . .108 .118
(.027) (.027)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) . . .137 .137
(.024) (.024)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) . . .021 .018
(.010) (.010)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) . . .038 .036
(.004) (.004)
Log(Inpatient Charges) . . .013 .012
(.006) (.006)
Log(Outpatient Charges) . . .027 .028
(.003) (.003)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) . . -.033 -.033
(.007) (.007)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months . . .0001 .0001
(.00007) (.00007)
% Female Physicians First Six Months . . .049 .061
(.028) (.028)
% Group Physicians First Six Months . . -.152 -.186
(.058) (.058)
Coverage Start Month Dummies N Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix N N Y Y
State FEs N N N Y
Obs. 14312 14312 14312 14312
R2 .012 .031 .159 .175
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 where the outcome is the natural loga-
rithm of the total number of denied Part B procedures for the beneficiary in the two
years following the initial six months of enrollment. Columns 1 through 4 account for
an increasing number of control variables.
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Table A.9: Females: Part B Allowed Procedures in Following Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Saw ABN in First Six Months .408 .399 -.008 -.017
(.027) (.027) (.023) (.023)
Black Beneficiary . -.129 -.080 -.123
(.048) (.039) (.041)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary . -.209 -.084 -.083
(.061) (.052) (.054)
Dual Eligible . .218 .039 .039
(.044) (.037) (.037)
Log(Mean Household Income) . .168 .152 .174
(.062) (.048) (.054)
Percent College Grad . .003 -.003 .00005
(.004) (.003) (.003)
Percent High School Grad . -.004 -.008 -.003
(.003) (.002) (.002)
Charlson Index . . .013 .013
(.004) (.004)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) . . -.284 -.283
(.021) (.021)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) . . .167 .181
(.029) (.029)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) . . .262 .246
(.028) (.028)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) . . .349 .346
(.014) (.014)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) . . -.018 -.018
(.004) (.004)
Log(Inpatient Charges) . . .024 .025
(.006) (.006)
Log(Outpatient Charges) . . .059 .061
(.003) (.003)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) . . -.080 -.080
(.007) (.007)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months . . .0003 .0003
(.00008) (.00008)
% Female Physicians First Six Months . . .030 .046
(.032) (.032)
% Group Physicians First Six Months . . .029 .029
(.061) (.061)
Coverage Start Month Dummies N Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix N N Y Y
State FEs N N N Y
Obs. 14312 14312 14312 14312
R2 .013 .019 .372 .38
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 where the outcome is the natural loga-
rithm of the total number of allowed Part B procedures for the beneficiary in the two
years following the initial six months of enrollment. Columns 1 through 4 account for
an increasing number of control variables.
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Table A.10: Females: Heterogeneity in Results by Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Saw ABN in First Six Months .978 -.749 2.246 1.113 -.032 1.661
(1.161) (1.702) (1.148) (.701) (.758) (.720)
Saw ABN  log(Median HH Income) -.092 .071 -.206 -.103 .005 -.154
(.107) (.155) (.106) (.064) (.069) (.066)
Black Beneficiary -.104 .014 -.196 -.073 .032 -.121
(.071) (.093) (.071) (.038) (.035) (.041)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary -.107 .022 -.101 -.077 -.022 -.085
(.088) (.113) (.092) (.050) (.043) (.054)
Dual Eligible .043 -.042 .008 .049 .003 .040
(.063) (.079) (.064) (.035) (.031) (.037)
Log(Mean Household Income) .304 .419 .294 .192 .192 .199
(.092) (.128) (.093) (.052) (.053) (.056)
Percent College Grad -.002 .001 .001 1.17e-06 -.0007 .0001
(.005) (.008) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Percent High School Grad -.007 -.023 -.002 -.003 -.007 -.003
(.004) (.006) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Charlson Index .008 -.002 .009 .013 .002 .013
(.007) (.011) (.007) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) -.226 .019 -.463 -.217 -.044 -.283
(.038) (.045) (.038) (.020) (.017) (.021)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) .286 .307 .227 .206 .118 .181
(.051) (.067) (.051) (.028) (.027) (.029)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) .096 .150 .107 .247 .137 .246
(.051) (.061) (.049) (.027) (.024) (.028)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) .489 .066 .776 .247 .018 .346
(.028) (.026) (.027) (.013) (.010) (.014)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) -.008 .074 -.008 -.011 .036 -.018
(.007) (.010) (.007) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Log(Inpatient Charges) .045 .044 .033 .024 .012 .025
(.010) (.014) (.010) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Log(Outpatient Charges) .099 .073 .100 .056 .028 .061
(.004) (.008) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) -.125 -.093 -.126 -.075 -.033 -.080
(.012) (.017) (.012) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months .0005 .0003 .0005 .0002 .0001 .0003
(.0001) (.0002) (.0001) (.00008) (.00007) (.00008)
% Female Physicians First Six Months .120 .148 .093 .052 .061 .047
(.057) (.071) (.056) (.031) (.028) (.032)
% Group Physicians First Six Months .105 -.141 .075 .014 -.186 .032
(.105) (.143) (.105) (.059) (.058) (.061)
Coverage Start Month Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 14312 14312 14312 14312 14312 14312
R2 .279 .146 .368 .349 .175 .38
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.2 with the interaction variable of inter-
est, Dm, being the median household income in the primary care service area of the
beneficiary. The outcomes of columns 1-3 are log(total charges), log(denied charges),
and log(allowed charges) for the following two years, respectively. The outcomes of
columns 4-6 are log(total procedures), log(denied procedures), and log(allowed proce-
dures) for the following two years respectively.
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Table A.11: Females: Heterogeneity in Results by Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Saw ABN in First Six Months .043 .048 .095 .035 .063 .050
(.084) (.129) (.081) (.050) (.057) (.052)
Saw ABN  Percent College Grad -.006 -.002 -.009 -.004 -.003 -.006
(.006) (.009) (.006) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Black Beneficiary -.104 .015 -.197 -.073 .033 -.122
(.071) (.093) (.071) (.038) (.035) (.041)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary -.107 .021 -.101 -.076 -.023 -.084
(.088) (.113) (.092) (.050) (.043) (.054)
Dual Eligible .042 -.041 .008 .049 .004 .039
(.063) (.079) (.064) (.035) (.031) (.037)
Log(Mean Household Income) .288 .430 .259 .175 .193 .173
(.088) (.124) (.089) (.051) (.052) (.054)
Percent College Grad -.0008 .001 .003 .0008 -.00007 .001
(.006) (.008) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Percent High School Grad -.007 -.023 -.002 -.003 -.007 -.003
(.004) (.006) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Charlson Index .008 -.002 .009 .013 .002 .013
(.007) (.011) (.007) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) -.226 .018 -.463 -.217 -.044 -.283
(.038) (.045) (.038) (.020) (.017) (.021)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) .286 .307 .227 .205 .118 .181
(.051) (.067) (.051) (.028) (.027) (.029)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) .096 .150 .107 .247 .137 .246
(.051) (.061) (.049) (.027) (.024) (.028)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) .489 .066 .776 .247 .018 .346
(.028) (.026) (.027) (.013) (.010) (.014)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) -.008 .074 -.008 -.011 .036 -.018
(.007) (.010) (.007) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Log(Inpatient Charges) .045 .044 .033 .024 .012 .025
(.010) (.014) (.010) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Log(Outpatient Charges) .099 .073 .100 .056 .028 .061
(.004) (.008) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) -.125 -.093 -.126 -.075 -.033 -.080
(.012) (.017) (.012) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months .0005 .0003 .0005 .0002 .0001 .0003
(.0001) (.0002) (.0001) (.00008) (.00007) (.00008)
% Female Physicians First Six Months .120 .148 .093 .052 .061 .046
(.057) (.071) (.056) (.031) (.028) (.032)
% Group Physicians First Six Months .103 -.140 .072 .012 -.185 .029
(.105) (.143) (.105) (.059) (.058) (.061)
Coverage Start Month Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 14312 14312 14312 14312 14312 14312
R2 .279 .146 .368 .349 .175 .38
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.2 with the interaction variable of interest,
Dm, being the percent of individuals that are college graduates in the primary care
service area of the beneficiary. The outcomes of columns 1-3 are log(total charges),
log(denied charges), and log(allowed charges) for the following two years, respectively.
The outcomes of columns 4-6 are log(total procedures), log(denied procedures), and
log(allowed procedures) for the following two years respectively.
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Table A.12: Females: Emergency Department Utilization in Following Two
Years
(1) (2) )
Saw ABN in First Six Months -.006 -.058
(.009) (.061)
Black Beneficiary .051 .387
(.013) (.094)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary -.033 -.300
(.017) (.122)
Dual Eligible .100 .831
(.013) (.092)
Log(Mean Household Income) .030 .255
(.017) (.125)
Percent College Grad -.002 -.013
(.001) (.008)
Percent High School Grad -.0005 -.008
(.0008) (.006)
Charlson Index .002 .021
(.002) (.012)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) -.011 -.071
(.006) (.042)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) .015 .135
(.010) (.067)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) .014 .098
(.009) (.062)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) .003 .018
(.003) (.022)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) .0008 .003
(.001) (.010)
Log(Inpatient Charges) .049 .377
(.002) (.017)
Log(Outpatient Charges) .091 .624
(.001) (.008)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) -.073 -.499
(.003) (.021)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months 1.00e-05 .0001
(.00002) (.0002)
% Female Physicians First Six Months .002 .024
(.010) (.072)
% Group Physicians First Six Months .051 .333
(.023) (.159)
Coverage Start Month Dummies Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix Y Y
State FEs Y Y
Obs. 14312 14312
R2 .366 .367
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 where the outcome of column 1 is a
binary indicator of whether the beneficiary had an emergency department (ED) visit
in the two years following the initial six months of enrollment. The outcome of column
2 is the natural logarithm of the total ED charges submitted in those same two years.
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Table A.13: Females: Heterogeneous Associations with ED Visits in Following Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Saw ABN in First Six Months -.310 -.012 -2.437 -.092
(.267) (.019) (1.882) (.133)
Saw ABN  log(Median HH Income) .028 . .218 .
(.024) (.173)
Saw ABN  Percent College Grad . .0005 . .003
(.001) (.010)
Black Beneficiary .051 .051 .385 .387
(.013) (.013) (.094) (.094)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary -.033 -.033 -.299 -.300
(.017) (.017) (.122) (.122)
Dual Eligible .100 .100 .829 .831
(.013) (.013) (.092) (.092)
Log(Mean Household Income) .025 .030 .219 .255
(.018) (.017) (.129) (.125)
Percent College Grad -.002 -.002 -.013 -.013
(.001) (.001) (.008) (.008)
Percent High School Grad -.0004 -.0005 -.008 -.008
(.0008) (.0008) (.006) (.006)
Charlson Index .002 .002 .021 .021
(.002) (.002) (.012) (.012)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) -.011 -.011 -.070 -.071
(.006) (.006) (.042) (.042)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) .015 .015 .135 .135
(.010) (.010) (.067) (.067)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) .014 .014 .098 .098
(.009) (.009) (.062) (.062)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) .003 .003 .018 .018
(.003) (.003) (.022) (.022)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) .0008 .0008 .003 .003
(.001) (.001) (.010) (.010)
Log(Inpatient Charges) .049 .049 .377 .377
(.002) (.002) (.017) (.017)
Log(Outpatient Charges) .091 .091 .624 .624
(.001) (.001) (.008) (.008)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) -.073 -.073 -.499 -.499
(.003) (.003) (.021) (.021)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months 1.00e-05 1.00e-05 .0001 .0001
(.00002) (.00002) (.0002) (.0002)
% Female Physicians First Six Months .002 .002 .024 .024
(.010) (.010) (.072) (.072)
% Group Physicians First Six Months .051 .051 .330 .333
(.023) (.023) (.159) (.159)
Coverage Start Month Dummies Y Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix Y Y Y Y
State FEs Y Y Y Y
Obs. 14312 14312 14312 14312
R2 .366 .366 .367 .367
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.2 where the outcomes are a binary indi-
cator of whether the beneficiary had an ED visit (columns 1 and 2) and the log(total
ED charges) (columns 3 and 4) in the two years following the initial six months of
enrollment. Column 1 and 3 present heterogeneity with respect to income and columns
2 and 4 present heterogeneity with respect to education level.
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Table A.14: Females: Associations for Experienced Beneficiaries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Saw ABN in First Six Months -.028 .029 -.003 -.0009 .013 .002
(.030) (.053) (.030) (.019) (.022) (.020)
Black Beneficiary -.217 -.066 -.308 -.164 -.027 -.215
(.055) (.085) (.057) (.033) (.034) (.035)
Non-White & Non-Black Beneficiary -.186 -.290 -.250 -.155 -.144 -.180
(.076) (.115) (.077) (.042) (.048) (.044)
Dual Eligible .072 .067 .025 .097 .083 .066
(.046) (.072) (.045) (.027) (.029) (.027)
Log(Mean Household Income) .181 .486 .188 .120 .197 .124
(.081) (.120) (.082) (.049) (.050) (.052)
Percent College Grad -.008 -.010 -.006 -.004 -.004 -.005
(.005) (.007) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Percent High School Grad -.009 -.024 -.006 -.006 -.010 -.005
(.004) (.006) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Charlson Index .022 .019 .020 .019 .010 .019
(.005) (.009) (.005) (.003) (.004) (.003)
Log(Part B Charges First Six Months) -.224 .008 -.566 -.254 -.045 -.358
(.034) (.044) (.032) (.018) (.017) (.018)
Log(Days with Part B Claim First Six Months) .127 .306 .065 .130 .075 .102
(.044) (.063) (.044) (.025) (.025) (.027)
Log(Part B Procedures First Six Months) .168 .243 .141 .325 .234 .303
(.043) (.060) (.041) (.024) (.024) (.025)
Log(Part B Allowed Amounts First Six Months) .487 -.015 .942 .266 -.017 .427
(.031) (.031) (.030) (.014) (.012) (.014)
Log(Part B Denied Charges First Six Months) -.014 .095 -.012 -.012 .038 -.018
(.005) (.009) (.006) (.003) (.004) (.004)
Log(Inpatient Charges) .030 .038 .024 .020 .017 .018
(.006) (.011) (.006) (.004) (.005) (.004)
Log(Outpatient Charges) .076 .064 .076 .046 .024 .050
(.003) (.007) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.002)
Log(Emergency Department Charges) -.079 -.084 -.080 -.056 -.035 -.059
(.008) (.015) (.008) (.005) (.006) (.006)
Average Experience of Physicians in First Six Months .0002 .0005 .0003 .0002 .0002 .0002
(.0001) (.0002) (.0001) (.00006) (.00007) (.00007)
% Female Physicians First Six Months .049 .087 .076 .019 .029 .035
(.051) (.073) (.050) (.029) (.028) (.030)
% Group Physicians First Six Months .290 .128 .333 .120 -.059 .169
(.086) (.135) (.089) (.052) (.056) (.055)
Coverage Start Month Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Physician Specialty Mix Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 15205 15205 15205 15205 15205 15205
R2 .306 .161 .427 .397 .203 .436
10%, 5%, 1% significance
This table presents the results of equation 3.1 when only beneficiaries who enrolled
in the first six months of 2002 are considered. The outcomes of columns 1-3 are
log(total charges), log(denied charges), and log(allowed charges) for the following two
years, respectively. The outcomes of columns 4-6 are log(total procedures), log(denied
procedures), and log(allowed procedures) for the following two years respectively.
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